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ABSTRACT
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) defines the estimate o f the difference 
between the federal income tax due each year and the amount voluntarily and timely paid 
as the “tax gap”. In 1981, the Service reports a tax gap of 81.5 billion dollars. In 2006, 
the most recent IRS data indicates that the tax gap has risen to 345 billion dollars which 
suggests that tax evasion in the United States remains a growing concern for the federal 
government. Although various economic and nonpecuniary theories have been developed 
to investigate tax noncompliance, Jackson and Milliron (1986) and Cruz et al. (2000) 
suggest that future research should investigate the importance of ideological factors.
Specifically, this study addresses questions concerning the importance o f religion 
and morality with respect to the ethical evaluation of tax evasion intentions. The 
respondents’ levels o f religiousness (i.e., intrinsic versus extrinsic), morality (i.e., 
postconventional reasoning), and ethicality are assessed to develop a structural model of 
the ideological factors of tax compliance. Primarily, the study finds that higher levels of 
intrinsic religiousness and postconventional morality are associated with higher 
evaluations that tax evasion is unethical. Also, increases in intrinsic religiousness are 
significantly associated with decreases in tax evasion intentions controlling for the effects 
o f ethicality. However, neither extrinsic religiousness nor postconventional morality is 
related to tax evasion intentions in light o f the ethical evaluations.
iv
This study’s results may be used by the IRS to introduce the ideological 
phenomena of religiousness, morality, and ethicality concerning the reduction of the tax
gap-
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The Internal Revenue Service (hereafter, IRS or Service) defines the estimate of 
the difference between the federal income tax due each year and the amount voluntarily 
and timely paid as the “tax gap” (IRS 2004). In 1981, the Service reports a tax gap of 
81.5 billion dollars (Tanzi 1986). In 2006, the most recent IRS data indicates that the tax 
gap has risen to 345 billion dollars which suggests that tax evasion in the United States 
remains a growing concern for the federal government (IRS 2011). There are two general 
schools of thought addressing the question, “why do some individuals evade their legal 
income tax obligation?” These competing yet complementary groups of theories are 
motivated by either economic or nonpecuniary concerns. The resulting conceptualizations 
have led to the inclusion of several tax compliance phenomena for the development o f tax 
research models and tax empirical analyses. Jackson and Milliron (1986) and Young 
(1994) delineate the following factors as important, but often inconclusive, determinants 
of tax evasion: (1) age, (2) sex, (3) level o f education, (4) level of income, (5) source of 
income, (6) occupation, (7) influence of peers, (8) social norms, (9) perceptions of 
fairness, (10) marginal tax rates, (11) complexity o f the tax system, (12) interpersonal 
sanctions, (13) party affiliation, (14) religion, and (15) other ideological factors. 
Interestingly, Jackson and Milliron (1986) suggest that future research
1
2
should investigate the importance of ideological factors which proposes changing the tax 
system to fit people rather than the converse. After outlining the various economic 
noncompliance tax factors and behavioral tax evasion phenomena addressing the question 
of income tax evasion, this chapter proceeds by introducing selected ideological elements 
that affect tax noncompliance.
Economic Theories
General Deterrence Theory (GDT)
Economists have developed models o f deterrence (i.e., GDT) to mitigate tax 
evasive intentions (Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Srinivasan 1973; Cowell 1985; Klepper 
and Nagin 1989). Collectively, these models assert propositions that income to be evaded 
is an optimum function of: (1) visibility o f income (i.e., probability o f detection), (2) 
level of penalty, (3) level of income, (4) tax rate structures, and (5) interactive effects. 
However, these models only assume underreporting o f taxable income without tax 
deduction overreporting. Furthermore, these conceptualizations impose a simple 
proportional tax rate structure rather than a progressive one.
Empirical research has uncovered some interesting findings. First, GDT research 
overwhelmingly finds that visibility o f income (i.e., third party reporting to the IRS) 
affects the likelihood of detection and is negatively correlated with admitted tax evasive 
behavior (Groves 1958, Mason and Calvin 1978; Madeo et al. 1987; Milliron and Toy 
1988; Buchheit et al. 2005; Gerxhani and Schram 2006; Aim and McKee 2006; Aim et 
al. 2009). This finding holds under cases o f varying detection rates by tax line item 
(Klepper and Nagin 1989; Martinez-Vazquez and Rider 2005). In fact, recent IRS data
3
indicates that approximately 55 percent o f the 197 billion dollar individual tax gap is 
from self-employed taxpayers’ understatement o f business receipts and/or overstatement 
of business deductions (IRS 2011). Self-employment earnings and deductions are not 
highly visible to the Service. Likewise, previous studies are inconclusive, but generally 
find that penalty level is negatively related to tax noncompliance (Mason and Calvin 
1984; Violette 1989; Carnes and Englebrecht 1995). Last, prior research is mixed 
concerning the income level o f taxpayer and the level o f tax rates, but both are primarily 
positively correlated with taxpayer noncompliant behavior (Srinivasan 1973; Spicer and 
Lundstedt 1976; Clotfelter 1983; Madeo et al. 1987; Aim et al. 1992; Aim and McKee 
2006; Aim et al. 2009). Madeo et al. (1987) and Clotfelter (1983) suggest that an 
unambiguous prediction could not be made for the main effects o f income level because 
of its interaction with source of income (i.e., opportunity). Furthermore, Madeo et al. 
(1987) also find an interactive effect between the tax rate structure and risk propensity.
Prospect Theory
Prospect theory posits that decisions under risk are inconsistent with the axioms 
of expected utility theory because individuals value potential gains and losses more than 
final asset states (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky 
and Kahneman 1992). Specifically, research finds that subjects are risk-adverse when 
experiencing pretax filing gain positions and risk-seeking during withholding loss 
situations. Furthermore, empirical studies find that individuals do not differentiate 
accurately when considering decisions involving small probabilities or experiencing 
subadditivity of decision weights (Jackson and Jones 1985; Dusenbury 1994; Reckers et 
al. 1994; Trivedi et al. 2003; Jackson and Hatfield 2005; Sanders et al. 2008; Boylan
4
2010). The previous finding may be significant for this study because tax evasion 
involves a minor chance (i.e., less than one percent) o f being caught for most taxpayers.
To summarize, economic theories support the explanatory power o f their primary 
propositions concerning evasive behaviors o f taxpayers, especially when taxpayer income 
is not reported to the IRS by third parties or when pre-filing frame (i.e., overpayment of 
tax or underpayment of tax) is salient for the taxpayer. Therefore, this study incorporates 
visibility of underreported taxable income and overreported tax deductions into its 
research design. Moreover, because of the extremely low likelihood of a tax audit for 
which Prospect Theory posits that taxpayers will overestimate the risk o f audit, the 
research question changes slightly from “why do some people not comply with tax laws” 
to “why don’t most self-employed individuals evade taxes?” Next, this chapter provides 
an overview of the various noneconomic behavioral theories to address this new question.
Noneconomic Theories
Fiscal Psychology Theory 
Fiscal psychology theory maintains that a taxpayer’s belief in the system’s 
fairness is more salient in alleviating noncompliance than the phenomenon posited by 
both GDT and Prospect Theory (Schmolders 1959). Previous research finds mixed results 
for the following Fiscal Policy Theory tax factors: (1) tax structure, (2) perceptions o f tax 
equity, (3) tax rate level and structure, and (4) complexity of the tax system (Mueller 
1963; Spicer and Lundstedt 1976; Song and Yarbrough 1978; Spicer and Becker 1980; 
Clotfelter 1983; Mason and Calvin 1984; Arrington and Reckers 1985; Milliron 1985; 
Long and Swingen 1987; Collins et al. 1992; Hite and Roberts 1992; Porcano and Price
1992; Forest and Sheffrin 2002; Feld and Frey 2007; McGee et al. 2008). This study 
evaluates hypotheses undergirded by the presumption that fairness and ethicality when 
interacting with morality and religiousness may affect tax evasion intentions.
Social Norms
In their seminal study concerning the social norms of taxation, Schwartz and 
Orleans (1967) find that conscience appeals are more effective than sanction threats. 
However, Violette (1989) finds that taxpayer evasive behavior is significantly influenced 
by formal legal sanctions rather than informal ones such as appeals to the conscience. 
Torgler (2002) finds that social and institutional factors matter even when holding GDT 
variables constant. This indicates that taxpayers have a more refined motivation structure 
than that assumed by traditional economic theory. Therefore, Aim (1999, p.32) indicates 
that researchers must consider the “full house” of theories to explain tax noncompliance.
Studies find conflicting results as to the saliency o f the following social norm 
factors: (1) guilt, (2) neutralization o f norms, (3) appeal to the conscience, and (4) 
internalization of norms (Scott and Grasmick 1981; Richards and Tittle 1981; Witte and 
Woodbury 1985; Hite 1988; Chung and Trivedi 2003; Wenzel 2004; Manly et al. 2005; 
Hasseldine et al. 2007; Bobek et al. 2007; Blanthome and Kaplan 2008). This study 
operationalizes fairness perceptions via the moral equity dimension of the 
Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) and internalization o f norms using the intrinsic 
religiousness measure of the Allport-Ross Religious Orientation Scale (ROS). Bobek et 
al. (2007) assess the role o f social norms in Australia, Singapore, and the U.S. and find 
that only in the U.S. was there significant correlation between social norms and 
compliance intentions. Therefore, in the U.S., paying taxes appears to be the social norm.
Furthermore, Rest (1986) indicates that most adults in the U.S. have a maintaining social 
norm level of moral reasoning and more than eight-five percent o f  this study’s subjects 
are U.S. citizens.
Theory o f  Planned Behavior
Because taxpayers must prepare and file an annual tax return themselves or solicit 
the services o f a tax preparer, tax evasion may be considered a planned behavior. Beck 
and Ajzen (1991) and others collectively posit that the central phenomena o f the Theory 
of Planned Behavior (TPB) are (1) intention to exert effort for individual behaviors, (2) 
attitudes about chosen behaviors, (3) social norm influences, (4) perceptions of 
behavioral control, and more recently (5) the impact o f  moral obligation. Moral 
obligation has been found to influence behavioral intent beyond that o f individual 
attitudes, perceived abilities, or societal norm concerns (Ajzen 1991; Bobek and Hatfield 
2003; Blanthome and Kaplan 2008).
Considering the extensions o f TPB to account for ethical and/or moral ideologies, 
this study employs explicit research methodologies to account for resulting interactions 
when measuring tax evasion intentions. Specifically, this study measures ethical 
evaluation via the MES and moral capacity using the Defining Issues Test (DIT 2) to 
determine tax compliance intentions. Both of these scales are discussed in the next 
section of this chapter.
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Ideological Philosophies
Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES)
Founded on a set o f normative philosophies, Reidenbach and Robin (R&R 1988, 
1990) find significant ethical dimensions for moral equity, relativism, and deontological 
based contractualism, but not for teleological based utilitarianism or egoism. R&R (1988, 
p. 877) say that the contractualism dimension “seems to suggest a more formalized set of 
rules and duties, perhaps based on family and religious training....” Their statement 
suggests an association between contractualism and religion for some respondents. The 
model’s dimensions remain valid while surveying business professions (R&R 1988, 
1990; Reidenbach et al. 1991; Flory et al. 1992; Cruz et al. 2000) and college students 
(Robin et al. 1996), but an additional dimension (i.e., teleological-utilitarianism) surfaces 
when surveying less conservative accounting students and accounting academics (Cohen 
et al. 1993) from the northeast region of the United States.
Empirically, Robin et al. (1996) not only assess the original six-dilemma Defining 
Issues Test (DIT 1), but also convert DIT 1 dilemmas into MES scenarios and find that 
the MES outperforms the DIT 1 in assessing ethical evaluations and behavioral intentions 
of the subjects. Moreover, Cohen et al. (1996) find that the MES is superior to the DIT in 
predicting the actions of accountants. While Weber (1996) welcomes the contributions of 
MES to the moral reasoning literature, he criticizes the research regarding its theory 
confusion, instrument confusion, and positive rather than normative conceptualizations. 
Nonetheless, he resolves that the MES is a compliment, not a replacement, to the DIT. 
More recently, Blanthome and Kaplan (2008) discover significant correlations between 
MES dimensions and tax compliance behavioral intent.
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Religious Orientation Scale 
Religion may be defined in terms of cognition (e.g., religious knowledge or 
belief), affect (e.g., emotion), and behavior (e.g., church affiliation, church attendance, 
Bible reading, or praying). In their study of churchgoers, Allport and Ross (1967) define 
four religious orientations: (1) intrinsics who live their religion, (2) extrinsics who use 
their religion for selfish motives, (3) indiscriminates who have both intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations, and (4) antireligious who are neither intrinsic nor extrinsic in nature. Their 
study indicates that, excluding antireligious people, intrinsics are the least prejudice 
concerning acceptance of minority groups, indiscriminates are most prejudice, and 
extrinsics are moderately prejudice.
With regard to reporting peer unethical behavior, Barnett et al. (1996) measure 
religiousness in unidimensional cognitive terms and ethical judgment via the MES (R&R 
1990). Their study finds that religiousness is negatively associated with relativism, but 
not associated with idealistic behavior such as that associated with the MES moral equity 
and contractualism dimensions. Concerning taxation and appeals to the conscience, 
Grasmick et al. (1991) find that threat o f shame for intrinsics is a stronger deterrent to tax 
evasion than embarrassment for extrinsics. Furthermore, Tittle and Welch (1983) find 
that religiousness predicts conformity to rules uniquely prohibited by religious 
institutions (e.g., tax evasion), but not necessarily to rules prohibited by society as a 
whole which reflects the idea o f normative dissensus o f deviant acts. Moreover, Tittle 
and Welch (1983, p. 662) state, “A multidimensional index of religiousness would have 
been desirable, but sufficient data to construct one were unavailable in the data set.” 
Last, previous research indicates that the DIT is not equivalent to various religiousness
9
measures in that they are either independent, inversely correlated, or connotatively 
conflictive (Kohlberg 1981: Getz 1984; Richards and Davison 1992). The DIT is 
discussed next.
Defining Issues Test (DIT)
Rest et al. (1999) asserts that Kohlberg’s core values o f cognitive moral 
development (CMD) consist o f (1) a cognitive emphasis, (2) an effortful construction of 
morality, (3) a developmental approach, (4) a shift in thinking, and (5) a macromorality 
concept. Within the context o f taxation, Kaplan et al. (1997) manipulate sanction type 
and find that tax evasion intentions are significantly lower for taxpayers who utilize 
relatively high levels o f moral reasoning (i.e., postconventional thinkers) regardless o f the 
level of perceived legal sanctions. In other words, this finding suggests that 
postconventional reasoners may not be affected by economic deterrent factors similar to 
that of individuals with lower levels o f moral capacity as measured by the DIT. 
Correspondingly, Troutman et al. (1995) assess student taxpayers and find that the DIT 1 
P-score is positively related to tax compliance through its determination o f taxpayers’ 
attitude concerning the fairness of the tax system. However, they determine that moral 
development is not directly related to tax compliance intentions. Furthermore, Trivedi et 
al. (2003) manipulate probability o f detection, social norms, and fairness covaried with 
moral reasoning and find that students’ moral reasoning is positively related to tax 
compliance. Moreover, student tax compliance is negatively affected by the level of their 
DIT 1 A-Score. This finding suggests that subjects who are highly anti-establishment or 
resistant to government have low intentions to comply with the tax system.
However, while administering the updated DIT (DIT 2), Shawver and Sennetti 
(2009) find that higher DIT 2 P-score students did not evaluate questionable accounting 
actions as more unethical than low DIT 2 P-score subjects. Moreover, the composite 
MES score better explains accounting students’ ethical choices and is unrelated to the 
DIT 2 P-score, indicating that the two measures quantify distinct constructs. Given these 
findings, this study evaluates the complementary aspects o f the DIT 2 and MES with 
respect to tax compliance intentions. Furthermore, the new DIT 2 measure (i.e., N2- 
score) is assessed in addition to the P-score and/or the A-score.
To summarize, this study combines several of the methodologies of the previously 
mentioned ideological studies. First, it incorporates the eight-item three-dimension MES 
to evaluate the ethical evaluation of tax evasion intentions (M&M 1988, 1990; Flory et al. 
1992; Henderson and Kaplan 2005). Second, the current study implements peer 
behavioral assessment to eliminate the “halo effect” or “social desirability bias” (Cohen 
et al. 1996) and extends the analysis to include subjective social norm evaluations. Third, 
Cruz et al. (2000) suggests that future research should investigate which is more 
significant, cognitive moral development or personal values, with respect to the 
evaluations o f ethical dilemmas and behavioral intentions. By incorporating scales for 
both measures (i.e., morality and religiousness, respectively), this study compares the 
predictability of moral reasoning and religiosity with respect to tax evasion intentions. 
Furthermore, this study assesses the complementary nature of the DIT 2 (i.e., morality) 
and the ROS (i.e., personal religious values) with the MES concerning tax evasion. 
Fourth, this study considers the interactive effects between the DIT 2 and MES constructs 
as suggested by Weber (1996). Fifth, the current research administers the DIT 2 to assess
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moral capacity as did Shawver and Sennetti (2009) and evaluates the study’s results using 
Structural Equations Modeling (SEM) which is similar to Henderson and Kaplan (2005). 
Sixth, consistent with Bamett et al. (1996), this study infers associations among 
religiousness and the moral equity, relativism, and contractualism dimensions o f the 
MES. Seventh, this study uses the ROS to address Tittle and Welch’s (1983) concern for 
the use o f a multidimensional measure o f religiousness to explain the effects o f religion 
on tax evasion (Gorsuch and McPherson 1989). Last, the association between the DIT 2 
and the ROS is evaluated for which prior research predicts or finds inconsistent results 
(Kohlberg 1981; Getz 1984; Richards and Davison 1992).
Research Questions and Findings
Cruz et al. (2000, p. 239) states, “ ...future research could investigate whether the 
effects o f personal characteristics such as cognitive moral development or personal 
values influence their deontological and teleological evaluations of ethical dilemmas, and 
whether those evaluations in turn influence ethical judgments and intentions.” Based on 
the previous statement, this study examined three complementary research questions. 
First, do personal religious beliefs matter with respect to the ethical evaluation o f tax 
evasion intentions? Similarly, the second question is whether moral capacity matters 
regarding the ethical evaluation of tax evasion intentions? The last inquiry considers 
interactive effects and questions whether cognitive moral development interacts with 
personal religious beliefs considering the ethical evaluation o f tax evasive practices?
Significant findings of the study are as follows. First, addressing the first two 
questions, the study finds that higher intrinsic religiousness and postconventional 
morality are associated with higher evaluations o f the moral equity dimension o f the
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MES, regardless of the type of hypothetical tax scenario (i.e., underreporting of income 
or overreporting of deductions). Second, with respect to the first question, higher 
extrinsic religious measures are related to lower assessments of moral equity and implied 
contracts as represented by the MES for the hypothetical income tax case and the 
combined scenarios, but not for the deduction instance. Third, also considering the first 
question, increases in intrinsicness are significantly associated with decreases in tax 
evasion intentions considering the effects of the MES dimensions. However, neither 
extrinsic religiousness nor postconventional moral reasoning is related to tax evasion 
intentions when accounting for MES dimensions. Last, in addition to finding moderate 
factor structure invariance for models combining religiousness with morality, R2s for 
these models are lower than all other models, especially for higher level postconventional 
reasoners.
Organization of the Study
In the next chapter, relevant economic and nonpecuniary literature, including 
ideological research streams, are reviewed. Moreover, hypotheses are developed and 
posited for the full model. In Chapter Three, the study’s experimental methodology is 
described including the subject types to be sampled, the instruments to be used for the 
requisite research tasks, and the statistical methods to be employed to validate the study’s 
results. Chapter Four reports the results of the analyses, and Chapter Five summarizes the 
study and discusses its limitations and extensions.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Overview
There are two general schools o f thought addressing the question, “why do some 
individuals evade their legal obligation to pay federal income taxes?” These competing, 
yet complementary, groups of theories are the economically based General Deterrence 
Theory (GDT) and Prospect Theory and behaviorally motivated theories such as Fiscal 
Psychology Theory, Equity Theory, and others. These conceptualizations have led to the 
inclusion of several tax compliance phenomena in the development o f tax research 
models and empirical tax studies. Jackson and Milliron (1986) and Young (1994) 
delineate the following factors as important, but inconclusive, determinants o f tax 
evasion: (1) age, (2) sex, (3) level o f education, (4) level o f income, (5) source of income, 
(6) occupation, (7) influence of peers, (8) social norms, (9) perceptions o f fairness, (10) 
marginal tax rates, (11) complexity o f the tax system, (12) interpersonal sanctions, (13) 
political affiliation, (14) religion, and (15) other ideological factors. Interestingly, 
Jackson and Milliron (1986) suggest that personal ideology may be an important 
noncompliance determinant which implies changing the tax system to fit taxpayers rather 
than the converse. After outlining the various economic noncompliance tax factors and 
behavioral tax evasion phenomena, this chapter proceeds to address the question of how
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ideological factors affect tax evasion intentions, for religiousness, for postconventional 




Becker (1968) develops an economic theory of crime and punishment which 
derives the optimal level o f expenditures for resources to assist law enforcement in not 
only apprehending and punishing offenders, but also deterring them from committing 
crime. This theory is grounded on the axioms of expected utility theory and the assertions 
of optimizing self-interested behavior. Ehrlich (1973) formalizes and tests general 
deterrence theory (GDT) within the context o f individual participation in illegal activities. 
The model assumes that those who violate certain laws differ systematically from those 
who abide by the same; however, both respond to economic incentives. Rather than 
resorting to hypotheses regarding unique personal characteristics and social conditions 
affecting respect for the law as did previous research, the model conceptualizes the extent 
to which illegal behavior can be explained by the effect o f opportunities given individual 
preference and self-interests. Since deviant behavior does not automatically provoke a 
penalty, but comes from the probability o f effortful patrol or surveillance, the model 
accounts for behavior under uncertainty. The study finds a deterrent effect of law- 
enforcement activity on all crime which mitigates the otherwise resulting social loss. 
Considering the widening of the tax gap, the study’s findings lend support for
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incorporating GDT to address the question, “why do some people evade their legal 
obligation to pay federal income taxes.”
Analytical GDT Tax Models 
Economists have developed models o f deterrence to mitigate tax evasion 
(Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Srinivasan 1973; Cowell 1985; Klepper and Nagin 1989). 
Collectively, these models assume that persons will submit an honest tax return only if  it 
is optimal for them to do so from a self-interested economic perspective.
First, of the GDT tax models included in this study, Srinivasan (1973) develops 
the least complex one. His conceptualization derives the optimum proportion of income 
to be understated as a function of (1) true income, (2) the probability o f detection, and (3) 
the penalty assessed on the understatement of taxable income. Furthermore, the penalty 
assessed for underreporting taxable income is determined by the level o f underreported 
income which indicates that there is perhaps an interactive relationship between these 
constructs (Madeo et al. 1987). The model posits a direct relationship between income 
level and tax noncompliance, but both likelihood of detection and penalty level should 
have an indirect correlation with tax evasive activities. Similar to the criminology models 
from which it precedes, Srinivasan’s (1973) model determines the optimal allocation of 
resources towards detection o f the criminal offense o f tax evasion. However, this less 
complex model holds annual income constant rather than varying it which is more 
consistent with the life-time income concept. It also assumes that all taxpayers comply at 
some level instead of accounting for a set o f non-filing taxpayers. Last, the model 
captures underreporting of taxable income, but ignores overreporting o f tax deductions 
which is another evasive tax practice.
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Second, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) develop a more dynamic model to 
examine various aspects of tax evasion. This model, like that o f Srinivasan (1973), is 
underpinned by criminology theory (Becker 1968), but also includes the finance theory of 
optimal portfolio investment. Their analytical model resolves issues that Srinivasan’s 
(1973) static model ignores, namely, the interrelationships that exist with other types of 
economic choices. Specifically, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model the opportunity to 
increase returns to cheating inherent in higher tax rates (i.e., higher tax rates yield higher 
incentives for tax evasion). The model also accounts for individual choices related to a 
sequence of annual tax declaration decisions similar to those of portfolio investment 
strategic decisions. However, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) do not structure the effect 
of nonfinancial penalties like jail sentences, but rather focus merely on pecuniary cost. 
Additionally, the model ignores the potential for dynamically determined court penalties 
which depend on the facts and circumstances surrounding those cases, but rather assumes 
functionally derived sanctions. Last, the model is simplified by considering a 
proportional rather than a progressive tax structure like that of the U.S. federal income 
tax system. The results o f their study indicate that accounting for static and dynamic 
aspects o f the decision to evade income taxes can allow for a more optimal design o f the 
U.S. federal income tax system.
Third, Cowell (1985) expands Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) GDT model of 
tax evasion to account for the tradeoff between legal income which is subject to 
withholding and illegitimate income which is difficult for governmental authorities to 
detect. This model also assumes that some would be taxpayers who earn illegal income 
will not file a return at all which addresses a weakness of previous conceptualizations.
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The study posits that taxpayers may divert their work efforts to areas not subject to 
withholding to avoid taxation. This may also help to explain the existence of and shifts to 
underground economies. Furthermore, their work suggests that an inefficient allocation of 
the macro labor market could result from taxpayers’ selection of this evasive tax strategy.
Last, Klepper and Nagin (1989) develop a tax noncompliance model motivated by 
previous research’s mixed results for both the penalty level and the income tax rate. This 
model is derived from Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) data. To 
account for the previously stated mixed results for penalty level, they incorporate 
nonmonetary penalties into their model and allow detection probability and penalty to be 
endogenously determined by tax line item. The resulting factors in their model include: 
(1) a flat tax structure, (2) detection probability endogenously determined by the audit 
rate of each tax line item, (3) penalties which include nonmonetary ones, (4) taxpayer risk 
neutrality, and (5) maximization of expected utility concepts. Because this model 
employs the use of line item tax effects, it may account for multiple modes of tax evasion 
activities between tax return line items. Contrary to Allingham and Sandmo (1972), their 
study does not identify a positive relationship between higher tax rates and tax 
noncompliance behavior. This suggests that perceived fairness in the income tax system 
as determined by tax rate structures may not be a resonant issue among taxpayers.
Empirical GDT Studies 
GDT assumes that individuals are economic utility maximizers who will evade 
taxes whenever the marginal benefits exceed the marginal costs o f tax noncompliance. 
The theory’s propositions have been the basis o f several individual taxpayer and 
professional tax preparer noncompliance studies, and the theory’s deterrent effects have
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been found significant (Mason and Calvin 1978; Mason and Calvin 1984; Madeo et al. 
1987; Violette 1989; Klepper and Nagin 1989; Reckers et al. 1991; Carnes and 
Englebrecht 1995; Martinez-Vazquez and Rider 2005; Buchheit et al. 2005; Aim et al. 
2009). GDT models (Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Srinivasan 1973; Cowell 1985; 
Klepper and Nagin 1989) collectively posit the following noncompliance factors and 
prior research finds mixed results concerning their saliency: (1) the likelihood of 
detection from the visibility o f tax information reported to the IRS, (2) the level of 
sanctions or penalties imposed on the taxpayer and/or tax preparer, and (3) the taxpayer’s 
level of taxable income.
Visibility of Income
Prior research overwhelmingly finds that visibility o f income via IRS third-party 
information reporting effects the likelihood of detection and is negatively correlated with 
admitted tax evasive behavior and/or tax noncompliance intentions (Groves 1958, Mason 
and Calvin 1978; Madeo et al. 1987; Milliron and Toy 1988; Martinez-Vazquez and 
Rider 2005; Buchheit et al. 2005; Gerxhani and Schram 2006; Aim and McKee 2006; 
Aim et al. 2009). In his seminal study, Groves (1958) investigates Wisconsin residential 
landlords and farmers and identifies income source as a significant influence of taxpayer 
noncompliance. Interestingly, the study documents less noncompliance for reporting 
fictitious deductions than for omitting income on the income tax returns selected. 
Motivated by Groves (1958), Mason and Calvin (1978) survey Oregon taxpayers and find 
that opportunity coupled with the probability of not being apprehended have the strongest 
correlation with admitted tax evasion. Additionally, Madeo et al. (1987), using a tax 
model derived from tax professionals, find that source of income is three times more
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important in predicting tax compliance than either the penalty level, the tax rate structure, 
or the taxpayer’s level of income. In their study, source of income serves as a proxy for 
visibility o f income to the Service. Furthermore, increases in the probability o f audit and 
information reporting are hypothesized and found to dissuade tax noncompliance 
(Milliron and Toy 1988).
In more recent studies, Buchheit et al. (2005) find that reduced detection risk 
caused by lower documentation requirements results in taxpayers overstating legal 
deductions for charitable contributions. Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005) find that 
increased enforcement effort (i.e., probability o f detection) in one mode of tax evasion 
has a net positive effect on tax compliance even though it has a negative effect on non­
targeted modes of tax evasion. This result supports Klepper and Nagin’s (1989) 
propositions delineated in their line item analytical model o f  tax evasion. Multiple modes 
of tax evasion by tax line item present a means for taxpayers to conceal income tax 
evasion efforts. Moreover, Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005) suggest, among other 
things, that the government need only increase income subject to third-party reporting by 
a small amount to exponentially increase tax compliance. Aim and McKee (2006) find 
that the increase in compliance for participants who have been informed that they will be 
audited is more than offset by the decrease in compliance for subjects who have been 
informed that they will not be audited. Gerxhani and Schram (2006) compare individuals’ 
tax evasive behaviors before and after a country’s transition from communism to 
capitalism. Their experiment indicates that subjects seem to choose a source o f income 
that takes the possibility o f tax evasion into account which can lead to an inefficient 
allocation of the labor market. These results may support Cowell’s (1985) tax model
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predictions of preferences for income that is not reported to the government to increase 
tax evasion opportunities and overall income. Last, Aim et al. (2009) conduct an 
experiment which manipulates the level o f earned income matched to recipients by the 
IRS and the probability o f audit. The study finds that higher unmatched earned income 
and lower audit probabilities lead to higher levels o f tax evasion. Aim et al. (2009) also 
find, as did Madeo et al. (1987), that the income source is overwhelmingly more 
important than other deterrence variables studied for predicting tax compliance.
Penalty Level
Prior research generally, but inconclusively, finds that the penalty level is 
negatively related to tax noncompliance as posited by GDT tax models (Mason and 
Calvin 1984; Violette 1989; Carnes and Englebrecht 1995). Mason and Calvin (1984), 
during their interview of adult taxpayers, find that sanction fear is a stronger incentive to 
obey tax laws than the taxpayers’ satisfaction with the tax system. Furthermore, in his 
experiment with adult night class students, Violette (1989) finds that communicating 
existing legal sanctions may increase tax compliance, but publicly listing tax violators, a 
noneconomic form of social stigma or guilt, does not reduce tax evasion. Previous studies 
set detection and penalty rates significantly higher than actual rates. However, even when 
penalty and detection rates are manipulated reflecting actual levels, Carnes and 
Englebrecht (1995) find that deterrent effects o f sanctions remain significant.
However, in their survey of Oregon residents, Mason and Calvin (1978) find that 
the deterrent effect o f penalties or sanctions seems uncertain concerning admitted evasion 
practices. Additionally, Madeo et al. (1987) derive a model based on responses from tax 
professionals and test it against IRS TCMP data from a period in which marginal tax
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rates are as high as seventy percent. Their study finds that increasing penalties are only an 
effective deterrent for steeply progressive income tax systems rather than moderately 
progressive or proportional tax systems. This result suggests that penalty sanctions are 
only necessary when the tax system is perceived to be unfair (i.e., steeply progressive tax 
rates).
Income Level
Prior studies primarily, but inconsistently, indicate that the level o f taxpayer’s 
income has a positive correlation with noncompliant behavior (Srinivasan 1973; Spicer 
and Lundstedt 1976; Clotfelter 1983; Madeo et al. 1987; Aim et al. 1992; Troutman et al. 
1995; Aim and McKee 2006; Aim et al. 2009). Initially, Srinivasan’s (1973) model posits 
this positive relationship between income level and tax noncompliance. Moreover, 
Clotfelter (1983) notes that an income level-tax evasion positive relation exists, but offers 
conjectures that high income taxpayers are less compliant simply because of the 
interaction with higher opportunities to evade or changes in risk propensities as income 
level increases. Similarly, when considering interactions with risk adverseness, Aim and 
McKee (2006) find that low- and middle-income taxpayers increased their reported 
taxable income when informed that they were likely to be audited, but higher-income 
taxpayers continue to underreport taxable income at a significant level. More recently, in 
their experiment with student subject which manipulated income visibility to the IRS, 
Aim et al. (2009) confirm the general relationship and find that higher earned income 
levels of subjects lead to higher levels o f tax evasion intentions.
However, some studies find either a negative correlation between level o f income 
and tax noncompliant behavior or no income level affect at all (Mason and Calvin 1978;
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Mason and Calvin 1984; Cowell 1985; Witte and Woodbury 1985; Madeo et al. 1987; 
Collins et al. 1992; Troutman et al. 1995). In their studies o f Oregon taxpayers, Mason 
and Calvin (1978, 1984) find a higher level o f  tax evasion for people with lower income 
levels (i.e., a negative correlation between income level and tax noncompliance). Also, 
Cowell (1985) tests his TCMP derived model and the results contradict Srinivasan’s 
(1973) model predictions in that Cowell (1985) does not find a significant relationship 
between the level of income and tax evasion practices. Troutman et al. (1995) find similar 
results in their survey of students. Witte and Woodbury (1985) find that middle-income 
taxpayers are most compliant and both low- and high-income level taxpayers are 
relatively noncompliant in comparison representing a curvilinear relationship. This 
nonlinear relationship between taxpayer income level and tax evasion behavior may 
account for the inconclusive results o f previous studies. As a result o f mixed previous 
results, Madeo et al. (1987) suggest that an unambiguous prediction could not be made 
for the main effects o f income level because o f its interaction with source o f income (i.e., 
opportunity). Furthermore, they are not able to posit hypotheses concerning the effects of 
the tax rate structure because of its interaction with income level and risk propensity. 
Additionally, Collins et al. (1992) find inconclusive results with regard to the correlation 
between income level and noncompliance behavior in their study o f households from the 
Southwest and the Northeast regions o f the United States.
A more recent archival study concerning the level o f  income sheds light on these 
mixed results. Johns and Slemrod (2010) use a newly available data source from the 
Service to assess the distributional consequences o f U.S. federal income tax 
noncompliance. Their study finds that the ratio o f aggregate misreported income to true
23
income generally increases with the level o f taxpayer income, but it peaks among 
taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes in the 99.0 to 99.5 percentiles. However, they find 
that the ratio o f underreported tax to true tax is highest for lower-income taxpayers. 
These mixed results indicate that income level is an area o f fruitful future research that 
may be clarified by behavioral theories. Moreover, the inconclusive findings concerning 
level o f taxpayer income suggests that researchers might include income level as a 
control variable in future studies.
Prospect Theory
Overview
Prospect theory posits that decision-making under risk is inconsistent with the 
axioms of expected utility theory in that individuals value potential marginal gains and 
losses rather than final asset states (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Prospect theory may address the risk 
propensity concern raised by prior research with respect to interactive effects. The utility 
function derived from Prospect Theory is concave for gains and convex for losses rather 
than linear. Specifically, subjects are risk-adverse for gain frame points o f reference and 
risk-seeking for loss vantage points which indicate that individuals have more disutility 
for losses than utility for gains.
Furthermore, individuals’ decision weight perceptions replace those of actual 
probabilities. Specifically, individuals do not differentiate accurately between small 
chance choices (i.e., subadditivity o f decision weights), but focus instead on magnitude of 
gamble which contradicts relevant axioms of expected utility. This idea is significant
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because the context of the tax evasion problem for many taxpayers involves minor 
chance of getting caught (e.g., less than one percent). The subadditivity o f decision 
weights caused by overestimating small detection probabilities may explain why many 
people do not evade taxes as often as expected utility theory and GDT predict. Moreover, 
people overweigh certain outcomes (i.e., certainty effect) for a definite amount o f taxes 
due compared with some probability that a greater amount will be paid because o f an 
additional penalty assessment if  caught evading taxes. To summarize, the concept of 
subadditivity o f decision weights posits that a very low or certain detection rate may 
cause taxpayers to reduce tax noncompliance more than expected utility theory predicts.
Empirical Studies
Empirical research grounded in Prospect Theory has explained the hypothesized 
effects of withholding frame reference points and very low audit detection rates 
concerning the subadditivity o f decision weights in light o f tax evasion (Jackson and 
Jones 1985; Dusenbury 1994; Reckers et al. 1994; Trivedi et al. 2003; Jackson and 
Hatfield 2005; Sanders et al. 2008; Boylan 2010).
Withholding Frame
Two early experimental studies investigate Prospect Theory’s assertions 
concerning withholding frame. First, Dusenbury (1994) observes experienced taxpayers 
and finds that subjects select riskier filing positions and report less income in payment 
due (i.e. loss frame) cases than in refund (i.e., gain frame) scenarios. Furthermore, 
participants select riskier options in a nontax loss frame context than in a tax loss frame 
environment indicating that subjects respond differently within tax settings as compared 
with nontax ones. Also, the study reveals that taxpayers with more filing experience
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preferred riskier filing positions than less experienced taxpayers in both the tax due and 
refund reference points. This finding suggests that there is a direct relationship between 
filing experience or perhaps age and tax noncompliance. Second, Reckers et al. (1994) 
manipulate tax rates (i.e., high and low) and withholding frame (i.e., refund or tax due) 
and find that subjects who do not view tax evasion as an ethical issue are influenced by 
framing as posited by Prospect Theory. However, when subjects are morally opposed to 
cheating on taxes in any amount, withholding position is irrelevant which is contrary to 
the tenets o f Prospect Theory. The results o f this study indicate that noneconomic factors 
based on psychology, sociology, and/or ideology may explain the inconsistent findings of 
prior tax compliance research.
In more recent studies, researchers uncover interesting findings. First, Trivedi et 
al. (2003) measure risk preference of participants and perform an experiment wherein the 
subject pay tax on an income endowment for which the recipient puts forth little or no 
effort to acquire. Their study finds a negative cause-effect relationship between risk- 
aversion and tax noncompliance. Complementarily, Boylan (2010) finds that when the 
taxpayer is given an income endowment, taxpayer compliance increases following an 
audit. However, when taxable income is earned and requires comparatively large 
amounts of time and energy to generate, taxpayer compliance decreases following an 
audit. If the reference point is after-tax income in Trivedi et al. (2003), then the 
respondent may believe that paying tax is a national duty (i.e., endowed income effect) 
and would be risk-averse concerning tax noncompliance. However, if the reference point 
is before-tax income, then the subject may believe that paying tax is a loss (i.e., earned 
income effect) and could be risk-seeking concerning tax evasive strategies.
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Next, Jackson and Hatfield’s (2005) experimental results indicate that taxpayers 
who owe additional taxes consider a pending conservative tax deduction as a threat of 
loss because their final state may still be a loss; whereas, those same taxpayers would 
view a pending aggressive tax deduction as an opportunity for gain. Conversely, 
taxpayers who are due a tax refund consider a pending conservative tax deduction as an 
opportunity for gain in that they are likely to retain their positive position. However, 
those same taxpayers would perceive a pending aggressive tax deduction as a threat of 
loss in light o f the potential cost associated with the probability of detection. With regard 
to the Jackson and Hatfield’s (2005) opportunity versus threat perspective, Sanders et al. 
(2008) perform an experiment among businesses and find that sanction manipulation is 
more effective among taxpayers in a declining revenue state (i.e., loss frame) than in an 
increasing revenue state (i.e., gain frame). Perhaps this finding stems from the idea that 
risk seeking loss frame taxpayers are more likely to evade taxes than risk adverse gain 
frame ones. This outcome partially supports Prospect Theory which asserts that subjects 
will be risk seeking for losses; however, this risky attitude is diminished when the 
taxpayer is made aware o f tax evasion sanctions (i.e., GDT effects).
Subadditivity of Decision Weights
Although most of the prior studies incorporating Prospect Theory to explain their 
findings are based on withholding frame concepts, an early experimental study of 
subadditivity o f decision weights highlights interesting results. Jackson and Jones (1985) 
compare the level o f detection risk with the magnitude o f the penalty level and determine 
that the penalty is more salient, especially when the probability o f occurrence is 
extremely low (i.e., when subadditivity o f decision weights exists). Moreover, consistent
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with Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), Jackson and Jones (1985) also find 
that those taxpayers are risk seekers for potential losses.
To summarize, economic theories generally, but inconclusively, support their 
primary propositions concerning evasive behaviors of taxpayers, especially when taxable 
income is not reported to the IRS by third parties or when pre-filing frame is salient for 
taxpayer. Therefore, this study incorporates visibility o f underreported taxable income 
and overreported tax deductions into its research design. Moreover, because of 
invisibility of some types of income (i.e., self-employment income) and the low 
likelihood of a tax audit for many taxpayers, the research question changes slightly from 
“why do some individuals evade their legal income tax obligation to pay income taxes” to 
“why don’t most individuals evade income taxes when their income is not visible to the 
Service?” Next, this study employs various noneconomic behavioral theories to address 
this significantly different question.
Fiscal Psychology Theory
Overview
Contrary to economic models o f tax evasion, Schmolders (1959) studies the 
motivational and emotional layers o f taxpayers’ minds in his development o f a theory of 
fiscal psychology. Soon after World War II, professional interviewers cross-examine a 
large sample of West Germans from all walks of life regarding their general tax- 
mindedness. The study finds that tax evasion is unfamiliar to most, and many believe that 
only businessmen and professions are able and willing to evade taxes (i.e., opportunity). 
This study also finds that tax resistance starts only after a certain threshold o f taxation has
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been surpassed. Fiscal psychology theory maintains that a taxpayer’s belief in the tax 
system’s fairness is more salient in alleviating noncompliance than the penalty structure 
and risk as posited by both GDT and Prospect Theory, respectively.
Empirical Studies
Studies grounded in Fiscal Psychology Theory hypothesize that decreasing the tax 
rate, the level of sanctions, and the probability of audit will increase tax compliance 
through improved taxpayer sentiment and tax system fairness perceptions. 
Comparatively, decreasing deductions permitted reduces perceived tax system 
complexity and is hypothesized to increases tax compliance (Porcano 1984, Milliron and 
Toy 1988). However, a decrease in allowed deductions for low- or middle-class taxpayers 
may be perceived as inequitable (Milliron 1985) and result in reduced tax compliance. 
Based on distributive justice to increase equity and to deter tax evasion, Porcano (1984) 
surveys graduate students and indicates that, from an equity perspective, taxpayer need 
and ability to pay are the most significant variables that should be utilized when 
formulating tax policies as opposed to self-interest motivations o f the taxpayer- 
government exchange. Also, the study finds support for the idea that negative tax is 
appropriate for low-income taxpayers, and respondents favor extending the earned 
income credit to this group of taxpayers whether they have dependents or not.
Milliron and Toy (1988) investigate seven key features o f tax compliance: (1) 
deductions permitted, (2) IRS information services, (3) information reporting, (4) 
preparer penalties, (5) taxpayer penalties, (6) probability o f audit, and (7) tax rates. Their 
study finds that CPA subjects considered reducing tax rates to be the most important 
feature for mitigating noncompliance. Furthermore, the study determines that subjects
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preferred an overall compliance system with a flatter tax structure that maintains or 
reduces the applicable penalty. These results are consistent with the propositions o f Fiscal 
Psychology Theory, which assert that the taxpayer’s belief in the tax system, not 
increasing penalties, is the solution for reducing evasive tax behavior (Song and 
Yarbrough 1978, Collins et al. 1992).
Song and Yarbrough (1978) conduct personal interviews with some subjects 
while others respond to a self-administered questionnaire to measure their general 
attitudes towards taxation. The study finds that North Carolina taxpayers in a college 
town are dissatisfied with the federal income tax burden placed by the government on the 
middle-class. Moreover, the study’s participants believe that the government provides 
unequal opportunities among taxpayers for reducing their individual tax burdens. 
However, most respondents have faith in the administrative efficiency o f the taxing 
authority, believe that they pay the same amount o f tax as others in similar situations, 
receive a similar benefit as taxes paid, and feel that people should pay taxes according to 
their ability. Collins et al. (1992) mail a random survey to households in the Southwest 
and the Northeast regions of the United States and evaluate the results o f a contingency 
model o f tax noncompliance. The study finds that return complexity, tax evasion 
opportunity, and tax system unfairness are significant and positively related to 
noncompliant tax behavior for all contingency subgroups. Their dependency model 
improves predictions compared with those of less dynamic models, but subgroups vary 
significantly making it difficult for the government to implement a single strategy to 
minimize tax evasive behavior. However, Arrington and Reckers (1985), in their pursuit 
to uncover a link between noneconomic factors and tax evasion, find that student
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subjects’ views regarding the equity o f national revenue and expenditure programs did 
not influence their responses concerning tax evasion. This result is contrary to the 
predictions of Fiscal Psychology Theory perhaps because there may be insufficient 
subject perception variation for students. Hence, student subjects may not be an 
appropriate surrogate for adult taxpayers when predicting tax evasion.
Based on the mixed results from the preceding discussion, the following Fiscal 
Policy Theory factors appear to be important: (1) fiscal policy and the tax system, (2) 
fairness perceptions, (3) tax rate level, and (4) tax system complexity. Next, this chapter 
addresses each of these factors in turn citing relevant empirical research as supporting 
evidence.
Fiscal Policy and the Tax System
In an early Fiscal Policy Theory study, Mueller (1963) interviews taxpayers and 
reports several significant outcomes. First, large majorities o f Americans have favorable 
attitudes toward a number of major government expenditure programs and did not favor 
less spending. Second, respondents exhibit a high level o f support for spending to help 
the elderly and the needy and to educate Americans, but little support for spending to 
help other countries, to support agriculture, or to explore space. Third, concerning 
government programs which subjects indicate should receive more spending, the list did 
not change much when asked whether they would pay more taxes to support the 
programs. Fourth, debt reduction is favored by many, but interestingly it has less priority 
in most people’s minds than the expansion of a number o f government programs. Fifth, 
when asked for their preferences o f money allocations if defense spending is reduced, 
most respondents favor spending more on other programs (i.e., welfare, public
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construction, education, etc.) rather than reducing debt or cutting taxes; however, 
wealthier individuals favor the latter. Sixth, contrary to intuition, upper income groups do 
not favor extension of government programs less than lower income groups, but upper 
income groups favor spending on different programs. Seventh, many people favor greater 
expenditures to programs from which they are not likely to reap direct personal benefit 
which contradicts exchange theory. Last, age differences are small, but people over fifty- 
five years of age prefer less government spending, lower taxes, and reduced budget 
deficits.
Fairness Perceptions
Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) conduct a survey and find that perceived inequities 
in the taxpayer-govemment exchange (i.e., exchange theory) and the number o f tax 
evaders known by the taxpayer (i.e., neutralization of social norms) are positively related 
to the likelihood of tax evasion. The results indicate that including psychological and 
sociological variables adds new and useful insights to the study of economic behavior for 
tax compliance. Specifically, perceived inequity, personally knows tax evader, and 
previously audited by the IRS are positively related to tax noncompliance intentions; 
whereas, age and income demographic variables are uncharacteristically negatively 
related. Furthermore, Lewis (1979) conducts interviews to measure different aspects of 
tax mentality and discovers several important findings concerning perceived tax fairness. 
First, people with higher incomes feel that legal tax avoidance is fair while those with 
lower incomes do not. Second, wealthy taxpayers do not believe that they have an unfair 
advantage because of loopholes; whereas, low-income earners belief the well-off have 
disproportionate opportunities for tax evasion. Third, people with higher incomes feel
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that small amounts o f tax evasion should be treated leniently, but lower income taxpayers 
do not. Fourth, in opposition to lower income earners, higher ones believe that the 
progressive tax system is unfair. Last, the relationship between taxation and services 
received through public expenditures (exchange theory) is not an important part o f tax 
mentality. In essence, the study’s results collectively suggest explanations for the 
generally positive relationship between level of income and tax evasion intentions despite 
the findings of Spicer and Lundstedt (1976).
Additionally, concerning fairness perceptions, Hite and Roberts (1992) conduct a 
survey to determine whether the Tax Reform Act o f 1986 was successful in improving 
public perceptions of fairness and economic growth as described by Adam Smith as 
factors o f an effective system o f taxation. The study finds that perceptions o f fairness, 
simplicity and helpfulness to the economy are negatively related to tax noncompliance. 
Furthermore, perceptions o f fairness better explained the participants’ reactions to tax 
system changes than did economic self-interest. Relatedly, Klepper and Nagin (1989) test 
an empirical model and find, among other things, that individuals with poor opportunities 
for noncompliance perceive the tax system as inequitable.
In two more recent studies, fairness is assessed referencing taxpayer-government 
behavioral relationships. First, Feld and Frey (2007) find that tax paying citizens are 
willing to honestly declare income even if  they do not receive a full public good 
equivalent in return for their tax payments as long as the political process is perceived to 
be fair and legitimate. Furthermore, friendly treatment o f taxpayers by the taxing 
authority in the tax audit processes reduces future tax noncompliance compared with 
more hostile treatment o f taxpayers. Second, McGee et al. (2008) survey university
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students from Hong Kong and the United States and find that ethical scores differ by 
country, but that the strongest arguments justifying tax evasion are in instances where the 
government is corrupt or where the tax system seems unfair. Conversely, the weakest 
arguments for validating tax evasive practices occur when taxpayers rationalize their 
actions based on their admitted selfish motivations.
Tax Rate Level
Compared with a control group, Spicer and Becker (1980) find that the percent of 
evasion is highest among those who are told that their tax rates are higher than average 
and noncompliance is lowest among those informed that their tax rates are lower than 
average. The study’s results support inequity theory which predicts that victims of 
inequity experience anger and evade taxes because they pay higher than average tax rates. 
Furthermore, inequity theory asserts that beneficiaries of inequity feel guilt and refrain 
from tax noncompliance which further explains why some would be taxpayer evaders 
comply with the tax system.
In an archival study using the IRS TCMP database, Clotfelter (1983) finds that 
taxpayers equate lower marginal tax rates with a fairer tax system. More importantly, 
perhaps because of this mental assessment, they decreased their level o f tax evasion 
intentions. This finding is significant because increasing marginal tax rates may drive 
more of the economy underground which has the potential to reduce tax revenue receipts 
and to widen the tax gap (Cowell 1985). Moreover, Porcano and Price (1992) survey 
taxpayers and tax preparers and find that practitioner perceived tax rate structures and 
constrained deductions as less fair than that o f the overall tax system which might 
contribute to tax preparer tax aggressiveness.
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Mason and Calvin (1984) interview adults responsible for keeping tax records and 
find that dissatisfied honest taxpayers are unwilling to employ noncompliance tactics to 
cope with feelings of inequity. Moreover, a higher proportion o f dissatisfied honest 
taxpayers compared with that o f dissatisfied dishonest taxpayers believe that people cheat 
because tax rates are too high. However, deterioration in public confidence in tax system 
is not associated with an increase in admitted income tax evasion, but may be in the long 
run if social norms concerning tax noncompliance are neutralized in the United States. 
Tax System Complexity
Milliron (1985) uses multidimensional scaling (MDS) for her exploratory study of 
tax complexity factors. The study finds that subjects view complexity and equity as 
inversely related features o f the tax system independent o f demographic and attitudinal 
control variables. Explicitly, four dimensions of tax complexity surfaced which include: 
(1) the nature of the topic, (2) the quantitativeness o f applying the tax law, (3) the 
vulnerability o f law to misuse, and (4) the readability o f  tax passage. The general 
perception across taxpayers is that simplifying the tax law is consistent with improving 
equity. However, efforts to improve fairness by refining tax laws to account for variations 
in personal and economic circumstances increases complexity. Similarly, Long and 
Swingen (1987) administer a questionnaire to professional tax preparers and use 
exploratory factor analysis to reveal factors o f tax complexity for selected tax return line 
items. The most salient of these complexity factors are (1) excessive details, (2) 
numerous calculations, (3) confusing forms, and (4) ambiguity.
From a different perspective, Porcano and Price (1992) survey taxpayer and tax 
preparers and find that they differ substantially in perceptions in that tax practitioners
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have a higher fairness rating for the overall tax system. Conversely, findings among 
taxpayers indicate that equity and complexity perceptions may have a major impact on 
their compliance behavior. Additionally, taxpayers only perceive taxing unemployment 
compensation as less fair than their assessment o f the overall tax system. Yet, both 
taxpayers and tax practitioners perceive providing relief to needy as a very fair criterion 
for assessing the tax system and consider equal treatment of taxpayers in similar 
situations as a judgment criterion most frequently linked to tax provision fairness. 
However, in a more recent study, Forest and Sheffrin (2002) find that simplifying the tax 
system may not be an effective deterrent to tax evasion because taxpayers do not 
necessarily consider a complex tax system as an unfair one which supports the conjecture 
of Milliron (1985). Furthermore, Pope and Mohdali (2010) give greater weight to 
ideological factors such as religiousness and spirituality in determining the extent to 
which people meet their legal tax obligations because of personal perceptions o f fairness.
This study posits hypotheses undergirded by the presumption that fairness and 
equity perceptions when interacting with moral capacity and religiousness may have a 
significant effect on tax evasion intentions. This idea is explored in more depth after a 
discussion of impact of social norms and the theory of planned or reasoned behavior.
Social Norms and the Theory of Planned Behavior
Social Norms Overview 
In their seminal study concerning the payment o f federal income taxes, Schwartz 
and Orleans (1967) perform an experiment to compare the effectiveness o f sanctions with 
that of appeals to the conscience. They find that conscience appeals are more effective
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than sanction threats perhaps because those appeals induce a moralistic attitude towards 
tax compliance. However, the tax evasion effect for conscience appeals and sanction 
threats are both significantly different from that o f the control group indicating that each 
possesses explanatory power. Moreover, conscience appeals seem to produce less social 
loss through resistance which may be caused by the taxpayer’s sense of civic 
responsibility compared with that o f the threat o f punishment. In opposition to the 
findings of Schwartz and Orleans (1967), Violette (1989) conducts an experiment 
manipulating sanction communication type from formal (i.e., legal penalty threats) to 
informal (i.e., guilt and appeal to conscience) and finds that taxpayer evasive behavior is 
not affected by informal sanction communication, but significantly minimized via formal 
legal sanctions. This result suggests that formal penalties may increase taxpayers’ 
perceptions o f the likelihood of getting caught or other deterrent phenomenon.
To assess the impact o f social norms on tax morale and tax evasive behavior, 
Torgler (2002), in his descriptive review of prior literature, defines social norms as 
consisting of prescribed behaviors which must be shared by other people and sustained 
by others’ approval or disapproval through the informal social sanction of reciprocity. 
The study finds that individuals who comply tend to view tax evasion as immoral. In 
societies, like the United States, which have a strong sense o f social cohesion, tax 
compliance may be higher if a moral or social appeal is made to the taxpayer rather than 
an economic threat. However, individuals with tax evaders as friends are more likely to 
not comply themselves because their social norms have been neutralized. Overall, the 
study finds that holding GDT influences constant, social and institutional factors matter. 
This indicates that taxpayers have a more refined motivation structure than that assumed
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by traditional economic theory; therefore, researchers must consider the “full house” of 
theories to explain tax noncompliance (Aim 1999, p. 32).
Social Norm Empirical Studies 
In light o f the previously discussed literature, the following social norm factors 
appear salient: (1) Guilt, (2) Neutralization of Norms, (3) Appeal to Conscience, and (4) 
Internalization of Norms. This study describes these factors in ascending order of 
commitment to the maintenance of social norms with guilt referencing the weak-end and 
internalized norms anchoring the strong-end o f the continuum. Next, this section 
addresses each of these factors, in turn, citing relevant empirical research as supporting 
evidence.
Guilt
Scott and Grasmick (1981) develop and test an analytical model o f utilitarian 
cost-benefit theory with respect to tax noncompliant behavior. On one hand, the study 
finds that, at high levels o f inhibition caused by the threat o f legal sanctions, injustice 
motivations are not strongly related to noncompliance behavior. Specifically, individuals 
who are outraged about social injustice are inhibited from tax evasive behavior because 
of pecuniary perceptions. On the other hand, at a low level o f  inhibition because of mere 
guilt feelings, a significant relationship occurs between injustice motivation and 
noncompliance behavior. Furthermore, in the absence of inhibition from legal sanctions 
or guilt feelings, higher social injustice motivation is related to a greater likelihood of 
noncompliant tax behavior. These results suggest that feelings of guilt interact with social 
injustice perceptions to cause tax noncompliance only when the threat o f penalty is low.
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One’s peers could provide motivation to comply with tax laws if feelings o f guilt 
or reciprocity deter tax noncompliance. However, if taxpayers’ peers are tax evasive 
themselves, then taxpayers’ social norms concerning tax compliance may be neutralized 
which could cause them to evade taxes. In light o f peer influence, Witte and Woodbury 
(1985) derive an empirical model from actual tax return data and find higher rates of 
evasion when the taxpayer’s community and peer groups are noncompliant. However, 
Hite (1988) conducts an experiment using prospective jurors and discovers that peer 
compliance-noncompliance experimental manipulations do not directly affect self- 
reported tax evasion intentions. These mixed findings indicate the need to conduct future 
studies to determine the effectiveness o f guilt for mitigating tax noncompliance intentions 
as it relates to social norms.
Appeals to the Conscience
Given the inconclusive prior research results for appeals to the conscience, Chung 
and Trivedi (2003) measure the effect o f friendly persuasion and gender on tax evasion 
intentions. The researchers have participants in the friendly persuasion group first 
generate and then read a list o f reasons why they should comply with the tax laws. The 
study contributes two significant results to the literature. First, consistent with previous 
research, the authors find that women are less tax evasive than men. The second result is 
much more interesting. Women in the friendly persuasion group report significantly 
higher amounts o f income compared with that o f men in the same group; however, there 
is not a significant difference in tax evasion intentions in the control group of men and 
women. These findings indicate that appeals to conscience may have a positive effect on 
income tax compliance, especially for women.
39
In an effort to evaluate tax non-filers’ motivations to complete their returns 
through amnesty programs, Manly et al. (2005) assess respondents reactions to 
enforcement efforts through federal-state data sharing programs. These efforts emphasize 
deterrence through the threat o f income visibility to the IRS and friendly persuasion 
through tax amnesty communications which accentuate social norms. The study finds that 
tax amnesty programs encourage taxpayers who want to avoid penalties and feel morally 
or socially obligated to pay taxes; whereas, letters from data-sharing programs increase 
amnesty participation by self-employed and higher income taxpayers. These results 
indicate that both enforcement measures (i.e., data sharing program letters) and outreach 
efforts (i.e., amnesty programs) may be effective means of capturing non-filers because 
these methods appealed to different types of taxpayers. Furthermore, federal-state data 
sharing programs attract compliance from two types o f taxpayers for which previous 
research suggests are highly evasive: the self-employed and the wealthy. In a more recent 
study, Hasseldine et al. (2007) manipulate type o f appeal at five levels on a continuum 
from normative appeal to sanction appeal to test the actual evasive behavior o f self- 
prepared and paid-preparer sole proprietors in the United Kingdom. The study finds that 
taxpayers reported increases in gross revenues and net income after receipt o f  the 
normative appeal or sanction appeal. Interestingly, the researchers find that the sanction 
letters are generally more effective than the normative citizenship appeal letters for 




In their study of adults in the United States, Richards and Tittle (1981) find that 
women perceive tax noncompliance detection risk higher than do men. Specifically, 
women perceive tax noncompliance of others lower than do men indicating that men’s 
social norms are probably neutralized more than that o f women. Hence, males are more 
noncompliant than females; however, women are closing this tax evasion gap via an 
apparent neutralization of their social norms. Moreover, this effect has seemingly 
occurred over time perhaps not only due to women’s perceptions of others’ tax 
compliance, but also potentially interacting with their changing role in society. 
Internalization of Norms
Wenzel (2004) investigates the moderating and mediating effects of personal and 
social norms on GDT. Schmolders’ (1959) argument that research needs to incorporate 
noneconomic factors such as norms, fairness, and morality in order to better understand 
tax compliance, rather than mere economic self-interest as posited by GDT, motivates 
this study. Wenzel (2004) and other studies measure personal norms, social norms, and 
ethical beliefs and find that internalized norms of tax honesty and ethics moderate the 
effects of GDT concerning the underreporting o f taxable income (Reckers et al. 1994, 
Blanthome and Kaplan 2008). This suggests that the deterrent effects o f GDT only occur 
when individual ethics are relatively weak.
Bobek et al. (2007) define social norms as rules and standards that are understood 
by members of group that guide and/or constrain social behavior without the force o f law. 
Moreover, social norms are categorized on a continuum from more general societal 
influences to more personal influences or internalized norms. First, beginning on the
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more general end of this spectrum, descriptive norms are casually observed standards of 
others’ behavior. Next, injunctive norms specify individual behavior with respect to 
group expectations. Following injunctive norms, subjective norms relate to expectations 
of referent others (e.g., family and friends). Last, personal norms are one’s self-based 
standards or internalized expectations o f appropriate behavior. Bobek et al. (2007) find 
that internalized personal and subjective norms are more important than descriptive and 
injunctive norms for explaining subjects’ tax noncompliance intentions. Furthermore, 
descriptive norms are not found to be significantly related to the subject’s tax evasion 
intentions under any circumstance.
Since studies find mixed results for the effect o f guilt, neutralization o f norms, 
appeal to conscience, and internalization o f social norms as predictors o f tax 
noncompliant behavior, future research should address this concern. It appears that these 
studies measure norms and fairness by means that are not well tested in the literature. 
Therefore, this study assesses fairness and equity using the Multidimensional Ethics 
Scale (MES) as it assesses the likelihood of taxpayer noncompliance. Furthermore, this 
study measures the internalization of religious beliefs based on the intrinsic and extrinsic 
orthogonal measures of the Religious Orientation Scale (ROS). Internalization of moral 
beliefs is measured based on the level o f postconventional reasoning as assessed by the 
Defining Issues Test (DIT 2). Moreover, subjective norms and peer influences are 
considered while assessing the likelihood of tax evasion intentions.
Theory o f  Planned Behavior Overview 
Ajzen (1991) and Beck and Ajzen (1991) posit that the central phenomenon o f the 
Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) is the intention of an individual to exert effort for
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given behavior. TPB extends the Theory of Reasoned Action which asserts that the 
determinants o f the intention to put forth effort are the evaluations o f alternative 
behaviors (i.e., opportunities) and subjective social norms (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977). In 
addition to behavioral evaluations and social norms as precursors o f intentions, TPB 
posits that behavioral control or the relative ease or difficulty o f overcoming past or 
anticipated obstacles is a significant predictor o f behavioral intentions. The theory 
predicts that more favorable behavioral attitudes, higher levels of subjective norms, and 
greater perceived behavioral control, result in a stronger intention to perform the behavior 
in question. Hence, intention depends on a person’s real or perceived access to resources, 
his or her assumed ability, and one’s supposed cooperation of others to determine the 
probability of successful completion of the desired outcome or behavior.
Reckers et al. (1994, p. 826) states, “ ...prior research (investigating tax rate 
effects and/or prospect theory’s framing effects) has been inconclusive in that the moral 
beliefs o f some subjects may have overridden other factors affecting tax compliance.” 
Considering the interactive effects of morality, Bobek and Hatfield (2003) extend TPB. 
Moral orientation is expected to be an important determinant of behavioral intent beyond 
the influences of the individual’s behavioral attitudes, abilities, and/or societal norm 
concerns. The results of this and other studies are discussed in the next sections.
TPB Empirical Studies
Non-Taxation Study
In their empirical study of students concerning cheating, stealing, and lying, Beck 
and Ajzen (1991) find that TPB predicts deviant intentions with a high degree of 
accuracy and with moderate success foretells actual behavior. Furthermore, TPB is more
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successful in predicting cheating than shoplifting or lying perhaps because their 
participants had more experience cheating or maybe because shoplifting and lying come 
more impulsively rather than as planned actions. Regardless, adding perceived moral 
obligations to the prediction equation improves the theory’s ability to explain subjects’ 
lying behaviors, but does not help predictions for deviant acts of cheating or shoplifting. 
Because TPB is more successful in predicting cheating than other behaviors, the theory’s 
constructs may be significantly associated with tax evasion intentions.
Taxation Studies
Bobek and Hatfield (2003) first determine the beliefs that underlie taxpayers’ 
attitudes and then ask subjects to respond to three tax compliance scenarios. This study 
has several interesting findings. First, the model which includes moral obligation, 
measured by the perceived moral wrongness o f the action, significantly explains tax 
noncompliance in all of the scenarios evaluated. Second, if moral obligation is low, 
almost all of subjects cheat. Third, when moral obligation is very high, a significant 
amount o f cheating still occurred which is contrary to the finding of Reckers et al. (1994). 
This finding suggests that interaction effects of moral obligation, possibly with fairness 
perceptions, appear to be more complex than originally hypothesized. Fourth, virtually no 
cheating occurs only when moral obligation is high and perceived behavioral control (i.e., 
opportunity) is reduced but not completely eliminated. Fifth, guilt and concern for 
legality o f behavior directly relate to tax compliance intentions, and the informal concern 
for illegality is greater than that o f formally incurring a legal penalty which contradicts 
Violette (1989). Last, taxpayers’ attitudes and perceived social pressures are influential in
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all scenarios. The study suggests that social influences and perceived behavioral control 
may improve voluntary compliance more than ethical beliefs and moral obligation.
In their survey of mostly flea-market vendors, Blanthome and Kaplan (2008) 
uncover several interesting results concerning the relationship among opportunity, social 
norms, and ethical behavior concerning self-reported tax noncompliance behavior and 
hypothetical tax evasion intentions. First, the study indicates that ethics partially mediates 
the relationship between opportunity and self-underreporting behavior. Specifically, 
taxpayers with high opportunity to underreport income judge underreporting to be less 
unethical than those with low opportunity to underreport income which is consistent with 
previous research (Schmolders 1959; Lewis 1979). Moreover, beliefs that underreporting 
income is unethical are negatively associated with self-reported noncompliant tax 
behavior. Furthermore, controlling for ethical beliefs, opportunity has a significant 
positive relationship with taxpayers’ self-underreporting tax behavior. Second, ethics
partially mediates the opportunity-behavioral intention relationship. Explicitly,
underreporting ethics is negatively associated with underreporting intentions at a similar
magnitude as self-underreporting tax behavior. Moreover, controlling for ethical beliefs, 
there is a direct relationship between opportunity and underreporting intentions but 
weaker than that of self-underreporting behavior. Last, ethical beliefs fully mediate the 
social norm-tax behavior relationship. More precisely, social norms have a significant 
direct relationship with underreporting ethics; however, controlling for ethics, the 
relationship between social norms and self-underreporting behavior is not significant. 
This result indicates that individuals internalize social norms which indirectly affect tax 
evasion intentions and actual underreporting decisions. However, contrary to
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expectations, taxpayers with a high opportunity to underreport income do not judge social 
norms for underreporting less unethical than those with a low opportunity for tax evasion.
Considering TPB for ethical and moral interactions of taxpayers, this study 
employs explicit research methodologies to account for these interactions when 
measuring tax evasion intentions. Specifically, this study measures the ethical evaluation 
of tax evasion intentions via the MES which is discussed in the next section o f this 
chapter. Also, this study assesses moral capacity using the Defining Issues Test (DIT 2) 
which is discussed in a later section of this chapter.
Ethical Evaluation
As the prior sections o f this study have indicated, internalized personal norms are 
powerful predictors and/or moderators o f tax evasion intentions. Specifically, there 
appears to be a negative relationship between personal norms and tax noncompliance. 
After considering the effects o f ethical evaluation, the remainder o f this chapter outlines 
the relationships between personal norms as indicated by religious orientations and moral 
capacity as they relate to the ethical evaluation o f tax evasion intentions.
Multidimensional Ethics Scale
In an initial development o f their model o f ethical behavior founded on normative 
philosophies o f deontology, utilitarian teleology, egoist teleology, relativism, and justice, 
Reidenbach and Robin (R&R 1988) survey students in a basic marketing course. Subjects 
are provided contextual stimuli to evoke their ethical evaluation processes. The 
Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) investigates not only one’s detailed ethical beliefs, 
but also one’s reasons for his or her beliefs. The subjects assess the probability that they
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would act in the same manner as the person in the hypothetical unethical scenario after 
rating twenty-nine items associated with the aforementioned normative philosophies. The 
study’s significant factors satisfy the tests o f consistency and reliability normally 
performed to validate similar scales and result in an eight item instrument with three 
independent dimensions. The subsequent dimensions are justice based moral equity, 
contextual based relativism, and deontological based contractualism. Factors grounded in 
teleological-utilitarianism, which focus on societal cost-benefits, and teleological-egoism, 
which measure selfish motivations, prove not to be significant. To summarize, 
individuals tend to rely on a broad sense of moral equity dominated by concerns for 
fairness and justice, tempered by relativistic behaviors and implied social contract 
deontological ideas. However, results do not support the contention that individuals are 
affected by the consequences o f teleology.
Furthermore, no one philosophy is assumed for ethical evaluation and decision­
making. Rest et al. (1999) suggests that individuals mature from personal interest 
thinking to society maintaining and postconventional moral reasoning. Postconventional 
thinkers are concerned about maintaining an ideal societal structure for all members o f a 
community which must be open to scrutiny. The dominance of the ideas o f fairness and 
justice in the moral equity dimension of the MES is rooted in Kohlbergian and Neo- 
Kohlbergian notions that these concepts are involved in all ethical decision-making 
regardless o f the individual’s stage of moral development. Interestingly, R&R (1988, p. 
877) say that the contractualism dimension “seems to suggest a more formalized set of 
rules and duties, perhaps based on family and religious training....” Their statement
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suggests an association between contractualism and religious orientation for some 
respondents.
Moreover, the model is tested surveying business professions (R&$ 1990), retail 
marketing professionals (Reidenbach et al. 1991), and business and nonbusiness students 
in a basic economics course (Robin et al. 1996). R&R (1990) find that the 
multidimensional scale is a significantly better predictor for most unethical scenarios 
compared with univariate measures o f ethicality. In addition to subjects assessing their 
likelihood of making the same decision as the protagonist in the scenario, the respondents 
evaluate the probability that their peers would make such a judgment. This method of 
evaluation minimizes the bias often evident in self-reports o f deviant behavior (i.e., the 
“halo effect” which asserts that respondents evaluate themselves more favorably than 
actual) and incorporates the concept o f  subjective social norms of referent others. R&R 
(1990) suggest that the moral equity dimension focuses on the inherent fairness, justice, 
goodness, and rightness o f decisions. The relativistic dimension seems to indicate that 
societal and cultural guidelines define our ethical beliefs rather than individual concerns. 
Furthermore, R&R (1990) indicate that the moral equity dimension may be defined by 
the broad relativism dimension in that each dimension has overlapping items o f differing 
moral philosophies. Last, the contractualism dimension is purely deontological and 
incorporates the idea of implied social contracts with institutions and society including 
implicit notions of fair play and truth telling. R&R (1991) find that the three dimensions 
remain significant for most of their experimental trials; however, a few trials indicate that 
moral equity and relativism combine into one large dimension while contractualism 
remains independent.
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In addition to administering the MES, Robin et al. (1996) not only assess the 
original six-dilemma Defining Issues Test (DIT 1), but also convert the DIT 1 dilemmas 
into MES-like scenarios to compare students’ evaluations o f the contextual differences of 
the settings. Two DIT 1 scores are assessed in this study: the P-score and the U-score. 
Briefly, the P-score measures the percentage o f moral thinking at the highest moral 
reasoning stages (i.e., postconventional morality) and the U-score evaluates the 
utilization of moral reasoning in the decision making process. It appears that DIT 
scenarios are direct, single issue stories about a potentially unethical situation and contain 
few complexities; while the MES scenarios offer alternative problems and possible 
rationalizations for acting unethically. Presumably because cognitive moral development 
(CMD) measures (i.e., the P-score and the U-score) are designed to measure moral 
cognition rather than behavior, the MES outperforms the DIT 1 in assessing the subjects’ 
ethical evaluation and behavioral intent. Specifically, the moral equity dimension is most 
significant, but both the relativism and contractualism factors of the MES individually 
outperform the CMD measures. Furthermore, the MES outperforms the DIT 1 even when 
predicting the behavioral intentions of the DIT 1 scenarios.
MES Empirical Studies
Non-Taxation Studies
Since R&R (1988, 1990) survey marketing student and marketing professional 
subjects from conservative Southern states, Cohen et al. (1993) question the 
generalizability of the study’s results. Cohen et al. (1993) replicate R&R’s (1988, 1990) 
study substituting more liberal Northeastern state participants for the more conservative 
Southern ones. Like that o f R&R (1988, 1990), the study finds that the multivariate scale
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has better explanatory power than univariate ethics measure for the marketing scenarios; 
however, the finding does not persist for accounting contextual scenarios. Furthermore, 
the teleological-utilitarian construct which relates to a “cost-benefit” or a “greater good” 
approach to ethical evaluation emerged for more conservative accounting academics 
evaluating accounting scenarios, somewhat contradicting R&R (1988, 1990). This 
finding suggests that since cost-benefit analysis is the cornerstone o f accounting decision 
making, the utilitarian dimension may be important for accounting academics and not 
marketing academics.
However, in their national questionnaire o f accountants, Flory et al. (1992) find 
results that confirm R&R’s (1988, 1990) three MES dimensional findings for accounting 
ethical decision-making. Flory et al. (1992) use four realistic accounting context MES 
scenarios to examine how accountants make ethical decisions. Since accounting is 
centered on the establishment o f pragmatic, rule-oriented codes intended to regulate 
public practice, philosophical discussions about good and evil are largely avoided. 
Consistent with this idea, their study finds that the three dimensions (i.e., moral equity, 
relativism, and contractualism) capture a substantial amount of the decision dynamics 
used by accountants to make ethical judgments in a financial context.
In another study, Cohen et al. (1998) compare subjects based on gender and 
university major (i.e., accounting versus non-accounting). The research finds that women 
and accounting students are more likely to evaluate questionable actions as more 
unethical and less likely to state an intention to perform the unethical action than male 
and non-accounting student respondents, respectively.
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Taxation Studies
Cruz et al. (2000) study tax practitioners from two of the big five accounting 
firms and find factor support for R&R (1990)’s moral equity, relativism, and 
contractualism dimensions along with Cohen et al. (1993)’s utilitarian dimension. 
However, the utilitarian dimension is not significant for any of their tax dilemmas with 
respect to ethical evaluation, and only important in one case for behavioral intentions of 
the subject. This finding also somewhat refutes Cohen et al. (1993)’s claim that cost- 
benefit utilitarian reasoning is central to accountants’ moral reasoning and may question 
the overall fairness of the tax system. Furthermore, the MES, compared with univariate 
measures, appears to be most useful in situations that pose relatively difficult tax ethical 
dilemmas for the respondents.
While administering a questionnaire to adults, Henderson and Kaplan (2005) 
assess the relationships among ethical orientations, ethical evaluations, and tax 
compliance behavior using Structural Equations Modeling (SEM). Subjects complete the 
MES including two tax scenarios based on cases used by Kaplan et al. (1997), an ethical 
orientation deontological-teleological scale, global tax ethical beliefs assessment, and tax 
system fairness assessment to provide interesting research findings. First, participants 
moderately believe that tax evasion is wrong in any amount and taxes are necessary to 
keep the society running smoothly, but somewhat disbelieve tax laws are enacted and 
administered fairly. Second, in predicting tax compliance, moral equity is positively 
related to tax compliance and has a larger effect for the expense scenario than the income 
case, even though the income case is also positively related to tax compliance and 
significant. Third, relativism and contractualism are only significant for the tax expense
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case; whereas, all dimensions are important when evaluating the taxable expense and 
taxable income cases simultaneously. Last, there is a direct relationship among ethical 
orientation and ethical evaluation and tax compliance; however, ethical orientation is 
only indirectly associated with tax compliance behavior through ethical evaluation. 
Overall, the study finds that ethical orientation is a complementary antecedent to MES 
dimensions.
Religious Orientation
Religion may be defined in terms of cognition (e.g., religious knowledge or 
beliefs), affect (e.g., emotion), and behavior (e.g., church affiliation, church attendance, 
reading about religion, or praying).
Beliefs and Emotions as Measures o f  Religiousness 
Barnett et al. (1996) surveys business students to assess relationships between 
religiousness and ethical ideology, ethical ideology and ethical judgments, and ethical 
judgments and intentions to report peer wrongdoing. The study measures religiousness in 
cognitive and affect terms, rather than a behavioral standpoint such as church attendance. 
Furthermore, ethical ideology is measured using Forsyth’s (1980) Idealism-Relativism 
Scale, ethical judgment is measured via R&R’s (1990) MES instrument, and behavioral 
intent is measured considering Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) Theory o f Reasoned Action. 
The study finds that religiousness is negatively associated with relativism, but not 
associated with idealism. Moreover, idealism is positively associated with judgments that 
peer reporting is ethical suggesting that idealists are concerned about others and believe 
that peer unethical action might harm the society. Also, relativism is negatively
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associated with judgments that peer reporting is ethical perhaps because relativists 
believe that it is impossible to make accurate ethical judgments about another’s behavior 
without knowing all circumstances that led to the behavior. Last, judgments that peer 
reporting is highly ethical is associated with stronger behavioral intentions to report a 
peer’s unethical behavior. This finding is consistent with the Theory of Reasoned Action 
(Ajzen and Fishbein 1977) or the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen 1991). Concerning 
this study, Barnett et al.’s (1996) findings link religiousness to MES dimensions (i.e., 
moral equity, relativism, and contractualism).
Church Attendance and Church Affiliation as 
Measures o f  Religiousness
Non-Taxation Studies
During their study which surveys students entering junior- and senior-high school, 
Hirschi and Stark (1969) measure religiousness via church attendance because it serves as 
a surrogate that internalizes moral values, legitimizes legal authority, and reinforces the 
concept o f supernatural punishment and rewards. They find that church attendance and 
belief in the supernatural are not deterrents to juvenile delinquency. This finding may be 
the result of children not internalizing their religious beliefs, but simply casually 
identifying with the beliefs of their parents. However, these children are slightly more 
likely to respect conventional authority.
McDaniel and Burnett (1990) conduct a national mail survey and compare 
religious commitment, measured via cognitive and behavioral attributes including church 
attendance, with religious affiliation to assess consumer behavior concerning retail 
market attributes. McDaniel and Burnett (1990, p. 103) define religion as “a belief in God
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accompanied by a commitment to follow principles believed to be set forth by God.” For 
all levels of religious commitment, the study finds a consistent positive relationship with 
importance placed on sales personnel friendliness and helpfulness, but inconsistent 
associations with product quality and availability o f credit at some levels o f religious 
commitment. To the contrary, religious affiliation is not supported at any level indicating 
that it may not be important in the United States. The authors suggest that while the 
typical consumer is in a state o f flux, religiousness may tend to be stable over a 
reasonable period of time which can serve as a basis for marketing strategies.
Conroy and Emerson (2004) study the effect o f religiousness as measured by 
church attendance and ethical and religious curricula on students’ ethical attitudes. Their 
study finds that church attendance significantly correlated with ethical perceptions while 
ethical and religious courses do not. Specifically, church attendance generally reduces the 
acceptability levels o f the unethical vignettes assessed in the study. However, for one 
scenario, church attendance unexpectedly increases acceptability when a male candidate 
is hired over equally qualified female applicant since the supervisor thinks that 
employees would resent being supervised by woman. The authors suggest that this 
extraneous result could either be because males dominate church leadership or 
religiousness is correlated with tradition. Nonetheless, in response to the study’s findings, 
the authors state (p. 384), “ ...perhaps believers in God are less willing to act unethically 
because they believe that an omniscient God will ‘catch’ them in the act -  or by 
extension, know their unethical thoughts or attitudes.” With respect to other important 
factors, the study finds that subjects who are female, non-white, over 23, or graduate 
students generally have reduced acceptability levels for the unethical vignettes. The
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authors suggest that these demographic characteristics may be used as control variables 
for future studies o f the effect of religiousness on ethical evaluation.
Taxation Studies
Tittle and Welch (1983) extract data from interviews of residents o f Iowa, New 
Jersey, and Oregon to determine whether religiousness, measured by church attendance, 
inhibits nine different deviant behaviors within various contexts. The contextual 
properties include: (1) normative dissensus among respondents concerning the morality 
of deviant acts, (2) social integration with the community, (3) perceived conformity with 
respect to committing deviant acts, (4) aggregate religiousness as measured by religious 
affiliation, and (5) status inequity as measured by dispersion of a socio-economic status 
(SES) variable. The study finds that tax evasion is the only of nine deviant behaviors 
significant for all five contextual characteristics. Moreover, the extent to which 
religiousness influences conformity varies directly with general normative dissensus. 
These findings may suggest that religiousness predicts conformity to rules uniquely 
prohibited by religious institutions (e.g., tax evasion), but not to rules prohibited by 
society as a whole which reflects the effect of normative dissensus. Furthermore, Tittle 
and Welch (1983, p. 662) state, “A multidimensional index of religiousness would have 
been desirable, but sufficient data to construct one were unavailable in the data set.” This 
study incorporates the use of a multidimensional measure o f religiousness (i.e., intrinsic 
and extrinsic religiousness) which is discussed in the next section o f this chapter.
Torgler (2006) conducts a multivariate archival analysis o f data from the World 
Values Survey and finds that religiousness as measured by church attendance is 
associated with rising tax morale, even when government corruption, trustworthiness, and
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demographic and economic factors are controlled. Specifically, the study finds that being 
an active member of a church group increases one’s probability o f believing that tax 
evasion is never justifiable. This more recent finding suggests that tax evasion is less 
likely for persons with higher levels o f church attendance or other religious behavioral 
attributes.
Similarly, in a current archival tax study, Boone et al. (2013) measure 
religiousness as the fraction of the U.S. county-wide population that claims affiliation 
with an organized religion. The study predicts and finds that religiousness is positively 
related with tax compliance for both corporations and individuals. Concerning individual 
taxpayers, the authors assert that perhaps their findings are the result o f the religious 
person’s higher level of risk aversion and potentially their perceived guilt from the 
violation of religious-based social norms. Their result is consistent with that o f Witte and 
Woodbury’s (1985) finding that higher rates o f tax evasion occur when the taxpayer’s 
community and peer groups are noncompliant. However, Boone et al. (2013)’s finding 
contradict that of Tittle and Welch (1983) which suggests that societal normative 
dissensus affords religion a greater influence on tax compliance intentions.
Religious Orientation Scale
Non-Taxation Studies
In their study of churchgoers, Allport and Ross (1967) define two measures which 
produce four orientations o f religiousness in their development o f the Religious 
Orientation Scale (ROS). First, people with an extrinsic orientation find religion useful 
for providing security and solace, sociability and distraction, and status and self­
justification. These persons turn to God, but not away from selfish motivations. Second,
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intrinsic religious people embrace and internalize a creed. Allport and Ross (1967, p. 
434) characterizes these two poles o f the religious continuum by stating, “ ...the 
extrinsically motivated person uses his religion, whereas the intrinsically motivated lives 
his religion.” The third and fourth religious orientations are indiscriminately proreligious 
(hereafter, indiscriminates) and antireligious. These religious orientations are simply 
extensions based on mean evaluations o f the intrinsic-extrinsic measures. Indiscriminates 
highly endorse all items that seem favorable to religion in any sense (i.e., both extrinsic 
and intrinsic items); whereas, antireligious people disagree with items on both intrinsic 
and extrinsic scales. Since their study surveys churchgoers, none of the participants are 
categorized as antireligious. However, o f the remaining religious types, their study 
indicates that intrinsics are the least prejudice concerning acceptance o f minority groups, 
indiscriminates are most prejudice, and extrinsics are moderately prejudice. These 
findings support the authors’ hypothesized religious characterizations.
In his meta-analysis o f the factors of religiousness (i.e., intrinsic, extrinsic, 
indiscriminate, and antireligious), Donahue (1985) assesses their correlations with other 
constructs and highlights several important findings. First, intrinsic religiousness is 
uncorrelated rather than negatively correlated with prejudice across most anti-black 
measures, but extrinsic religiousness is positively correlated with this prejudice measure. 
These findings partially support Allport and Ross (1967) in that Donahue (1985) finds 
support for extrinsic outcomes, but not for intrinsic ones. Second, extrinsic religiousness 
is positively correlated with religious close-mindedness, but intrinsic religiousness is 
uncorrelated with such dogmatic attitudes. Third, extrinsic religiousness tends to be 
positively correlated with negatively evaluated characteristics and uncorrelated with other
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measures of religious belief and commitment; whereas, intrinsic religiousness tends to be 
uneorrelated with negatively evaluated characteristics and positively associated with 
other measures of religiousness. Fourth, intrinsic and extrinsic factors are orthogonal 
dimensions rather than a continuum as originally assessed by Allport and Ross (1967). 
Last, the ROS based on median splits o f the two scales is o f little use when the dependent 
variable is religious in nature, but various nonreligious variables produce results that may 
correspond to findings of curvilinearity observed with other measures o f religiousness.
Gorsuch and Venable (1983) develop an “Age Universal” ROS scale and find that 
it compares favorably to the original ROS scale for adults and children with a fifth grade 
reading level or higher. Gorsuch and McPherson (1989) refine the “Age Universal” ROS 
scale by studying middle school, junior high school, high school, and college students to 
assess the subdivision of the ROS extrinsic construct into three components: personally 
oriented extrinsicness, socially oriented extrinsicness, and reverse intrinsicness. Their 
results indicate that reliabilities are equal to or better than those o f the original scales. 
Furthermore, the reversed intrinsic items seem to indicate something other than religion 
is important while increasing the level o f overall reliability o f intrinsicness while 
counterbalancing the intrinsic scale against acquiescence bias. Concerning the two new 
“E-scale” measures, Gorsuch and McPherson (1989, p. 353) state that they are 
“empirically distinctive.... However, the scales need further work to determine whether or 
not they differentially predict criteria.”
Taxation Study
Grasmick et al. (1991) describe people who have a strong religious identity 
salience or internalized religious convictions as intrinsic, and those who are involved in a
58
social network based on religion as extrinsic. They interview adults and find that the 
threat of shame emanating from religious identity salience (i.e., intrinsics) is a stronger 
deterrent to cheating on taxes than embarrassment o f those involved in a social network 
(i.e., extrinsics); however, both religious types are significant. Furthermore, religiousness 
measured by identity salience or church attendance has a greater negative effect on 
inclination to cheat on taxes than do gender, race, socio-economic status, and political 
conservatism. Overall, this study indicates that intrinsic religious persons and persons 
with higher levels of church attendance tend to have higher tax compliance intentions.
Religious Orientation Scale (ROS) and 
Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES)
Multidimensional ethic philosophies encompass ideas of fairness, justice, social 
contracts, obligations, consequences, and greatest goods which can be found in the Bible, 
the Koran, the writings o f Buddha, and in other religious or spiritual written works. Two 
studies relate the ROS with the MES. First, Clark and Dawson (1996) investigate the 
influence of religiousness in the formation of ethical judgments for business activities. 
The study provides an initial framework relating the orthogonal religious measures (i.e., 
intrinsicness and extrinsicness) with the moral equity dimension o f the MES. They find 
that intrinsics rated the unethical actions o f the protagonists in the scenarios as more 
unethical than extrinsics, but interestingly less unethical compared with non-religious 
participants. The authors offer several explanations o f the variation between intrinsics 
and non-religious participants. First, intrinsics may perceive fewer viable alternatives and 
evaluate the consequences o f those alternatives differently. Second, intrinsics may tend to 
be more concerned with interpersonal relationships and social customs (i.e., utilitarian
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norms). Third, intrinsics may place higher values on forgiveness and obedience and 
therefore internalize less demanding duty and justice conceptualizations. Last, intrinsics 
may experience conflicts between teleological work ethic coupled with its commensurate 
benefits and deontological future orientation which rejects the importance o f material 
things. Perhaps these conflicts cause intrinsics to be less concerned with and therefore 
less condemning of minor unethical lapses especially in moderately unethical 
circumstances.
Second, Wiebe and Fleck (1980) find that intrinsic religious persons tend to be 
more moral, more conscientious, and more disciplined suggesting that intrinsic religious 
commitment may affect ethical judgments. In light of this finding, Knotts et al. (2000) 
study religiousness (i.e., ROS intrinsic scale only) among other factors that may affect the 
ethical decision-making process (MES moral equity dimension only). Their research 
finds that females, business students, and intrinsics judged MES scenario actions as more 
unethical which partially contradicts Clark and Dawson (1996). With respect to religious 
commitment, the authors say, “Therefore, these results suggest the need for greater 
attention to religiousness and its influence on ethical decision-making” (Knotts et al.
2000, p. 162).
To address the concern of Knotts et al. (2000), this study relates both the intrinsic 
and extrinsic orthogonal measures o f the ROS with all three dimensions o f the MES (i.e., 
moral equity, relavatism, and contractualism). Based on the author’s review of prior 
literature, this relationship has not been examined for tax compliance.
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Moral Reasoning
Cognitive Moral Development (CMD)
Kohlberg (1981) asserts that morality is a philosophical or an ethical rather than a 
behavioral concept. Furthermore, an adequate psychological explanation of cognition or 
of morality must include an explanation o f the universality o f these concepts throughout 
humanity. Consistent with this idea, Kohlberg derives his theory from the works of Kant 
and Rawls. First, Kantian morality assumes a moral judgment based on conformity to an 
ideal norm, instead of one that adheres to particular circumstances or cultures. Second, 
Rawls’ moral philosophy asserts that inequality is only justified if it is acceptable to the 
person in the most disadvantaged position. The sentiment o f this view is similar to that of 
the Golden Rule (i.e., “one should treat others the way that he or she would prefer to be 
treated”) which is observed by many of the world’s religions. This study discusses the 
implications of religion as it relates to morality later in this chapter.
Contrarily, relativists believe that there are no universal human values because 
each culture or society determines its own moral values. Although rational ethics may be 
considered prescriptive in that it is guided by rational standards, relativism is generally a 
descriptive doctrine. Kohlberg (1981) states that the naturalistic fallacy results from the 
attempt to derive prescriptive statements from descriptive ones. He emphasizes that even 
if there are observed cultural or societal differences in moral judgment, there are moral 
principles that can reconcile these differences and lead to consensus. Kohlberg (1981) 
suggests twenty-nine categories o f morality consisting of modal elements (e.g., obeying 
or consulting), value elements (e.g., seeking rewards or avoiding punishment), and 
societal norms (e.g., preservation o f life).
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Rest et al. (1999) asserts that Kohlberg’s core values o f Cognitive Moral 
Development (CMD) consist o f (1) a cognitive emphasis, (2) an effortful construction of 
morality, (3) a developmental approach, (4) a shift in thinking, and (5) a macromorality 
concept. First, a cognitive emphasis is asserted because one must understand how people 
make sense of the world (i.e., their worldview) in order to comprehend their moral 
behavior. Second, the individual’s construction o f his or her basic categories o f morality 
(e.g., justice, duty, right, and social order) are aggressively self-constructed, not passively 
absorbed through their cultural surroundings. Moreover, the highest level o f moral 
development constructs a moral point o f view by imaginatively taking the roles o f all the 
participants in the dilemma with all the contextual information available to each person 
(Rest et al. 1999). Third, development of moral judgment evolves from simple to 
complex with gradual transition periods. Fourth, a shift in thinking occurs from 
conventional maintenance of social norms to postconventional ideas for which rules, 
roles, laws, and institution serve some sharable concept o f  cooperation which must be 
open to scrutiny. Last, postconventional moral reasoning is macromorality or man’s 
interaction with formal institutions o f society rather than man’s micromoral face-to-face 
interaction with people of close relations. A specific postconventional macromoral 
concern is equity in economics which includes paying a fair amount o f taxes to the 
government for the support of public institutions which is the central theme o f this study.
Flowever, critics o f CMD object to the view that the most advanced moral 
thinking is independent individual cognition apart from others who may have a stake in 
the moral decision. Furthermore, opponents cite that stage three, seeking interpersonal 
concordance, is unjustly portrayed as being primitive to stage six, loyalty to abstractions
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or societal institutions. Munsey (1980) rejects CMD in that the philosophy asserts 
principlism of one rule or one method of reasoning over others. Specifically, CMD favors 
a “bottom up” morality based on theories o f justice instead of a “top down” common 
morality of the community or relativism. However, Rest et al. (1999) note that, in a 
democratic society like the United States, open discussion, debate, and disagreement are 
inevitable and can lead to societal justice rather than Kohlberg’s fear— mindless 
conformity to the status quo.
Levels (Schemas) and Stages o f  CMD 
Prior research summarizes Kohlbergian and Rest’s Neo-Kohlbergian moral stages 
of development and indicates each stage’s motivation for action (Munsey 1980; Rest et 
al. 1999; Bebeau and Thoma 2003) including faith or religious motivations (Kohlberg 
1981). Rest et al. (1999) concludes that the Defining Issues Test (DIT) which 
operationalizes CMD empirically supports only three schemas which are combinations of 
five of the six Kohlbergian stages. Furthermore, the three DIT schemas allow researchers 
to describe the developmental aspect o f moral judgment and the construction of basic 
moral concepts. These DIT schemas are described in addition to Kohlberg’s moral stages. 
Also, Kohlberg (1981) describes faith stages that parallel moral ones which are also 
addressed in this section.
Stages One and Two
First, the preconventional level has two stages which indicate a person’s 
responsiveness to cultural rules and labels o f right or wrong based on one’s self-interest. 
In stage one, action is motivated by avoidance of punishment and conscience is the fear 
of punishment. Physical outcomes determine an action’s rightness or wrongness
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regardless of the moral value of these consequences. Concerning the parallel faith stage, 
responsiveness to God’s rules replaces that o f societal laws. In stage two, action is 
motivated by desire for reward or benefit in mutual exchanges. Right actions consist of 
what maximizes the individual’s utility and occasionally the utility o f others. For the 
complementary faith stage, exchanges between God and mankind supplant those between 
individuals. Clearly, the theory underlying preconventional action is associated with the 
preventative effects o f general deterrence theory (GDT) in that punishment is avoided or 
self-interest is sought and morality is disregarded. Therefore, persons with an affinity to 
preconventional behaviors should not evade taxes when deterrence factors are high and 
should be noncompliant when these factors are low or absent. Furthermore, the 
preconventional level seems to be theoretically related to the teleological egoism 
orientation which asserts that individual morality is grounded on cost-benefit 
consequences to actions in light o f the individual’s selfish interests. However, 
preconventional thinking is primarily found in adolescents and seldom observed in adults 
who are the focus of this study.
Stages Three and Four
Second, the conventional level considers the individual’s expectations o f family, 
group, and nation as valuable from the perspective o f maintaining a good society 
regardless of individual consequences. It seems to be interconnected with the teleological 
utilitarian “greatest good” or a relativistic theoretical orientation. Conventional moral 
thinking is the morality o f maintaining social norms because persons at this level believe 
that these norms are the most appropriate way o f doing things in society. This cognitive 
style embraces micromoral concepts which include: (1) displaying courtesy and
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helpfulness to others; (2) caring in intimate relationships; (3) observing personal events 
of friends and family; (4) being punctual for appointments; and (5) generally acting in a 
decent, responsible, empathic way in one’s daily dealing with others. This level also has 
two stages. In stage three, action is motivated by the actual or imagined disapproval of 
others (e.g., guilt for committing actions that are contrary to social order). Good behavior 
is defined as what pleases or helps others and is approved by society. The corresponding 
faith stage substitutes the disapproval o f others for that o f God. Furthermore, guilt 
feelings are magnified at this stage because God is now considered a personal friend as 
well as an all knowing eternal being.
In stage four, action is motivated by anticipation of dishonor or failure as 
perceived by one’s social group. Right behavior consists o f  doing one’s duty, showing 
respect for authority, and maintaining social order. The related faith stage asserts that 
moral rules are internalized and driven by one’s conscience. The action basis o f the 
conventional level moves an individual from GDT motivations towards the sentiments 
and loyalties described by Fiscal Psychology Theory (i.e., fairness). Specifically, since 
social norms have been found to moderate the deterrent effects o f GDT (Reckers et al. 
1994, Wenzel 2004, Blanthome and Kaplan 2008), persons with strong conventional 
behaviors may be more likely than preconventional thinkers to be tax compliant 
irrespective o f deterrent levels. Furthermore, social institutions reinforce this attitude by 
mediating conflicting claims, promoting the common good, and codifying such practices 
into institutionalized laws such as those found in the Internal Revenue Code.
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Stages Five and Six
Last, at the postconventional level, a clear effort is made to define moral values 
and principles that have validity and application apart from the authority o f the groups 
holding these principles (i.e., family, peers, and nation) in order to proactively create, 
rather than maintain, a just society. This type of moral thinking holds a macromoral point 
o f view which includes: (1) rights and responsibilities o f free speech, (2) due-process 
rights of the accused, (3) nondiscriminatory work practices, (4) freedom of religion, and 
(5) equity in economic and educational opportunities. Because Kohlbergian Theory is 
concerned with the possibility o f establishing a system of cooperation at a society-wide 
level, such as that required for a country’s system of taxation, impartiality or fairness 
among participants is demanded. The postconventional level has two stages. In stage five, 
action is motivated by concern for maintaining respect for equals, for the community, and 
for one’s self based on reasons of justice rather than those of emotion. The comparable 
faith stage posits that God and man will combine to create a community in which dignity 
and freedom prosper. This stage separates postconventional thinkers from conventional 
reasoners, where the former are rational moral agents aware of fundamental universal 
rights which a moral society must protect for all o f  its members and the latter are biased 
by loyalties to associated persons and groups.
In stage six, action is motivated by concern about self-condemnation for violating 
one’s internalized principles and integrity. The individual is concerned with self- 
determined universal principles o f justice, with reciprocity and equality o f human rights, 
and with dignity o f human life. For the parallel faith stage, there exists a natural or 
common law which unites principles o f justice with the ultimate. Additionally, Kohlberg
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(1981) suggests a seventh moral stage based on the sentiments o f the sixth religious 
stage. This ultimate moral stage is not only concerned about integrity and oneness with 
people and all o f life, but also the confrontation and defeat of despair which universal 
principle awareness alone is unable to conquer. The actions o f the postconventional level 
embody the philosophy of Fiscal Psychology in that perceptions o f fairness and justice 
are important in both. Low penalty and tax rate structures have been found to indicate a 
fair tax system. Therefore, persons with postconventional tendencies should be tax 
compliant only when the tax system’s penalties, rates, and other tax structure factors are 
perceived to be fair; otherwise, they will likely evade taxes.
Defining Issues Test
The Defining Issues Test (DIT 1 or DIT 2) operationalizes the measurement of 
moral capacity and has been administered in over four hundred studies (Bebeau and 
Thoma 2003). The DIT activates and assesses moral schemas in terms of importance 
judgments. The instrument uses a bottom-up fragment strategy to state just enough of 
argument to activate one’s moral schema with a top-down method of not stating too much 
to encourage concept-driven processing (Rest et al. 1999). Lawrence (1978) suggests that 
less developed subjects do not select high-staged items because they do not comprehend 
them, and more developed subjects do not select low-staged items because they prefer 
high-staged ones. The DIT schemas, personal interest, maintaining norms, and 
postconventional, capture the essence of Kohlbergian stages, but are somewhat different. 
The personal interest schema of development (i.e., Kohlberg’s stages two and three) is 
concerned with teleological egoism; whereas, the maintaining norms schema (i.e., 
Kohlberg’s stage four) is associated with relativism. Furthermore, the postconventional
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schema (i.e., Kohlberg’s stages five and six) emphasizes society-creating with a 
deontological justice orientation. Therefore, the DIT is able to distinguish between 
maintaining norms and postconventional thinking. On one hand, maintaining norms 
reasoning involves doing one’s duty guided by the authoritarianism of governmental 
control. On the other hand, society-creating postconventional reasoning recognizes that 
the law may be inequitable, should be open to scrutiny, and should appeal to a sharable 
social ideal.
The newer DIT instrument (i.e., DIT 2) updates the dilemmas and items used to 
activate moral reasoning. Furthermore the DIT 2 is shorter than the original DIT 1 and 
fewer subjects are purged during its reliability checks. The validity and reliability o f the 
DIT 1 and DIT 2 have been robustly tested. First, their measures differentiate groups 
assumed to be of greater or lesser expertise in moral reasoning (i.e., formal moral 
education improves scores). Second, an upward change in longitudinal studies is evident 
in that each higher level o f education increases P-scores by about ten points indicating 
that higher levels o f education challenge subjects to reexamine their perception o f the 
moral basis o f society. Third, higher P-scores are associated with advanced 
comprehension of moral concepts, higher job performance, and greater ability to 
reconstruct moral arguments, but they are not necessarily related to moral action or 
behavior. Fourth, to improve the measure’s predictability, the N2-score has been 
developed for the DIT 2 and has greater internal reliability than that o f the P-score. The 
N2-score measures the extent to which the subject ranks postconventional items highly 
while avoiding rating personal interest items as important.
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To address the concern that the DIT is biased towards liberals, McGeorge (1975) 
asks first-year teachers college students to respond to the DIT as if they are either liberal 
or conservative. The study’s results indicate that the students are not able to fake high 
DIT 1 P-scores, but are able to fake low ones. However, there is some concern about the 
scale’s ability to significantly predict political attitudes, political choices, and societal 
participation (Bailey et al. 2010). To compensate for political concerns, the DIT 2 
includes a measure of political identification and religious attitudes to produce an 
orthodoxy-progressivism scale which accounts for about two-thirds o f the variance on 
positions o f divisive public policy issues such as abortion, school prayer, gay and lesbian 
rights, women rights, and free speech. Bebeau and Thoma (2003) suggest that 
understanding the development o f moral judgment is crucial to comprehending the great 
ideological divide between conservatism and liberalism.
When questioning whether the Kohlbergian CMD philosophy should be 
abandoned by accountants, Bailey et al. (2010) analyze prior research and find mixed 
results concerning the Kohlbergian approach and DIT results for accountants. First, 
principled reasoning is important for accountants, but accounting students and 
professional accountants’ P-scores are generally below that o f adults with similar levels 
of education. Second, there is only a small effect that the DIT measures political ideology 
rather than identifies moral capacity for accountants. Third, women tend to score higher 
than their male counterparts on the DIT for which the authors suggest that future research 
should include gender as a covariate. Last, the study finds that prior research is 
inconclusive concerning the mismeasurement o f accountants’ ethical judgment.
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DIT Empirical Studies 
Fisher (1997, 1999) develops and tests a tax specific DIT. First, Fisher (1997) 
surveys high school students, undergraduate and graduate college students, faculty, and 
university staff and administrators to develop a DIT instrument with a tax framework 
called the Tax Context Issues Test (TCIT). Since the author posits that stage three 
reasoning is more likely to cheat on taxes than stage four thinkers, the study calculates a 
T-score as the sum of stages four through six whereas the DIT P-score only sums stages 
five and six in its calculation. However like the DIT, the TCIT assesses issue statements 
from stage two through stage six presenting lower stage items earlier, includes an anti­
establishment assessment (i.e., the A-score measures the condemnation of the traditional 
for the arbitrary) and a meaningless measure (i.e., the M-score assesses the attractiveness 
of ambiguous wording). Moreover, validity and reliability test for the TCIT are 
comparable to those of the DIT. For the TCIT, the study finds that the mean level of 
moral reasoning is equivalent to that o f the DIT, persons with more education display 
higher levels o f moral reasoning, and the mean level of moral reasoning is higher for 
females than males. However, the moral reasoning concerning taxpaying contexts seems 
less advanced than that of the social dilemmas measured by the DIT. This difference in 
reasoning may surface because of the greater difficulty o f observing the effects of 
taxpaying behavior on the welfare o f others or because persons perceive issues o f the DIT 
on a higher moral plane than those of the TCIT.
Second, Fisher (1999) conducts an experiment with business students 
manipulating penalty level and congressional intent of the tax law to assess the TCIT’s 
(Fisher 1997) ability to predict tax evasion. The study finds that the likelihood of tax
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noncompliance for subjects receiving the penalty treatment is less than that o f subjects 
receiving the intent of law treatment. Moreover, for tax evasion, the penalty treatment has 
a greater effect on low level moral reasoners and the intent o f law treatment has a greater 
effect on postconventional moral thinkers indicating that moral reasoning has a 
moderating effect on GDT factors. However, because the TCIT score combines 
maintaining norms thinking with postconventional reasoning, the study’s finding may not 
be comparable with other DIT studies.
In an experiment o f first year MBA students, Kaplan et al. (1997) manipulate type 
o f sanction (i.e., legal versus appeal to conscience) to assess the moderating effects o f  the 
DIT 1 P-score on the likelihood o f tax noncompliance. The study finds that tax evasion 
intentions are significantly lower for taxpayers who utilize postconventional moral 
reasoning. Furthermore, for taxpayers utilizing relatively low levels o f moral reasoning, 
tax evasion intentions are significantly lower among those who receive legal sanction 
communication than those receiving either no educational communication or appeal to 
conscience communication. However, tax evasion intentions are not significantly lower 
among those postconventional thinkers who receive appeal to conscience communication 
as opposed to those receiving no educational communication. Perhaps the most 
interesting finding is that legal sanction communication has no effect on the tax evasive 
behavior of postconventional moral reasoners which further indicates that morality 
moderates the effects o f GDT.
Last, Troutman et al. (1995) assess student taxpayers and find that higher DIT t 
P-scores are related to higher levels o f tax compliance only through tax system fairness 
perceptions. However, they determine that moral development, income level, and age are
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not directly related to tax compliance intentions. Furthermore, Trivedi et al. (2003) 
manipulate audit level, peer reporting information, and tax inequity covaried with moral 
reasoning among other variables and find, ceteris paribus, that students’ DIT 1 P-scores 
are positively related to tax compliance. Furthermore, student tax compliance is 
negatively affected by the level o f their DIT 1 A-Score (i.e., anti-establishment score). 
These results are encouraging concerning the potential use o f the DIT measures for future 
tax compliance research as a moderating or interacting variable.
Ethical Evaluation and Moral Capacity 
Cohen et al. (1996) relate the MES to the DIT 1 for auditing professionals and 
find that the MES outperforms the DIT 1 in assessing moral development and predicting 
moral behavior. While Weber (1996), in his commentary of Cohen et al. (1996), 
welcomes the contributions o f the MES to the assessment o f individuals’ moral 
reasoning; he criticizes the research regarding theory confusion, instrument confusion, 
and the theoretical basis of the MES. First, Weber believes that theory confusion is 
apparent when Cohen et al. (1996) equate Kohlberg’s and Rest’s theories to the MES. 
Weber (1996, p. 518) states, “While moral equity may provide an excellent foundation 
for the development o f the MES, condemning Kohlberg or Rest for their failure to ground 
their CMD theories on this construct or for developing instruments that do not emphasize 
this cognitive moral reasoning element is inappropriate.” The reasons concerning the 
first criticism are made more clear by the second concern— instrument confusion. The 
DIT is neither equal to the MES, nor is it intended to be. According to Weber (1996), the 
MES has no a priori normative moral philosophy; therefore, it allows individuals to apply 
their own previously learned perceptions o f fairness or justice when making ethical
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judgments. However, the DIT is primarily based on the ideological philosophy of Kantian 
deontology or a duty to act the “right” or “just” way regardless o f the circumstances. 
Last, the third critique highlights a concern stemming from the second observation: the 
fear that the MES allows respondents to create their personal perception of what is fair 
and just which suggests that ethics research should be normative rather than positive. 
Kohlberg (1981) refers to this as the naturalistic fallacy. Specifically, Reidenbach and 
Robin (1988) consistent with CMD theory group the statements “acceptable to my 
family” and “unacceptable to my family” as relativistic; however, factor analysis results 
of the subjects’ responses seem to inappropriately group these items with normative 
moral equity or justice. Concerning the other dimensions o f the MES, Forsyth (1980) 
finds that neither idealism (i.e., MES contractualism dimension) nor relativism as 
measured by his Ethics Position Questionnaire is related to the DIT 1 P-score. Therefore, 
the MES dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and contractualism) appear to be 
independent of the DIT. Moreover, Weber (1996) resolves that the MES is a compliment, 
not a replacement, to the DIT and Neo-Kohlbergian Theory.
In a more recent study, Shawver and Sennetti (2009) survey undergraduate 
students in an introductory accounting course and measure their ethical behavior using 
the MES and the DIT 2 to assess whether accounting ethics should be taught at the 
university level. The study has a number o f thought-provoking results. First, higher DIT 2 
P-score students did not evaluate questionable accounting actions as more unethical than 
low DIT 2 P-score subjects. This outcome reinforces previous findings that the DIT may 
be incapable o f predicting behavioral intentions. Second, consistent with Cohen et al. 
(1996), the MES constructs of moral equity, relativism, egoism, utilitarianism, or
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contractualism and the composite MES score explain the ethical and unethical choices by 
accounting students better than the DIT 2 P-score. Last, the study indicates that the 
composite MES score is not related to the DIT 2 P-score suggesting that the two 
measures quantify distinct constructs which is consistent with Weber (1996).
Morality and Religiousness 
Kohlberg (1981) distinguishes morality from religiousness in that the purpose of 
moral thinking is to resolve competing claims on the basis of moral norms; however, 
religious reasoning defines life and morality beyond human experiences (i.e., reliance on 
God to live a moral life). Although morality differs from religiousness, Kohlberg defines 
common attributes o f both constructs. These common attributes are the foundation of 
Natural Law Theory which is discussed later in this section. Moreover, Kohlberg 
distinguishes faith from religion in that the former is an abstract universal quality of 
knowing; whereas, the latter is an expression o f  former in which concerns about the 
ultimate are made clear. Kohlberg (1981) parallels moral reasoning stages with those of 
religious thinking (i.e., faith thinking) for which the motivation for action have 
previously been addressed in this chapter. Nonetheless, the study finds that differences 
only occur in the higher stages with the moral reasoning being rated more highly. This 
result suggests that the development o f higher levels o f moral reason precede that of 
higher levels o f religious thinking. Therefore, religious reasoning maybe derived from 
moral reason.
On one extreme, Fundamentalists or Divine Command theorists posit that 
morality is ultimately defined by divine commands revealed by some document of 
ultimate revelation (e.g., The Bible or Koran). On the other extreme, Freud’s Emotivistic
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or Agnostic Theory posits that morality and religion are simply irrational illusions or 
human fantasies. Freud asserts that moral judgments only offer emotional approval or 
disapproval; therefore, they have no meaning as statements o f truth or falsity. However, 
Freud contends that scientific judgments have meaning because they are predictors of 
observable data. A more neutral position, Natural Law Theory, posits that there are 
universal or natural principles o f justice and morality developed through Socratic 
reasoning that should guide all societies. Furthermore, these principles are independent of 
specific religious revelation or faith. Kohlberg provides an exemplar o f Natural Law 
Theory in a statement by Martin Luther King from a Birmingham jail. King says 
(Kohlberg 1981, p. 319), “There is a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws, though 
one must do so openly, lovingly and with a willingness to accept the penalty.”
Previous studies indicate that morality as measured by the DIT is not equivalent 
to various religiousness measures especially for subjects with conservative religious 
beliefs (Kohlberg 1981; Getz 1984; Rest et al. 1986; Richards and Davison 1992). 
Kohlberg (1981) believes that religious orientation is mostly independent of moral 
development in that the former focuses on religious doctrine which may be biased and the 
latter strives for an ideal norm. Furthermore, Rest et al. (1999) note that a limitation of 
the Kohlbergian Approach is that it neglects the role of religion in the formation of moral 
thinking. Getz (1984), in her review o f the relevant literature, finds an inverse 
relationship between principled moral reasoning and conservative religious beliefs for 
most studies. However, Getz (1984) does not find conclusive evidence concerning the 
relationship between religious orientations (e.g., intrinsic and extrinsic) and moral 
judgment. Getz (1984, p. 107) states, “Those who were intrinsically oriented clearly
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tended to take seriously the moral teachings typical o f their particular congregation.” 
This observation suggests that intrinsic religious subjects may behave differently than 
other religious people and that their religion may intensify their behavioral preferences. 
Furthermore, Rest et al. (1986) note that the divine origin of moral absolutes for religious 
persons may cause them to not rely on their own intellect for making moral judgments; 
therefore, religious people may refrain from principled moral thinking.
In their study of conservative religious subjects, Richards and Davison (1992) 
find that some stage four and anti-establishment DIT items have religious connotations. 
The authors suggest that these implied spiritual tones activate conservative religious 
people’s moral schema causing them to select these conventional items rather than 
postconventional ones. Furthermore, they find that some postconventional items have 
negative religious undertones for conservative religious subjects triggering them to reject 
these items in favor o f lower stage items. Richards and Davison (1992) suggest that the 
weakness of Kohlbergian Theory is that it assesses information in light o f justice 
considerations, to the exclusion of other philosophies such as care, moral duty, 
benevolence, compassion, self-realization, honor, and liberty.
To summarize, this study incorporates several of the methodologies o f the 
previously mentioned ideological studies. First, it uses the R&R (1988, 1990) eight-item 
three-dimension MES (i.e., moral equity, relativism, contractualism) to evaluate tax 
evasion intentions using both evasive income and deduction cases (Henderson and 
Kaplan 2005; Kaplan et al. 1997). Second, the current study implements a peer 
behavioral assessment to eliminate the “halo effect” (i.e., reduce the bias o f self-reports 
of deviant behavior) and incorporate subjective norms. Third, Cruz et al. (2000, p. 239)
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states, “ ...future research could investigate whether the effects of personal characteristics 
such as cognitive moral development or personal values influence their deontological and 
teleological evaluations o f ethical dilemmas, and whether those evaluations in turn 
influence ethical judgments and intentions.” Consequently, this study assesses the 
complementary nature of the DIT 2 and the ROS with the MES concerning tax evasion 
intentions. Furthermore, this study considers the interactive effects between the DIT 2 
and MES constructs as suggested by Weber (1996). Additionally, the current research 
administers the DIT 2 to assess moral orientation as did Shawver and Sennetti (2009) and 
evaluates the study’s results using SEM which is consistent with Shawver and Sennetti 
(2009) and Henderson and Kaplan (2005). Last, this study extends Henderson and Kaplan 
(2005) by substituting the orthogonal religious scales (i.e., intrinsic and extrinsic) for the 
orthogonal ethical orientation measures (i.e., deontology and teleology) and evaluating 
the interactive effects of the DIT measures (i.e., P-score and N2-score).
Development of Hypotheses
Cruz et al. (2000, p. 239) states, “ ...future research could investigate whether the 
effects o f personal characteristics such as cognitive moral development or personal 
values influence their deontological and teleological evaluations o f ethical dilemmas, and 
whether those evaluations in turn influence ethical judgments and intentions.” Based on 
the previous statement, this study examines three complementary research questions. 
First, do personal religious beliefs matter with respect to the ethical evaluation o f tax 
evasion intentions? Similarly, the second question is whether moral capacity matters 
regarding the ethical evaluation of tax evasion intentions? The last query considers 
interactive effects and questions whether cognitive moral development interacts with
77
personal religious beliefs considering the ethical evaluation of tax evasive practices? In 
order to appropriately address these questions, the study’s constructs must be defined.
First, McDaniel and Burnett (1990, p. 103) define religion as “a belief in God 
accompanied by a commensurate commitment to follow principles believed to be set 
forth by God.” Similarly, Kohlberg distinguishes faith from religion in that the former is 
an abstract universal quality o f knowing; whereas, the latter is an expression o f the 
former in which concerns about the ultimate are made clear. Second, Forsyth (1980) 
develops an ethical ideology taxonomy based on two factors o f ethical evaluation: (1) the 
extent to which one replaces universal moral rules with relativism and (2) the degree to 
which one focuses on idealism. Idealism and relativism are purported to be orthogonal 
measures with characteristics similar to those of deontology and teleology, respectively. 
Third, Kohlbergian morality and Rest’s Neo-Kohlbergian morality are derived from Kant 
and Rawls (Munsey 1980; Kohlberg 1981; Rest et al. 1999; Bebeau and Thoma 2003). 
Kantian deontological philosophy assumes that moral judgment is based on conformity to 
an ideal norm or a duty to act the “right” or “just” way, regardless o f the teleological 
circumstances. Moreover, Rawls’ moral philosophy asserts that inequality is only 
justified if it is acceptable to the person in the most disadvantaged position.
Religion may be defined in terms of cognition (e.g., religious knowledge or 
belief), affect (e.g., emotion), and behavior (e.g., church affiliation, church attendance, 
Bible reading, or praying). Tittle and Welch (1983) indicate that a multidimensional scale 
of religiousness may have improved their study. Therefore, this study measures 
religiousness via the multidimensional Religious Orientation Scale (Allport and Ross 
1967; Gorsuch and McPherson 1989). Allport and Ross (1967, p. 434) characterize two
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constructs of the scale by stating, “ ...the extrinsically motivated person uses his religion, 
whereas the intrinsically motivated lives his religion.” Moreover, Getz (1984, p. 107) 
states, “Those who were intrinsically oriented clearly tended to take seriously the moral 
teachings typical of their particular congregation.” Furthermore, Grasmick et al. (1991) 
in their tax compliance study describe people who have a strong religious identity 
salience or internalized religious convictions as intrinsic, and those who are involved in a 
social network based on religion as extrinsic. Also, Tittle and Welch (1983) suggest that 
religiousness predicts conformity to rules uniquely prohibited by religious institutions 
(e.g., tax evasion), but not to rules prohibited by society as a whole.
The first stage of the ideological model o f tax evasion indicates that religiousness 







































Figure 4 Measurement Model o f the Defining Issues Test (DIT 2) Moral Capacity
















Figure 5 Hypothesized SE M of the Effect o f the ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 1)
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Figure 6 Hypothesized SEM o f the Effect o f the ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f  Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 2)
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Figure 7 Hypothesized SEM o f the Effect o f the ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f  Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 3) 00L /t
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Furthermore, Donahue (1985) finds that intrinsic and extrinsic factors are 
orthogonal dimensions rather than a continuum as originally posited, and Cruz et al. 
(2000) suggest that these respective religious factors may have deontological and 
teleological characteristics. This conceptualization is similar to that of the 
aforementioned idealism-relativism characteristics as posited by Forsyth (1980). The 
distinction between “intrinsics” and “extrinsics” indicates that the former “live” their 
religion while the latter “use” their religion is consistent with deontology and teleology, 
respectively. Tax and non-tax studies generally find that intrinsic religiousness or a 
deontological perspective is directly related to both the moral equity dimension o f the 
MES (Collins and Daniel 1996; Knotts et al. 2000; Henderson and Kaplan 2005) and the 
contractualism dimension of the MES (R&R 1988; Henderson and Kaplan 2005), but 
inversely related to the relativism dimension o f the MES and tax evasion intentions 
(Grasmick et al. 1991; Bamett et al. 1996; Clark and Dawson 1996). However, 
insignificant correlations are also found between intrinsic religiousness or a deontological 
perspective and the relativism dimension o f the MES (Henderson and Kaplan 2005), the 
contractualism dimension of the MES (Bamett et al. 1996), and tax evasion intentions 
(Donahue 1985; Henderson and Kaplan 2005).
Considering the previous research with respect to intrinsic religiousness or a 
deontological perspective, the following hypotheses are offered:
Hla: Intrinsic religiousness is positively related to the moral equity dimension
of the MES.
Hlb: Intrinsic religiousness is positively related to the contractualism dimension 
of the MES.
Hlc: Intrinsic religiousness is negatively related to the relativism dimension of
the MES.
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Hid: Intrinsic religiousness is negatively related to tax evasion intentions as 
assessed by the MES and has a larger negative effect than extrinsic 
religiousness.
Tax and non-tax studies have found inverse correlations between extrinsic 
religiousness or a teleological perspective and both the moral equity and the 
contractualism dimensions of the MES (R&R 1988; Clark and Dawson 1996; Henderson 
and Kaplan 2005), and a direct association with the relativism dimension of the MES 
(Henderson and Kaplan 2005). Moreover, Grasmick et al. (1991) find that extrinsic 
religiousness or a teleological perspective and tax evasion intentions are indirectly 
related; whereas, However, Donahue (1985) and Henderson and Kaplan (2005).
Considering the previous research with respect to extrinsic religiousness or a 
teleological perspective, the following hypotheses are offered:
H2a: Extrinsic religiousness is negatively related to the moral equity dimension
of the MES.
H2b: Extrinsic religiousness is negatively related to the contractualism 
dimension of the MES.
H2c: Extrinsic religiousness is positively related to the relativism dimension of
the MES.
H2d: Extrinsic religiousness is negatively related to tax evasion intentions as 
assessed by the MES and has a smaller negative effect than intrinsic 
religiousness.
The D1T 2 P-score and N2-score are both often used to evaluate moral capacity as 
assessed by the DIT. The DIT 2 P-score measures the percentage that the respondent 
selects postconventional items; whereas, the N2-score measures the extent to which the 
subject ranks postconventional items highly while avoiding rating personal interest items 
as important. The N2-score has greater internal reliability than that o f the P-score. 
Furthermore, the DIT 2 measures three different schemas: (1) personal interest, (2)
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maintaining norms, and (2) postconventional. With respect to the lower levels of 
development, the personal interest schema (i.e., Kohlberg’s stages two and three) is 
concerned with teleological egoism; whereas, the maintaining norms schema (i.e., 
Kohlberg’s stage four) is associated with relativism. Forsyth (1980) finds that neither 
idealism (i.e., MES contractualism dimension) nor relativism as measured by his Ethics 
Position Questionnaire is related to the DIT 1 P-score.
Concerning the highest level o f development, the postconventional schema (i.e., 
Kohlberg’s stages five and six) emphasizes society-creating with a justice orientation. 
Postconventional thinkers view rules, roles, laws, and institution as serving some sharable 
concept o f cooperation (Rest et al. 1999). In particular, postconventional reasoners are 
concerned about maintaining an ideal societal structure for all members o f society which 
must be open to scrutiny. Riedenbach and Robin (1988) develop the moral equity 
dimension of the MES based on a justice perspective similar to that o f the DIT and 
Kohlbergian Theory. Studies have found that the MES outperforms the DIT in predicting 
behavioral intent (Cohen et al. 1996; Shawver and Sennetti 2009). However, Weber 
(1996) indicates that the DIT is neither equal to the MES, nor is it intended to be. 
Moreover, Weber resolves that the MES may be a compliment (e.g., justice orientation), 
not a replacement, to the DIT and Kohlbergian Theory. Based on the author’s review of 
the literature, Weber’s complementary assertion has not been tested.
Last, Kohlberg (1981) asserts that morality is a philosophical or an ethical rather 
than a behavioral concept; therefore cognitive moral development and the DIT may not 
accurately measure behavioral intent or action. Concerning the DIT P-score and the 
prediction of behavioral intent, previous research has not only found that higher P-scores
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are related to lower tax evasion intentions (Kaplan et al. 1997; Fisher 1999; Trivedi et al. 
2003), but also found no relation between P-scores and tax evasion intentions (Troutman 
et al. 1995; Shawver and Sennetti 2009).
Considering the previous research with respect to moral capacity, the following 
hypotheses are offered:
H3a: Postconventional moral capacity is positively related to the moral equity
dimension of the MES.
H3b: Postconventional moral capacity is not related to the contractualism 
dimension of the MES.
H3c: Postconventional moral capacity is not related to the relativism dimension
of the MES.
H3d: Postconventional moral capacity is not related to tax evasion intentions as 
assessed by the MES.
Regarding the MES and ethical evaluation, individuals tend to rely on a broad 
sense of moral equity dominated by concerns for fairness and justice, tempered by 
relativistic and implied social contract deontological dimensions. Prior research generally 
finds that all three MES dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and contractualism) 
are indirectly related to the evaluation o f unethical behavior, such as tax evasion 
intentions (R&R 1988, 1990; Cohen et al. 1996; Henderson and Kaplan 2005). However, 
Henderson and Kaplan (2005) assess both the underreporting of taxable income and the 
overreporting of tax deductions and find that the latter is rated more unethical than the 
former for actual taxpayers. Furthermore, the income scenarios are not significant for the 
relativism and contractualism dimensions o f the MES; however, when both income and 
deduction cases are simultaneously evaluated, all MES dimensions are significant. Their 
result concerning the disparity between income and deductions is similar to that of
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Groves (1958) which finds that farmers and landlords are reluctant to overreport 
deductions as compared with underreporting income.
Considering the previous research with respect to ethical evaluation, the following 
hypotheses are offered:
H4a: When income and deduction scenarios are simultaneously evaluated, all
three MES dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and contractualism) 
will be negatively related with tax evasion intentions.
H4b: When deduction scenarios are independently evaluated, all three MES 
dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and contractualism) will be 
negatively related with tax evasion intentions.
H4c: When income scenarios are independently evaluated, only the moral
equity dimension o f the MES will be negatively related with tax evasion 
intentions.
Last, Kohlberg (1981) distinguishes morality from religiousness in that the 
purpose of the former is to resolve competing claims on the basis o f moral norms; 
however, the latter defines life and morality beyond human experiences. This distinction 
suggests that the development o f moral reasoning precede that o f religious thinking. 
Specifically, perhaps religious reasoning takes longer to develop than moral reasoning. 
Rest et al. (1999) note that a limitation of the Kohlbergian Approach is that it neglects the 
role of religion in the formation o f moral thinking. Explicitly, Richards and Davison 
(1992) suggest that the weakness o f Kohlbergian Theory is that it assesses information in 
light of justice considerations, to the exclusion o f other philosophies such as care, moral 
duty, benevolence, compassion, self-realization, honor, and liberty. Moreover, Getz 
(1984) does not find conclusive evidence concerning the relationship between religious 
orientations (e.g., intrinsic and extrinsic) and moral judgment as indicated by the DIT P- 
score. Interestingly, Richards and Davison (1992) find that some maintaining norms and
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anti-establishment DIT items have attractive religious connotations; whereas, some 
postconventional DIT items have negative religious undertones. Because of these 
embedded religious connotations, they suggest that intrinsically religious persons will 
tend to reject postconventional items in favor o f conventional or preconventional ones. 
Previous research indicates that the ROS and the DIT are distinct measures of 
religiousness and moral capacity, respectively. Perhaps these unique measures may 
combine to better predict behavioral intent (e.g., tax evasion intentions) than either single 
measure alone. Based on the author’s review of the literature, the ROS (intrinsic and 
extrinsic religiousness) constructs have not been compared with those o f the DIT 2 (P- 
score, N2-score, etc.) concerning the prediction of behavioral intent.
Considering the previous research indicated above, with respect to the association 
between religiousness (i.e, ROS) and moral capacity (i.e., DIT 2) and the prediction of 
behavioral intent, the following research question is offered:
RQ: The model of the ideological factors o f tax compliance will improve when
considering the ROS (i.e., intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness) in addition 
to the DIT (i.e., P-score, N2-score, etc.) above that o f the single construct 




To test each of the research hypotheses, this study surveyed undergraduate and 
graduate business and non-business students using a three-part questionnaire. The first 
part contained two hypothetical tax compliance cases (i.e., underreported income and 
overreported deductions) and was used to assess the subjects’ agreement, or lack thereof, 
with the unethical action described in the scenarios as determined by the 
Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES). The sequence o f the cases (i.e., income and 
deduction) was presented in the same order for each participant. The second part assessed 
their levels of intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness as measured by the Religious 
Orientation Scale (ROS). The last part measured the subjects’ level o f moral capacity as 
indicated by the P-score and N2-score derived from the Defining Issues Test (DIT 2). 
Each participant received each part of the questionnaire in the same order (i.e., MES, 
ROS, and DIT 2).
The Questionnaires
Multidimensional Ethics Scale 
First, subjects evaluated two hypothetical tax evasion scenarios via the MES as 
shown in Appendix A. The tax scenarios employed income and deduction items that are
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not easily verified by the IRS for which prior research overwhelmingly finds that this 
invisibility increases the likelihood of tax evasion (Madeo et al. 1987). Furthermore, 
these scenarios were previously tested by Kaplan et al. (1997) and Henderson and Kaplan 
(2005), allowing this study’s results to potentially be comparable with those studies. The 
income scenario described selling a business computer to a friend and not reporting the 
taxable gain from the sale; whereas, personal meal and entertainment expenses are 
illegally deducted for business purposes in the deduction case. In each o f the scenarios, 
subjects judged the ethical context based on three dimensions (i.e., moral equity, 
relativism, and contractualism) and rated on a seven-point scale. These evaluations serve 
as both dependent and independent variables in the assessment of the structured equation 
model for this study.
Additionally, participants indicated their (and their peers) probability o f acting in 
the same unethical manner as the protagonist in the scenario on a seven-point scale 
anchored by “high” (scored 1) and “low” (scored 7). Hence, larger scores indicated 
disagreement with the unethical behavior. These evaluations served as univariate 
dependent measures of behavioral intent. Respondents indicated the degree to which the 
person described in the scenario acted ethically on a seven-point scaled anchored by 
“ethical” (scored 1) and “unethical” (scored 7). Again, larger scores suggested increased 
disagreement with the unethical behavior. This measure served as a univariate dependent 
measure of ethical evaluation that can be compared with the multivariate measure of 
ethical evaluation. Last, subjects indicated their perception of the likelihood o f getting 
caught evading taxes on a seven-point scale anchored by “high” (scored 1) and “low” 
(scored 7). Based on general deterrence theory (GDT), higher scores indicated a greater
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likelihood of evading taxes. This measure is used to control for the visibility o f income to 
the IRS which prior research indicates is the most important factor for determining tax 
compliance behavior. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) results and previous research 
indicate that the MES dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and contractualism) are 
significantly correlated which is represented in all structural models (i.e., Models 1 — 9). 
When observing the means and standard deviations o f the aforementioned measures, 
neither end-loading nor low item variance appears to be a concern for the sample (Flory 
et al. 1992). Furthermore, large standard deviations suggest that the scenarios are truly 
ethical dilemmas for the respondents as a whole.
Religious Orientation Scale
Second, subjects provided demographic information and, afterwards, completed a 
questionnaire to indicate their religious orientation by responding to scale items as shown 
in Appendix B. Gorsuch and McPherson (1989) refine the Allport and Ross (1967) 
religious orientation scale (ROS) by subdividing the ROS extrinsic construct into three 
components: personally oriented extrinsicness, socially oriented extrinsicness, and 
reverse intrinsicness. Gorsuch and McPherson (1989) indicate that the best single 
measures for personal and social extrinsicness are “What religion offers me most is 
comfort in times of trouble and sorrow” and “I go to church mainly because I enjoy 
seeing people I know there,” respectively. Furthermore, the strongest predictor o f reverse 
intrinsicness is “It doesn’t matter what I believe so long as I am good.” The reversed 
intrinsic items are combined with original intrinsic scale items increasing the level of 
overall reliability of intrinsicness while counterbalancing the intrinsic scale against 
acquiescence bias (see Tables 1-8).
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Table 1
Ethical Evaluation Demographic and Descriptive Statistics fo r  Models 1-3
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
AGE 181 18 69 24.19 8.087
SEX(M) 181 0 1 .55 .499
I JUST 181 1 7 4.45 2.080
I FAIR 181 1 7 4.09 2.051
I RIGHT 181 1 7 5.08 1.779
I FAMILY 181 1 7 3.79 2.155
I TRAD 181 1 7 3.61 2.102
I CULTURE 181 1 7 3.11 1.807
I CONTRACT 181 1 7 4.38 2.042
I PROMISE 181 1 7 4.19 2.065
I FRIENDS 181 1 7 5.20 1.833
I SUBJECT 181 1 7 4.15 2.269
D JUST 181 1 7 5.83 1.505
D FAIR 181 1 7 5.77 1.468
D RIGHT 181 1 7 6.19 1.134
D FAMILY 181 1 7 5.46 1.724
D TRAD 181 1 7 4.93 1.811
D CULTURE 181 1 7 4.47 1.864
D CONTRACT 181 1 7 4.96 1.973
D PROMISE 181 1 7 5.00 1.944
D FRIENDS 181 1 7 3.78 1.931
D SUBJECT 181 1 7 2.98 2.196
JUST 181 1 7 5.14 1.534
FAIR 181 1 7 4.93 1.523
RIGHT 181 1 7 5.64 1.264
FAMILY 181 1 7 4.62 1.652
TRAD 181 1.0 7.0 4.27 1.706
CULTURE 181 1.0 7.0 3.80 1.619
CONTRACT 181 1.0 7.0 4.71 1.705
PROMISE 181 1 7 4.59 1.749





1 7 3.56 1.695
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Table 2
Ethical Evaluation Demographic and Descriptive Statistics fo r  Models 4-6 and Models 7- 
9 (All Subjects)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
AGE 128 18 69 24.63 8.855
SEX(M) 128 0 1 .53 .501
I JUST 128 1 7 4.49 2.047
I FAIR 128 1 7 4.07 1.981
I RIGHT 128 1 7 5.30 1.638
I FAMILY 128 1 7 3.79 2.128
I TRAD 128 1 7 3.60 2.079
I CULTURE 128 1 7 2.94 1.724
I CONTRACT 128 1 7 4.44 2.023
I PROMISE 128 1 7 4.27 2.069
I FRIENDS 128 1 7 5.36 1.760
I SUBJECT 128 1 7 4.23 2.232
D JUST 128 1 7 5.76 1.571
D FAIR 128 1 7 5.74 1.497
D RIGHT 128 1 7 6.22 1.108
D FAMILY 128 1 7 5.47 1.716
D TRAD 128 1 7 4.84 1.911
D CULTURE 128 1 7 4.34 1.905
D CONTRACT 128 1 7 4.88 2.053
D PROMISE 128 1 7 4.91 2.033
D FRIENDS 128 1 7 3.79 1.893
D SUBJECT 128 1 7 2.41 1.825
JUST 128 1 7 5.13 1.561
FAIR 128 1 7 4.91 1.530
RIGHT 128 1 7 5.76 1.204
FAMILY 128 1 7 4.63 1.656
TRAD 128 1.0 7.0 4.219 1.732
CULTURE 128 1.0 7.0 3.641 1.595
CONTRACT 128 1.0 7.0 4.660 1.755
PROMISE 128 1 7 4.59 1.836





1 7 3.32 1.701
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Table 3
Ethical Evaluation Demographic and Descriptive Statistics/or Models 7-9 (High Moral
Capacity)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
AGE 64 19 60 24.84 8.429
SEX(M) 64 0 1 .58 .498
I JUST 64 1 7 4.91 1.925
I FAIR 64 1 7 4.58 1.950
I RIGHT 64 1 7 5.52 1.681
I FAMILY 64 1 7 4.16 2.110
I TRAD 64 1 7 3.89 2.032
I CULTURE 64 1 7 3.11 1.691
I CONTRACT 64 1 7 4.69 1.975
I PROMISE 64 1 7 4.48 1.992
I FRIENDS 64 1 7 5.38 1.628
I SUBJECT 64 1 7 3.91 2.252
D JUST 64 1 7 5.84 1.417
D FAIR 64 7 5.95 1.201
D RIGHT 64 7 6.36 .915
D FAMILY 64 1 7 5.52 1.643
D TRAD 64 1 7 4.91 1.779
D CULTURE 64 1 7 4.36 1.872
D CONTRACT 64 1 7 5.08 1.986
D PROMISE 64 1 7 4.89 2.063
D FRIENDS 64 1 7 4.00 1.826
D SUBJECT 64 1 7 2.44 1.790
JUST 64 2.0 7.0 5.38 1.464
FAIR 64 2.0 7.0 5.27 1.412
RIGHT 64 3 7 5.94 1.146
FAMILY 64 1 7 4.84 1.640
TRAD 64 1.5 7.0 4.40 1.589
CULTURE 64 1.0 7.0 3.73 1.527
CONTRACT 64 1 7 4.88 1.666
PROMISE 64 1 7 4.69 1.751





1.0 7.0 3.17 1.751
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Table 4
Ethical Evaluation Demographic and Descriptive Statistics fo r  Models 7-9 (Low Moral
Capacity)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
AGE 64 18 69 24.42 9.323
SEX(M) 64 0 1 .48 .504
I JUST 64 1 7 4.08 2.095
I FAIR 64 1 7 3.56 1.893
I RIGHT 64 1 7 5.08 1.577
I FAMILY 64 1 7 3.42 2.099
I TRAD 64 1 7 3.31 2.100
I CULTURE 64 1 7 2.77 1.752
I CONTRACT 64 1 7 4.19 2.054
I PROMISE 64 1 7 4.06 2.137
I FRIENDS 64 1 7 5.34 1.896
I SUBJECT 64 1 7 4.55 2.182
D JUST 64 1 7 5.67 1.719
D FAIR 64 1 7 5.53 1.727
D RIGHT 64 1 7 6.08 1.264
D FAMILY 64 1 7 5.42 1.798
D TRAD 64 1 7 4.77 2.045
D CULTURE 64 1 7 4.33 1.952
D CONTRACT 64 1 7 4.69 2.115
D PROMISE 64 1 7 4.92 2.018
D FRIENDS 64 1 7 3.58 1.950
D SUBJECT 64 1 7 2.39 1.874
JUST 64 1 7 4.88 1.626
FAIR 64 1 7 4.55 1.570
RIGHT 64 1 7 5.58 1.242
FAMILY 64 1 7 4.42 1.658
TRAD 64 1.0 7.0 4.04 1.859
CULTURE 64 1.0 7.0 3.55 1.666
CONTRACT 64 1.0 7.0 4.44 1.825
PROMISE 64 1 7 4.49 1.926





1 7 3.47 1.650
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Table 5
Religiousness Descriptive Statistics fo r  Models 1-3
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
11 181 0 7 5.28 1.967
2ES 181 0 7 3.06 1.889
3IR 181 0 7 4.93 2.137
41 181 0 7 5.55 1.809
51 181 0 7 5.05 2.088
6EP 181 0 7 4.11 1.983
71 181 0 7 4.81 2.137
8EP 181 0 7 4.57 2.209
9EP 181 0 7 4.88 1.907
10IR 181 0 7 4.31 2.225
11ES 181 0 7 2.08 1.518
121 181 0 7 4.24 2.187
13IR 181 0 7 4.10 2.298
Valid N (listwise) 181
Table 6
Religiousness Descriptive Statistics fo r  Models 7-9 (All Subjects)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
11 128 0 7 5.15 2.016
2ES 128 0 7 3.09 1.880
3IR 128 0 7 5.02 2.142
41 128 0 7 5.47 1.844
51 128 0 7 5.00 2.107
6EP 128 0 7 3.97 2.008
71 128 0 7 4.75 2.122
8EP 128 0 7 4.53 2.155
9EP 128 0 7 4.79 1.902
101R 128 0 7 4.40 2.182
11ES 128 0 7 2.09 1.506
121 128 0 7 4.24 2.091
13IR 128 0 7 4.16 2.285
Valid N (listwise) 128
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Table 7
Religiousness Descriptive Statistics fo r  Models 7-9 (High Moral Capacity)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
11 64 0 7 4.94 2.046
2ES 64 0 7 3.00 1.984
3IR 64 0 7 4.58 2.376
41 64 0 7 5.02 2.097
51 64 0 7 4.72 2.271
6EP 64 0 7 3.80 2.132
71 64 0 7 4.52 2.282
8EP 64 0 7 4.06 2.281
9EP 64 0 7 4.48 1.944
10IR 64 0 7 4.38 2.020
11ES 64 0 7 2.14 1.698
121 64 0 7 4.16 2.125
13IR 64 0 7 3.98 2.236
Valid N (listwise) 64
Table 8
Religiousness Descriptive Statistics fo r  Models 7-9 (Low Moral Capacity)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
11 64 0 7 5.36 1.979
2ES 64 0 7 3.19 1.781
3IR 64 1 7 5.47 1.790
41 64 1 7 5.92 1.429
51 64 0 7 5.28 1.906
6EP 64 0 7 4.14 1.876
71 64 0 7 4.98 1.939
8EP 64 0 7 5.00 1.927
9EP 64 0 7 5.09 1.823
10IR 64 0 7 4.42 2.349
11ES 64 0 7 2.03 1.297
121 64 0 7 4.33 2.071
13IR 64 0 7 4.33 2.337
Valid N (listwise) 64
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Both Gorsuch and McPherson (1989) and Allport and Ross (1967) include these 
original intrinsic religious items in their overall constructs. Gorsuch and McPherson 
(1989) indicate that the best univariate measure o f intrinsicness is “My whole approach to 
life is based on my religion.” This study employs the univariate measures of social 
extrinsicness and reverse intrinsicness, while maintaining the multivariate assessments of 
personal extrinsicness and intrinsic religiousness (Allport and Ross, 1967; Gorsuch and 
McPherson, 1989). Confirmatory factor analysis indicates that the single measures are 
essentially the same as the multiple measures; furthermore, the scale reduction adds to the 
model parsimony. As such, Models 1 -  3 which assess the hypothesized model o f tax 
evasion with respect to religiousness and ethical evaluation appear in Figures 5 — 7, 
respectively.
The Defining Issues Test
Last, each subject responded to survey items concerning five different social 
problems (Defining Issues Test— DIT 2, sample shown in Appendix C). The DIT 
activates moral schemas by rating and rankings issues in terms of importance judgments. 
If subjects encounter items that both make sense and tap into their preferred schema (i.e., 
activates schema), then those items should be rated and ranked highly. However, if  
subjects encounter items that either do not make sense or seem simplistic and 
unconvincing, then those items should receive a low rating and not be ranked highly. The 
DIT presents just enough o f a line o f argument to activate a schema, but not so much that 
the subject substitutes the meaning of the information presented for the meaning o f the 
schema already in the subject’s mind. Respondents scoring at higher levels of
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postconventional moral reasoning select items exhibiting a shareable ideal o f cooperation 
for all members o f society which should be open to scrutiny.
The current version of the DIT (DIT2) includes two moral judgment scores for 
which this study employs. First, the P-score refers to the extent to which a subject prefers 
postconventional moral thinking as indicated by the fifth and sixth stages o f moral 
reasoning (Bebeau and Thoma 2003). For each dilemma, participants receive four points, 
three points, two points, and one point for the most, second most, third most, and fourth 
most important postconventional item, respectively. O f the twelve items to be rated, three 
or four items correspond to the four item rankings representing the postconventional 
schema. Therefore, the P-score represents the percent o f the postconventional moral 
thinking that the participant ranked highly and can range from zero to 95. Second, the 
N2-score has two components: two-thirds of the extent that the subject prefers 
postconventional moral reasoning (i.e., the P-score) less one-third o f the degree 
preconventional moral reasoning receives higher ratings.
Flypothesized structural models (i.e., Model 4, Model 5, and Model 6) o f tax 
evasion regarding postconventional reasoning are assessed based on the participants’ DIT 
2 P-scores and N2-scores.. Furthermore, participants are dichotomized into above and 
below mean groups to assess the combined DIT 2 and ROS models (i.e., Model 7, Model 
8, and Model 9). Bebeau and Thoma (2003) indicate that the median level DIT 2 P-score 
for college students is approximately forty-five; however, no such measure is provided 
for the DIT 2 N2-score. For measures like the DIT 2 P-score and the N2-score, Shadish et 
al. (2002) indicate that dichotomizing the measure’s scores (e.g., postconventional and 
non-postconventional) strengthens the study’s internal validity. This cutoff seems
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appropriate given the study’s hypotheses concerning association of DIT 2 scores with 
variation in both ethical evaluation and intention to evade taxes.
Statistical Analyses
Factor analysis was conducted to validate the factor loadings for the ROS and 
MES item measures and the results were similar to prior research. Furthermore, the factor 
analytical process was performed for the combined DIT 2 P-score and N2-score construct 
representing postconventional reasoning. All factor items loaded reasonably high with 
their hypothesized construct indicating strong convergent validity while remaining 
unrelated to other model constructs indicating discriminant validity.
Furthermore, Structured Equation Modeling (SEM) was conducted to identify 
significant empirical paths for Models 1 -  9 as shown in Figures 8 -  23. A similar 
methodology was used in previous research to study religiousness, ethical evaluation, 
and/or tax evasion intentions (Barnett et al. 1996; Henderson and Kaplan 2005; 
Blanthome and Kaplan 2008). Path significance is tested from both the first-order 
intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness scales and the postconventional reasoning construct 
as measured by the DIT 2 P-score and N2-score (Models 4 -  6 as indicated in Figures 14 
- 1 6 ,  respectively) to ethical evaluation as determined by dimensions o f the MES (i.e., 
moral equity, relativism, contractualism). Furthermore, the combined effect of 
postconventional reasoning and religiousness on ethical evaluation is tested in Models 7 -  
9 as depicted in Figure 18. Last, all models (Models 1 -  9 as indicated in the 
aforementioned figures) tested the relationships from the ethical evaluation construct 
dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and contractualism) to tax evasion intention.












Figure 8 SEM Estimates o f the Effect o f the ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f  Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 1)
Religiousness Ethical Evaluation Tax Evasion Intentions
(income/deduction)












*** significant at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
Figure 9 SEM Estimates o f the Effect o f the ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 2)













* significant at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
Figure 10 SEM Estimates o f the Effect o f  the ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 3)









H3d (NS) H4a (-)
H3b (NS)
Contractualism
Figure 11 Hypothesized SEM o f the Effect o f the DIT 2 on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 4)









H3d (NS) H4a (-)
H3b (NS)
Contractualism
Figure 12 Hypothesized SEM o f the Effect o f the DIT 2 on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 5)











Figure 13 Hypothesized SEM o f the Effect o f the DIT 2 on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 6)










* significant at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
Figure 14 SEM Estimates o f the Effect o f the DIT 2 on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 4)








*** significant at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
Figure 15 SEM Estimates o f the Effect o f the DIT 2 on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tea Evasion Intentions (Model 5)
Moral Capacity Ethical Evaluation Tax Evasion Intentions
(income/deduction)
Moral Equity






*, **, *** significant at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
Figure 16 SEM Estimates o f  the Effect o f the DIT 2 on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 6)
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(Note: Dashed lines indicate relationships with hypothesized Moral Capacity differences.)
Figure 17 Hypothesized SE M of the Effect o f ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Models 7 - 9 )














(Note: Dashed lines indicate relationships with hypothesized High Moral Capacity differences.)
Figure 18 SEM Estimates o f the Effect o f the ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model la)











(Note: Dashed lines indicate relationships with hypothesized Low Moral Capacity differences.)
Tax Evasion
Figure 19 SEM Estimates o f the Effect o f the ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f  Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 7b)










(Note: Dashed lines indicate relationships with hypothesized High Moral Capacity differences.)
Figure 20 SEM Estimates o f the Effect o f the ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 8a)













(Note: Dashed lines indicate relationships with hypothesized Low Moral Capacity differences.)
Figure 21 SEM Estimates o f the Effect o f the ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 8b)













Figure 22 SEM Estimates o f  the Effect o f the ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 9a)













Figure 23 SEM Estimates o f the Effect o f the ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 9b)
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Based on prior research, ethical evaluation may either mediate or moderate both 
the moral capacity- and religiousness-tax evasion intention relationships (Grasmick et al. 
1991; Kaplan et al. 1997; Henderson and Kaplan 2005). Bonner (2008) defines a 
mediator as a necessary underlying factor in a person’s decision-making process; whereas 
a moderator simply determines the strength of the process-outcome relationship. These 
statistical methods are incorporated to assess the significance of the study’s posited 
hypotheses and to improve the generalization of the study’s findings.
CHAPTER FOUR
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Overview
This chapter presents the analyses and results o f the study. Instrument administration, 
demographic, and descriptive statistics are presented first. These are followed by 
summary statistics and tests o f the hypotheses using Structural Equation Modeling 
(SEM).
Instrument Administration
A single administrator distributed 243 assessment packages to potential participants, and 
each of these packages consisted of the following: (1) a human subjects’ consent form, 
(2) two tax evasion scenarios assessed via the Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES), (3) 
the Religious Orientation Scale (ROS), and (4) the updated Defining Issues Test (DIT 2). 
The subjects were undergraduate and graduate students from a medium-sized southern 
university. Because average package completion time was expected to be about one hour, 
respondents were allowed to complete the instruments on their own and return them to 
the administrator or to their course instructor (if applicable) who, in turn, forwarded the 
packages to the survey administrator. O f the packages distributed, 53 were not returned 
leaving 190 surveys collected. Of the instruments collected, nine were incomplete 
concerning either the MES or the ROS, and 53 failed validity checks for the
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DIT 2. Therefore, the final pairwise sample size was 181 for Models 1 -  3 and 128 for 
Models 4 - 9  (see Tables 9 - 1 1 ) .
Table 9
Moral Capacity Descriptive Statistics fo r  Models 4-9 (All Subjects)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
P SCORE 128 0 64 28.80 11.596
N2 SCORE 128 -4.58 64.59 27.2369 12.62661
PN2 128 -4.58 128.59 56.0385 23.26762
Valid N (listwise) 128
Table 10
Moral Capacity Descriptive Statistics fo r  Models 4-9 (High Moral Capacity)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
P SCORE 64 28 64 37.70 7.216
N2 SCORE 64 18.67 64.59 36.4725 8.04959
PN2 64 57.86 128.59 74.1695 13.79225
Valid N (listwise) 64
Table 11
Moral Capacity Descriptive Statistics fo r  Models 4-9 (Low Moral Capacity)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
P SCORE 64 0 38 19.91 7.630
N2 SCORE 64 -4.58 30.97 18.0013 9.12666
PN2 64 -4.58 57.32 37.9075 15.27181
Valid N (listwise) 64
The recommended sample size is ten respondents per estimated parameter (Hair et 
al. 2006; Byrne 2010). Models 1 -  3 each have 20 estimated items which yields a 
recommended sample size of 200 subjects rather than the 181 collected; however, Field 
(2009) maintains that a sample size from five to ten subjects per measured parameter is
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acceptable with appropriate model fit. Model fit is assessed in the next section of this 
chapter. The actual sample size for Models 4 - 6  appears to be adequate in that the 
models only have twelve estimated items each resulting in a recommended sample size of 
120 participants compared to the 128 collected. Models 7 - 9  compare higher moral 
capacity respondents with lower ones by splitting the DIT 2 sample (i.e., 128 subjects) at 
the mean, resulting in two samples o f 64 participants each. Like Models 1 - 3 ,  Models 7 
-  9 have 20 items to be estimated yielding a suggested sample size from the low- to the 
high-end of 100 and 200, respectively. However, Hair et al. (2006) indicate that with 
good model fit, even sample sizes o f those observed in Models 7 - 9  may be adequate. 
Again, model fit is examined in the next section o f this chapter.
Measurement Model Results 
Overall measurement quality for all models (i.e., Models 1 - 1 2 )  was 
simultaneously assessed using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) for a complete test of 
convergent and discriminant validity. A comparative analysis of relevant fit statistics for 
the each measurement model is presented in Table 12. First, preliminary tests o f Models 
1 -  3 suggested three items (i.e., two items of reverse intrinsicness and one item of social 
extrinsicness) with low factor loadings (i.e., below .40) be dropped from the models. 
Although these measures were eliminated, other items remained in the models which 
were similar to those purged (i.e., items measuring reverse intrinsicness and social 
extrinsicness). Additionally, two factors (i.e., Tax Evasion Intentions and the MES 
Contractualism dimension) which consisted o f only two items each required factor 
loadings to be set at .7 because at least one error variance was negative.
Table 12
Comparison o f Measurement Model Fit Statistics













Y 280.8 275.6 304.0 114.8 138.0 87.2 243.3 218.2 242.0 242.0 227.3 222.7
*df 157 157 157 46 46 46 158 158 158 158 158 158
p d f 1.789 1.755 1.936 2.495 3.000 1.897 1.542 1.381 1.532 1.532 1.439 1.410
3cn .94 .94 .93 .93 .91 .96 .90 .93 .90 .90 .91 .92
4rmse .06 .06 .07 .10 .12 .08 .09 .08 .09 .09 08 .08
Sample
Size 181 181 181 128 128 128 64 64 64 64 64 64
N)
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All factor loadings exceeded .5 except for the socially extrinsic item that read, “I 
go to church because it helps me make friends.” Perhaps respondents viewed this 
extrinsically categorized item as intrinsically oriented Christian fellowship. Regardless, 
consistent with the scale’s theory, the item was left in the model. Additionally, each 
indicator t-value is significant (p < .001). The overall fit supports the measurement 
analysis for Models 1 -  3. The x,2 fit statistic is 280.8, 275.6, and 304.0 for Models 1 -  3, 
respectively, with 157 degrees of freedom (df) for each model (p < .001). The x2/df is less 
than 1.94 for each model which is less than 2.00 as suggested (Hair et al. 2006; Byrnes 
2010). The comparative fit index (CFI) is at least .93 for each model for which Hair et al. 
(2006) and Byrnes (2010) agree that acceptable levels are above .9. Furthermore, the root 
mean squared error (RMSE) which measures badness o f fit is below .07 for each model 
(Models 1 -  3). Statisticians suggest that the RMSE should be below .08 (Hair et al. 
2006; Bymes 2010); therefore, Models 1 -  3 fulfill this requirement. Given the indicated 
good model fit, the sample size for Models 1 -  3 appear to be acceptable; therefore, the 
measures are adequate for further analysis.
Second, initial tests of Models 4 - 6  did not indicate any necessary model changes 
due to low factor loadings; however the Relativism dimension (i.e., a two-measure 
construct) of the MES had at least one negative error variance. Therefore, factor loadings 
for the Relativism construct were set at .7 for each of its two items. All factor loadings 
exceeded .7 except for the peer assessment item that read, “The probability that my 
friends would undertake the same action is ...” This item was added to the scale to 
minimize the bias often evident in self-reports o f deviant actions such as tax evasion. 
Based on a seven-point scale, respondents rated the likelihood that their friends would
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cheat (i.e., mean = 4.57) higher than that o f themselves (i.e., mean = 3.32) as indicated in 
Table 2. Concerning factor loadings, Models 4 - 6  were superior to those of Models 1 -  
3. Additionally, each indicator t-value is significant (p < .001). The overall fit supports 
the measurement analysis for Models 4 - 6 .  The %2 fit statistic is 114.8, 138.0, and 87.2 
for Models 4 - 6 ,  respectively, with 46 degrees o f freedom (df) for each model (p < .001). 
The x /df is only less than 2.00 for Model 6 (i.e., income scenario); whereas, the x /d f for 
Model 4 and Model 5 are 2.50 and 3.00, respectively which exceeds the rule o f thumb 
(Hair et al. 2006; Byrnes 2010). The CFI is at least .91 for each model for which Hair et 
al. (2006) and Byrnes (2010) agree that acceptable levels are above .9. Furthermore, the 
RMSE is below .08 for Model 6 (i.e., income scenario), but is .11 and .13 for Model 4 
and Model 5, respectively. Statisticians suggest that the RMSE should be below .08 (Hair 
et al. 2006; Bymes 2010). Given the moderate model fit, the measures appear adequate 
for further analysis; however, concerns about model fit for Models 4 — 6 are discussed as 
limitations of this study in Chapter Five.
Third, Models 7 - 1 2  compared higher moral capacity respondents with lower 
ones splitting the DIT sample size in half for each group (i.e., 64 subjects in each 
sample). Preliminary tests of Models 7 - 9  exhibited similar factor loading concerns as 
did Models 1 - 3 ;  therefore, the model changes made for Models 1 — 3 were also made 
for Models 7 - 9 .  Considering Models 7 - 9 ,  all factor loadings exceeded .5 except for the 
socially extrinsic item that was previously discussed in the assessment o f Models 1 - 3 .  
With respect to factor loadings, Models 7 -  9 for both higher and lower moral capacity 
subjects were similar or better than those of Models 1 -  6. As in the case o f Models 1 -  6, 
each indicator t-value was significant (p < .001) for Models 7 - 9 ,  and the overall fit
127
supports the measurement analysis for the models. The %2 fit statistic is less than 243.3 
for Models 7 -  9 for both higher and lower moral capacity respondents, with 158 degrees 
of freedom (df) for each model (p < .001). The y?/d f is less than 1.60 for all models which 
is less than 2.00 as suggesting good fit (Hair et al. 2006; Byrnes 2010). The CFI is at least 
.9 for each model for which Hair et al. (2006) and Byrnes (2010) agree that acceptable 
levels are above .9. Furthermore, the RMSE is below .08 for Model 7 (i.e., combined 
scenario) and Model 9 (i.e., income scenario) and merely .09 for Model 8 (i.e., deduction 
scenario). RMSEs below .08 suggest good fit (Hair et al. 2006; Byrnes 2010). Models 7 -  
9 have the best overall fit of any o f the models tested in this study. Given this model fit, 
the measures appear adequate for further analysis even though the sample size (i.e., 64 
respondents) for these models appeared at first glance to be somewhat small. Precautions 
about small sample size are discussed as a limitation of this study.
Hypotheses Testing
To test the study’s hypotheses, nine structural models are evaluated. The nine 
models consist o f three models (i.e., income case, deduction case, and a combination of 
the previous cases) o f the effect of each of the following on the ethical evaluation of tax 
evasion intentions: religiousness, moral capacity, and a mixture o f religiousness and 
moral capacity considering high and low moral capacity. Summary results for the study’s 
hypotheses are presented in Table 13.
Table 13






H la Intrinsic Religiousness —► Moral Equity Dimension of MES Positive Positive **
Hlb Intrinsic Religiousness —*• Contractualism Dimension of MES Positive Positive NS
Hlc Intrinsic Religiousness —*■ Relativism Dimension of MES Negative Positive NS
Hid Intrinsic Religiousness —► Tax Evasion Intentions (larger than extrinsic) Negative Negative *
H2a Extrinsic Religiousness —> Moral Equity Dimension of MES Negative Negative **
H2b Extrinsic Religiousness —► Contractualism Dimension of MES Negative Negative **
H2c Extrinsic Religiousness —► Relativism Dimension of MES Positive Negative *
H2d Extrinsic Religiousness —*■ Tax Evasion Intentions (smaller than 
intrinsic)
Negative Positive NS
H3a Postconventional Moral Capacity —► Moral Equity Dimension of MES Positive Positive **
H3b Postconventional Moral Capacity —► Contractualism Dimension of MES Not Related Positive NS
H3c Postconventional Moral Capacity —> Relativism Dimension of MES Not Related Positive *
H3d Postconventional Moral Capacity —* Tax Evasion Intentions Not Related Mixed NS
H4a All MES Dimensions —* Tax Evasion Intentions (simultaneous) Negative Negative ***
H4b All MES Dimensions —> Tax Evasion Intentions (deduction) Negative Negative **
H4c Moral Equity MES Dimension —► Tax Evasion Intentions (income) Negative Negative ***





Religious Orientation Hypotheses 
The hypotheses related to intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness are assessed via 
structural Model 1 (i.e., combined case), Model 2 (i.e., deduction case), and Model 3 
(income case) as indicated in Figures 8-10. Before evaluating the models’ results, model 
fit statistics are examined and presented in Table 14. The x2 fit statistics are 287.9, 278.9, 
and 321.6 for Models 1-3, respectively. The accompanying degrees of freedom (df) for 
each model are 160 resulting in a significant p-value for each model (p < .001). The x2/df 
for Models 1-3 are 1.82, 1.77, and 2.04, respectively. These are all less than 2.00 except 
for Model 3 (i.e., income case) which is slightly over the suggested limit representing 
good model fit (Hair et al. 2006; Byrnes 2010). The comparative fit indexes (CFI) are 
.94, .94, and .92 for Models 1-3, respectively. Hair et al. (2006) and Byrnes (2010) agree 
that acceptable levels of CFI are above .9. Furthermore, the root mean squared errors 
(RMSEs) which measures badness o f fit are .06, .06, and .07, respectively. These 
measures are all below the recommended .08 suggesting good model fit (Hair et al. 2006; 
Byrnes 2010). Additionally, each estimated indicator t-value is significant for each 
model’s constructs (p < .001). The overall fit supports the structural analysis for Models 
1-3. Given the indicated good model fit and acceptable sample sizes, Models 1-3 are 
adequate for further analysis.
Table 14
Comparison o f Structural Model Fit Statistics













y 287.9 278.9 321.6 115.9 138.2 93.3 460.4 480.0 485.1 506.5 446.9 469.5
-df 158 158 158 47 47 47 320 332 320 332 320 332
X '/d f 1.822 1.765 2.036 2.467 2.941 1.987 1.439 1.446 1.516 1.526 1.397 1.414
'CFI .94 .94 .92 .94 .91 .95 .92 .91 .90 .90 .92 .91
4RMSE .06 .06 .07 .10 .12 .08 .11 .09 .06 .06 .05 .05
RJ .33 .27 .34 .43 .47 .39 .14 .37 .35 .40 .17 .38
Sample
Size 181 181 181 128 128 128 64 64 64 64 64 64
'Chi Square 
'Degrees of Freedom 
3Comparitive Fit Index 
4Root Mean Squared Error
5Higher Moral Capacity as measured by the DIT 2 P-score and N2-score 
6Lower Moral Capacity as measured by the DIT 2 P-score and N2-score
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Intrinsic Religiousness Hypotheses
Hypotheses H la through H id regarding intrinsic religiousness and hypotheses 
H2a through H2d with respect to extrinsic religiousness are evaluated via Models 1-3 as 
shown in Figures 8-10. First, H la  posits that intrinsic religiousness is positively related to 
the moral equity dimension of the multidimensional ethics scale (MES). Models 1-3 each 
support this hypothesis in that their standardized regression weights are all positive (i.e., 
.23, .20, and .21, respectively) and significant (p < .05).
Second, H lb  predicts a direct relationship between intrinsic religiousness and the 
contractualism dimension of the MES. This prediction is not supported by Models 1-3. 
The standardized regression weights for Models 1-3 are in the predicted direction (i.e., 
.15, .14, and .14, respectively); however, their suggested paths are not significant.
Third, H lc asserts that intrinsic religiousness is negatively associated with the 
relativism dimension of the MES. Models 1-3 also do not support this conjecture in that 
the standardized regression weights for Model 1 (i.e., combined cases) and Model 3 (i.e., 
income case) are not in the predicted direction (i.e., .04 and .17, respectively) compared 
with that o f Model 2 (i.e., deduction case) -.12. However, none of the indicated paths 
have a significant p-value with respect to any of the models.
Last, H id hypothesizes that intrinsic religiousness is negatively related to tax 
evasion intention as assessed by the MES and has a larger negative effect than extrinsic 
religiousness. Models 1-3 all have standardized regression weights in the predicted 
direction (i.e., -.19, -.27, and -.09, respectively) with Model 2 (i.e., deduction scenario) 
indicating the strongest association. Although the standardized regression weights are all 
in the anticipated direction, only Model 1 and Model 2 are statistically significant at the
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.10 level while Model 3 is not significant at any relevant level. Therefore, Models 1-3 
partially support the first part o f Hid. The second portion o f the hypothesis is evaluated 
in the next section.
Extrinsic Religiousness Hypotheses
Hypotheses H2a through H2d with respect to extrinsic religiousness are evaluated 
via Models 1-3 as shown in Figures 8-10. First, H2a posits that extrinsic religiousness is 
negatively associated with the moral equity dimension of the MES. Models 1-3 
moderately support this prediction. Models 1-3 have standardized regression weights in 
the anticipated direction (i.e., -.26, -.15, and -.26, respectively); however, Model 2 (i.e., 
deduction case) is not significant whereas Model 1 (i.e., combined cases) and Model 3 
(i.e., income scenario) are statistically significant at the .05 level
Second, H2b predicts an indirect relationship between extrinsic religiousness and 
the contractualism dimension of the MES. This prediction is moderately supported by 
Models 1-3. The standardized regression weights for Models 1-3 are in the predicted 
direction (i.e., -.23, -.14, and -.26, respectively); however, the statistical significance of 
these paths vary. The extrinsic-contractualism path for Model 1 (i.e., combined scenarios) 
is significant at the .10 level and that for Model 3 (i.e., income case) is significant at the 
.05 level; however, the respective path for Model 2 is not significant at any reasonable 
level.
Third, H2c asserts that extrinsic religiousness is directly associated with the 
relativism dimension of the MES. Models 1-3 do not support this conjecture in that the 
standardized regression weights for Model 1 (i.e., combined cases) and Model 3 (i.e., 
income case) are not in the predicted direction (i.e., -.13 and -.25, respectively) compared
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with that o f Model 2 (i.e., deduction case) .02. Furthermore, only the indicated extrinsic- 
relativism path for Model 3 has a significant p-value at the .05 level; however, the 
standardized regression weight is not in the anticipated direction.
Last, H2d hypothesizes that extrinsic religiousness is negatively related to tax 
evasion intention as assessed by the MES and has a smaller negative effect than intrinsic 
religiousness. Neither of the standardized regression weights for Models 1-3 are in the 
predicted direction (i.e., .11, .16, and .11, respectively) nor are they statistically 
significant at any of the normal alpha levels. Therefore, the first part o f this hypothesis is 
not supported via Models 1-3 and the last part o f this hypothesis is not relevant for this 
prediction. However, the fact that H2d is rejected strengthens the support for H id  which 
predicts that intrinsic religiousness is indirectly associated with tax evasion intentions and 
has a larger effect than extrinsic religiousness.
The following summarizes the results o f H la-H ld  and H2a-H2d concerning 
intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness. First, higher intrinsic religious assessments are 
associated with higher evaluations that tax evasion is unjust, unfair, immoral, and 
unacceptable to the respondents family as measured by the moral equity dimension o f the 
MES, regardless o f the type of hypothetical tax scenario (i.e., income case, deduction 
case, or a combination of the cases). Second, higher extrinsic religious measures are 
related to lower assessments of moral equity and implied contracts as represented by the 
MES for the hypothetical income tax case and the combined scenarios, but not for the 
deduction case. Last, increases in intrinsicness are significantly associated with decreases 
in tax evasion intentions considering the effects of the MES dimensions (i.e., moral
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equity, relativism, and contractual ism). However, extrinsic religiousness is not related to 
tax evasion intentions when accounting for MES dimensions.
Moral Capacity Hypotheses 
The hypotheses related to moral capacity are assessed via structural Model 4 (i.e., 
combined case), Model 5 (i.e., deduction case), and Model 6 (income case) as indicated 
in Figures 14-16. Before evaluating the models’ results, model fit statistics are examined 
and presented in Table 14. The %2 fit statistics are 115.9, 138.2, and 93.3 for Models 4-6, 
respectively. The accompanying degrees o f freedom for each model are 47 resulting in a 
significance p-value for each model (p < .001). The x2/df for Models 4-6 are 2.47, 2.94, 
and 1.99, respectively. Chi square/df for Model 3 (i.e., income case) is the only one 
which is less than the suggested limit o f 2.00 representing good model fit (Hair et al. 
2006; Byrnes 2010). The CFIs are .94, .91, and .95 for Models 4-6, respectively. Hair et 
al. (2006) and Byrnes (2010) agree that acceptable CFIs are above .9. Furthermore, the 
RMSEs which measure badness of fit are .10, .12, .08, respectively. Again, only Model 3 
(i.e., income case) is below the recommended .08 suggesting good model fit (Hair et al. 
2006; Byrnes 2010). Additionally, each estimated indicator t-value is significant for each 
model’s constructs (p < .001). The overall fit supports the structural analysis for Model 6 
and perhaps Model 4 and Model 5, since their CFIs indicate good model fit. The 
moderate fit of structural Models 4 and 5 is a potential limitation to this study. Given the 
indicated good to moderate model fit and acceptable sample sizes, Models 4-6 are 
adequate for further analysis.
Hypotheses H3a through H3d regarding postconventional moral capacity are 
evaluated via Models 4-6 as shown in Figures 14-16. First, H3a posits that
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postconventional moral capacity is positively related to the moral equity dimension o f the 
multidimensional ethics scale (MES). Models 4-6 each support this hypothesis in that 
their standardized regression weights are all positive (i.e., .14, .05, and .16, respectively) 
and statistically significant (p < .10, p < .05, and p < .05, respectively).
Second, H3b predicts no relationship between postconventional moral capacity 
and the contractualism dimension of the MES. This prediction is partially supported by 
Models 4-6. The standardized regression weights for Models 4-6 are all positive (i.e., .16, 
.08, and .16, respectively); however, two o f their suggested paths are significant. The 
Model 4 (i.e., combined scenarios) and the Model 6 (i.e., income case) postconventional 
moral capacity-contractualism paths are statistically significant at the .10 level; whereas, 
Model 5 (i.e., deduction scenario) is not significant at normal alpha levels.
Third, H3c asserts that postconventional moral capacity is not associated with the 
relativism dimension of the MES. Models 4-6 support this conjecture. Although, the 
standardized regression weights for Models 4-6 are all positive (i.e., .09, .01, and .15, 
respectively), none of the indicated paths have a significant p-value with respect to any of 
the fore mentioned models.
Last, H3d hypothesizes that postconventional moral capacity is not related to tax 
evasion intention as assessed by the MES. Models 4-6 all have standardized regression 
weights in differing directions (i.e., .01, -.03, and -.01, respectively). In addition to the 
standardized regression weights being in conflicting directions, no model is statistically 
significant at any relevant level. Therefore, Models 4-6 support the hypothesis that 
postconventional moral capacity is not associated with tax evasion intentions.
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The following summarizes the results o f H3a-H3d concerning postconventional 
moral reasoning. First, like measures o f intrinsic religiousness, higher levels of 
postconventional reasoning are associated with higher evaluations that tax evasion is 
unjust, unfair, immoral, and unacceptable to the respondents family as measured by the 
moral equity dimension of the MES, regardless o f the type of hypothetical tax scenario 
(i.e., income case, deduction case, or a combination o f the cases). Second, assessments of 
postconventional moral reasoning are not related to assessments o f relativism as 
measured by the MES. The insignificance in the postconventional reasoning-relativism 
path holds for all hypothetical tax cases (i.e., income, deduction, and the combined 
scenarios). Third, increases in postconventional moral thinking are significantly 
associated with increases in implied contractual ism as measured by the MES for Model 4 
(i.e., combined case) and Model 6 (i.e., income case), but not for Model 5 (i.e., deduction 
case). Last, postconventional moral reasoning is not related to tax evasion intentions 
when accounting for MES dimensions, regardless o f the type o f hypothetical tax scenario.
Ethical Evaluation Hypotheses 
The hypotheses related to ethical evaluation are assessed via structural Models 1 - 
6 as indicated in Figures 8-10 for Models 1-3 and in Figures 14-16 for Models 4-6. Fit 
statistics in Table 14 have been examined for all these models, and all models indicated 
relatively good fit conducive for further analysis. First, H4a posits that when income and 
deduction scenarios are simultaneously evaluated, all three MES dimensions (i.e., moral 
equity, relativism, and contractualism) will be negatively related with tax evasion 
intentions. Model 1 and Model 4 are assessed to evaluate H4a. The regression weights for 
all paths from the moral equity and relativism dimensions of the MES to tax evasion
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intentions are in the predicted direction (i.e., negative) and are statistically significant (p
< .001). However, although regression estimates are in the predicted direction for the 
contractualism dimension of the MES, the estimates are either only moderately 
significant (p < .10) as for Model 4 (i.e., moral capacity effects) or insignificant as in the 
case of Model 1 (i.e., religiousness effects). Therefore, H4a is supported with respect to 
the moral equity and relativism dimensions o f the MES, but not for the contractualism 
dimension of the construct.
Second, H4b asserts that when deduction cases are independently evaluated, all 
three MES dimensions will be inversely associated with tax evasion intentions. Model 2 
and Model 5 are assessed to evaluate H4b. The regression weights for all paths from all 
MES dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and contractualism) to tax evasion 
intentions are in the predicted direction (i.e., negative) and are statistically significant (p
< .05) for Model 5 (i.e., moral capacity effects). However, although regression estimates 
are in the predicted direction for Model 2 (i.e., religious effects), the estimate is only 
significant (p < .001) as for the relativism dimension o f the MES. Consequently, the 
results indicate that H4b is supported when ethical evaluation is related to 
postconventional moral reasoning, but not necessarily when associated with religious 
orientation.
Last, H4c predicts that only the moral equity dimension of the MES will be 
indirectly linked with tax evasion intentions when income scenarios are independently 
evaluated. Model 3 and Model 6 are assessed to evaluate H4c. Like the results for H4a, 
the regression weights for all paths from the moral equity and relativism dimensions of 
the MES to tax evasion intentions are in the predicted direction (i.e., negative) and are
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statistically significant (p < .001). Also, similar to the findings for H4a, the regression 
estimates are in the predicted direction for the contractualism dimension o f the MES; 
however, the estimates are insignificant for both Model 3 (i.e., religiousness effects) and 
Model 6 (i.e., moral capacity effects). Therefore, H4c is supported with respect to the 
moral equity and relativism dimensions o f the MES, but not for the contractualism 
dimension of the construct.
To summarize the findings for the ethical evaluation hypotheses, all 
postconventional moral capacity models (i.e., Models 4-6) generally support a negative 
association between each of the MES dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and 
contractualism) and tax evasion intentions. However, only the moral equity and 
relativism dimensions of the MES are significantly inversely related to probable tax 
evasive practices for religious orientation models (i.e., Models 1-3).
Religiousness Across Moral Capacity 
Levels Research Question
The research question related to religiousness across high and low levels of 
postconventional moral capacity is assessed via structural Model 7 (i.e., combined case), 
Model 8 (i.e., deduction case), and Model 9 (income case) as indicated in Figures 18-23. 
Specifically, the research question addresses whether the model o f the ideological factors 
of tax compliance improves when religiousness is evaluated across levels o f moral 
capacity. This research question requires testing the aforementioned structural models on 
the overall sample and on a dichotomously divided sample of high and low moral 
reasoning. Before evaluating the models’ results, model fit statistics are examined. The
' j
X/df for each model is less than 1.53 which is less than the suggested limit of 2.00
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representing good model fit (Hair et al. 2006; Byrnes 2010). Furthermore, the CFIs are 
greater than .90 for which Hair et al. (2006) and Bymes (2010) agree are acceptable for 
good fit. Moreover, the RMSEs are less than the recommended .08 except for Model 7 
(i.e., combined cases) which is .11 and .09 for the totally free and constrained models, 
respectively (Hair et al. 2006; Bymes 2010). Additionally, each estimated indicator t- 
value is significant for each model’s constructs (p < .001). The overall fit supports the 
structural analysis for Model 8 and Model 9 and perhaps Model 7. Given the indicated 
good model fit and acceptable sample sizes, Models 7-9 appear adequate for further 
analysis.
Factor structure invariance across postconventional moral capacity levels is 
examined by comparing the totally free model with the model o f constrained 
measurement weights. As indicated in Table 14, the x,2 fit statistics for Model 7 (i.e., 
combination of the income and deduction scenarios) are 460.4 and 480.0 for the 
unconstrained and constrained models, respectively. Furthermore, the related degrees of 
freedom are 332 and 320 for the unconstrained and constrained models, correspondingly. 
The difference between the x2 and degrees of freedom is 19.7 and 12, respectively which 
is marginally significant (p > .10). This finding provides moderate evidence that the 
factor weights hold across high and low postconventional levels for Model 7. Next, for
■y
Model 8 (i.e., deduction case), the x fit statistics are 485.1 and 506.5 for the 
unconstrained and constrained models, respectively. Furthermore, the related degrees of 
freedom are 332 and 320 for the unconstrained and constrained models. The difference 
between the % and degrees of freedom is 21.4 and 12, respectively which is significant (p 
< .05). This finding provides evidence that the factor weights are not constant across high
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and low postconventional levels for Model 8. Last, for Model 9 (i.e., income case), the % 
fit statistics are 446.9 and 469.5 for the unconstrained and constrained models, 
respectively. Furthermore, the related degrees o f freedom are 332 and 320 for the 
unconstrained and constrained models. The difference between the x  and degrees of 
freedom is 22.6 and 12, respectively which is significant (p < .05). Like that o f Model 8, 
this finding provides evidence that the factor weights are not constant across high and 
low postconventional levels for Model 9.
In addition to factor structure invariance which measures the stability of factor 
loadings across postconventional levels, model R2 s may be compared to assess the 
quality o f the each models (Models 1-9) predictions. As indicated in Table 14, the R2 s for 
Models 1-3 (i.e., religious orientation models) are slightly lower than those of Models 4-6 
(i.e., moral capacity models). Furthermore, R2 s for Models 7-9 (i.e., models combining 
religiousness and morality) for higher postconventional reasoning are generally lower 
than all other models. Moreover, R2 s for lower postconventional moral capacity are 
nearly as high as Models 4-6. Therefore, the moral capacity models (i.e., Models 4-6) 
seem to not only be more predictive than the combined religiousness-morality models 
(i.e., Models 7-9), but also the stand-alone religiousness models (i.e., Models 1-3). 
Therefore, both the lack structural invariance across levels o f moral capacity for two of 
the three models (i.e., Models 8 and 9) and lower R2 s for most models (i.e., Models 7-9) 
indicate that the models o f the ideological factors o f tax compliance (i.e., Models 7-9) do 
not seem to improve when religiousness is evaluated across levels of moral capacity.
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Overview
The purpose o f this chapter is to summarize the findings o f this study and their 
implications to tax compliance research. Furthermore, limitations o f the study are 
evaluated and suggestions for future research are discussed along with concluding 
remarks.
Summary of Previous Chapters
Chapter One highlights the continuing concern with respect to the widening o f the 
tax gap. The chapter outlines the various economic and behavioral theories used to 
explain and predict income tax compliance. Furthermore, ideological factors such as 
religiousness and morality are suggested as antecedents o f ethical evaluations to predict 
tax evasion intentions. The study analyzes the question whether religion, morality, or 
some combination of the two matter relating to the ethical evaluation of tax evasion 
intentions. Chapter One culminates by briefly identifying the study’s results and outlining 
the research process.
Selected tax compliance literature is reviewed in Chapter Two. First, this study’s 
research design includes low Internal Revenue Service visibility (i.e., low opportunity o f 
getting caught evading taxes) based on the assertions o f General Deterrence Theory
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(GDT) and subadditivity of decision weights from Prospect Theory. Next, the chapter 
assesses behavioral theories of fairness (i.e., Fiscal Psychology), social contracts (i.e., 
Social Norms), and behavioral intentions (i.e., Theory of Planned Behavior). Following 
these behavioral conceptualizations, ideological postulations are described including: 
Multidimensional Ethics, Religious Orientation, and Moral Reasoning. The 
Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) combines the concepts of fairness, social contracts, 
and greater good while evaluating an ethical dilemma (i.e., tax evasion intentions). 
Moreover, the Religious Orientation Scale (ROS) measures the extent to which one’s 
religiousness is either intrinsically or extrinsically motivated. Furthermore, the Defining 
Issues Test (DIT 2) assesses the level o f postconventional moral capacity. 
Postconventional thinkers desire to create a society that appeals to a sharable social ideal 
which is fair to all societal members and open to scrutiny. The research design includes 
both the ROS and the DIT 2 as antecedents to the MES in that they are posited to 
influence the ethical evaluation of tax evasion intentions. Last, Chapter Two develops the 
study’s research hypotheses.
Chapter Three describes the research methodology by describing the study’s 
participants, three-part questionnaire (i.e., MES, ROS, and DIT 2), and statistical 
analyses. Following the research design, Chapter Four analyzes the data and presents the 
results of the research.
Summary of Research Findings
Cruz et al. (2000, p. 239) states, “ ...future research could investigate whether the 
effects o f personal characteristics such as cognitive moral development or personal 
values influence their deontological and teleological evaluations of ethical dilemmas, and
143
whether those evaluations in turn influence ethical judgments and intentions.” Based on 
the previous statement, this study examines three complementary research questions. 
First, do personal religious beliefs matter with respect to the ethical evaluation o f tax 
evasion intentions? Similarly, the second question is whether moral capacity matters 
regarding the ethical evaluation of tax evasion intentions? The last inquiry considers 
interactive effects and questions whether cognitive moral development interacts with 
personal religious beliefs when considering the ethical evaluation of tax evasive 
practices?
The Importance o f  Religiousness 
Concerning the first question, Figures 5-7 indicate that religiousness is posited to 
directly influence the ethical evaluation of one’s tax reporting decisions. Tax and non-tax 
studies generally find that intrinsic religiousness or a deontological perspective is directly 
related to both the moral equity dimension o f the MES (Collins and Daniel 1996; Knotts 
et al. 2000; Henderson and Kaplan 2005) and the contractualism dimension of the MES 
(R&R 1988; Henderson and Kaplan 2005), but inversely related to the relativism 
dimension of the MES and tax evasion intentions (Grasmick et al. 1991; Barnett et al. 
1996; Clark and Dawson 1996). However, insignificant correlations are also found 
between intrinsic religiousness or a deontological perspective and the relativism 
dimension of the MES (Henderson and Kaplan 2005), the contractualism dimension of 
the MES (Barnett et al. 1996), and tax evasion intentions (Donahue 1985; Henderson and 
Kaplan 2005). Thus, when considering the relationship between intrinsic religiousness 
and the dimensions of the MES, only the moral equity dimension is expected to be 
consistently significant.
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Moreover, tax and non-tax studies have found inverse correlations between 
extrinsic religiousness or a teleological perspective and both the moral equity and the 
contractualism dimensions of the MES (R&R 1988; Clark and Dawson 1996; Henderson 
and Kaplan 2005), and a direct association with the relativism dimension of the MES 
(Henderson and Kaplan 2005). However, Donahue (1985) and Henderson and Kaplan 
(2005) find an insignificant correlation between extrinsic religiousness or a teleological 
perspective and tax evasion intentions. Therefore, extrinsic religiousness has been 
significantly related to the MES dimensions, but not directly associated with tax evasion 
intentions.
Considering the previous research with respect to intrinsic and extrinsic 
religiousness, the following hypotheses are offered:
Hla: Intrinsic religiousness is positively related to the moral equity dimension
of the MES.
Hlb: Intrinsic religiousness is positively related to the contractualism dimension 
of the MES.
Hlc: Intrinsic religiousness is negatively related to the relativism dimension of
the MES.
Hid: Intrinsic religiousness is negatively related to tax evasion intentions as 
assessed by the MES and has a larger negative effect than extrinsic religiousness. 
H2a: Extrinsic religiousness is negatively related to the moral equity dimension
of the MES.
H2b: Extrinsic religiousness is negatively related to the contractualism
dimension of the MES.
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H2c: Extrinsic religiousness is positively related to the relativism dimension of
the MES.
H2d: Extrinsic religiousness is not related to tax evasion intentions as assessed 
by the MES and has a smaller negative effect than intrinsic religiousness.
Table 13 summarizes the results o f H la-H ld  and H2a-H2d concerning intrinsic 
and extrinsic religiousness. First, higher intrinsic religious assessments are associated 
with higher evaluations that tax evasion is unjust, unfair, immoral, and unacceptable to 
the respondents family as measured by the moral equity dimension o f the MES, 
regardless of the type of hypothetical tax scenario (i.e., income case, deduction case, or a 
combination o f the cases). This finding provides support for HI a. Second, higher 
extrinsic religious measures are related to lower assessments o f moral equity and implied 
contracts as represented by the MES for the hypothetical income tax case and the 
combined scenarios, but not for the deduction case. This finding provides partial support 
for both H2a and H2b. Last, increases in intrinsicness are significantly associated with 
decreases in tax evasion intentions considering the effects o f the MES dimensions (i.e., 
moral equity, relativism, and contractualism). However, extrinsic religiousness is not 
related to tax evasion intentions when accounting for MES dimension effects. These last 
findings confirm the results indicated by previous research.
The Importance o f  Moral Judgment 
Concerning the second question about moral judgment, Figures 11-13 indicate 
that postconventional moral reasoning is an antecedent to the ethical evaluation of one’s 
tax reporting decisions. The highest level o f development, the postconventional schema 
(i.e., Kohlberg’s stages five and six), emphasizes society-creating with a justice
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orientation. Postconventional thinkers view rules, roles, laws, and institution as serving 
some sharable concept of cooperation (Rest et al. 1999). In particular, postconventional 
reasoners are concerned about maintaining an ideal societal structure for all members of 
society which must be open to scrutiny. Studies have found that the MES outperforms the 
DIT in predicting behavioral intent (Cohen et al. 1996; Shawver and Sennetti 2009). 
However, Weber (1996) indicates that the DIT is neither equal to the MES, nor is it 
intended to be. Moreover, Weber resolves that the MES may be a compliment (e.g., 
justice orientation), not a replacement, to the DIT and Kohlbergian Theory. Concerning 
the DIT P-score and the prediction of behavioral intent, previous research has not only 
found that higher P-scores are related to lower tax evasion intentions (Kaplan et al. 1997; 
Fisher 1999; Trivedi et al. 2003), but also found no relation between P-scores and tax 
evasion intentions (Troutman et al. 1995; Shawver and Sennetti 2009).
Considering the previous research with respect to moral capacity, the following 
hypotheses are offered:
H3a: Postconventional moral capacity is positively related to the moral equity
dimension of the MES.
H3b: Postconventional moral capacity is not related to the contractualism 
dimension of the MES.
H3c: Postconventional moral capacity is not related to the relativism dimension
of the MES.
H3d: Postconventional moral capacity is not related to tax evasion intentions as 
assessed by the MES.
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The finding related to the preceding postconventional moral reasoning hypotheses 
may be summarized as follows. First, like measures o f intrinsic religiousness, higher 
levels o f postconventional moral thinking are associated with higher evaluations that tax 
evasion is unjust, unfair, immoral, and unacceptable to the respondents family as 
measured by the moral equity dimension of the MES, regardless o f the type of 
hypothetical tax scenario (i.e., income case, deduction case, or a combination o f the 
cases). This finding substantially provides support for H3a. Second, increases in 
postconventional moral thinking are significantly associated with increases in implied 
contractualism as measured by the MES for Model 4 and Model 6, but not for Model 5 
(i.e., deduction case). This finding offers partial support for H3b particularly for the 
understatement o f income case. Third, assessments of postconventional moral reasoning 
are not related to values o f relativism as measured by the MES. The insignificance in the 
postconventional reasoning-relativism path holds for all hypothetical tax cases (i.e., 
income, deduction, and the combined scenarios). Therefore, the study’s findings do not 
support H3c. Last, postconventional moral reasoning is not related to tax evasion 
intentions when accounting for MES dimensions, regardless of the type o f hypothetical 
tax scenario. This finding provides support for H3d which is consistent with the assertion 
that morality is a philosophical rather than a behavioral concept and may not accurately 
measure behavioral intent or action (Kohlberg 1981).
Ethical Evaluation
Regarding the MES and ethical evaluation, individuals tend to rely on a broad 
sense of moral equity dominated by concerns for fairness and justice, tempered by 
relativistic and implied social contract deontological dimensions. Prior research generally
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finds that all three MES dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and contractualism) 
are indirectly related to the evaluation o f unethical behavior, such as tax evasion 
intentions (R&R 1988, 1990; Cohen et al. 1996; Henderson and Kaplan 2005). However, 
Henderson and Kaplan (2005) assess both the underreporting of taxable income and the 
overreporting of tax deductions and find that the latter is rated more unethical than the 
former for actual taxpayers. Furthermore, the income scenarios are not significant for the 
relativism and contractualism dimensions o f the MES; however, when both income and 
deduction cases are simultaneously evaluated, all MES dimensions are significant. Their 
result concerning the disparity between income and deductions is similar to that of 
Groves (1958) which finds that farmers and landlords are reluctant to overreport 
deductions as compared with underreporting income.
Considering the previous research with respect to ethical evaluation, the following 
hypotheses are offered:
H4a: When income and deduction scenarios are simultaneously evaluated, all
three MES dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and contractualism) will be 
negatively related with tax evasion intentions.
H4b: When deduction scenarios are independently evaluated, all three MES 
dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and contractualism) will be negatively 
related with tax evasion intentions.
H4c: When income scenarios are independently evaluated, only the moral 
equity dimension of the MES will be negatively related with tax evasion 
intentions.
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To summarize the findings for the ethical evaluation hypotheses (i.e., Figures 5-7 
for religiousness and Figures 11-13 concerning morality), all postconventional moral 
capacity structural models (i.e., Models 14-16 representing the combined case, the 
deduction case, and the income case, respectively) generally support a negative 
association between each of the MES dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and 
contractualism) and tax evasion intentions. However, only the moral equity and 
relativism dimensions of the MES are significantly inversely related to probable tax 
evasive practices for religious orientation models (i.e., Models 1-3). Therefore, the study 
provides support for H4a when moral capacity is an antecedent to the ethical evaluation 
as measured by the MES, but not when religion precedes the ethical evaluation as 
indicated by the MES. Like Henderson and Kaplan (2005), this study finds that subjects 
respond differently when considering the income case and the deduction scenario. 
However, unlike Henderson and Kaplan (2005), the income case seems to be significant 
rather than the deduction case. Perhaps this finding results from differing participant 
characteristics. This study assesses student subjects (i.e., mean age = 24.2); whereas, 
Henderson and Kaplan (2005)’s participants are more mature (i.e., mean age = 37.2).
The Importance o f  Religiousness 
Across Moral Capacity Levels
Previous research indicates that the ROS and the DIT are distinct measures of 
religiousness and moral capacity, respectively. Perhaps these unique measures may 
combine to better predict behavioral intent (e.g., tax evasion intentions) than either single 
measure alone. Based on the preceding statements, the following research question is 
offered:
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RQ: The model of the ideological factors o f tax compliance will improve when
considering the ROS (i.e., intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness) in addition to the 
DIT (i.e., P-score, N2-score, etc.) above that o f the single construct alone (i.e., 
ROS or DIT).
Model improvement is evaluated via a two-fold assessment. First, factor structure 
invariance across postconventional moral capacity levels is examined by comparing the 
totally free model with the model of constrained measurement weights. The difference 
between the % and degrees of freedom is insignificant (p > .05) for Model 7, but not for 
Model 8 or Model 9. These results provide partial support for factor structure invariance 
which indicates that the combination o f the income and deduction scenarios has 
consistent factor weights across measures o f high and low postconventional reasoning.
Second, in addition to factor structure invariance, model R2 s may be compared to 
assess the quality o f the each models (Models 1-9) predictions. As indicated in Table 14, 
the R2 s for Models 1-3 (i.e., religious orientation models) are slightly lower than those of 
Models 4-6 (i.e., moral capacity models). Furthermore, R2 s for Models 7-9 (i.e., models 
combining religiousness and morality) for higher postconventional reasoning are lower 
than all other models, and R2 s for lower postconventional moral capacity are nearly as 
high as Models 4-6. Therefore, the moral capacity models (i.e., Models 4-6) seem to be 
more predictive not only considering the combined models (i.e., Models 7-9), but also the 
religiousness models (i.e., Models 1-3).
Implications
This study potentially contributes to the tax compliance literature in that it sets out 
to disentangle the underlying motivations for tax evasion intentions of intrinsic and
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extrinsic religious types with respect to the ethical evaluation dimensions (i.e., moral 
equity, relativism, contractualism, and utilitarianism). Based on the author’s research, this 
study is the first to simultaneously assess the interaction among religiousness 
operationalized by the ROS and the ethical evaluation of tax evasion intentions using the 
MES.
The study’s findings make two significant contributions to the tax compliance 
literature. First, intrinsic religiousness appears to be not only an important predictor of 
tax evasion intentions, but also an antecedent to the moral equity and deontological 
contractualism dimensions o f the MES. However, similar results are not found for 
extrinsic religiousness. Second, the models o f postconventional moral reasoning explain 
the ethical evaluation of tax evasion intentions better than either the religious orientation 
models or the models combining religiousness and morality. However, as predicted, the 
models of postconventional morality do not predict tax evasion intentions directly.
Limitations
The primary limitations o f this study are the use of students as proxies for U.S. 
taxpayers, a small sample size and poor model fit with respect to a few of the study’s 
assessed models. First, this study evaluates religious, ethical, moral, and tax compliance 
intentions o f undergraduate and graduate students. The average age of the respondents 
who participated in this study is 24.2 years old, while the approximate mean age of the 
U.S. taxpayer in 2010 was 44.9 years old (Hodge and McBride 2012). This may explain 
the inconsistent findings between this study and Henderson and Kaplan (2005). Both 
studies used the same measure to assess tax evasion intentions for an underreporting of 
income scenario and an overreporting of deduction case. Additionally, both studies’
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findings are statistically significant when the scenarios are combined. However, 
Henderson and Kaplan (2005) find significant results primarily for the deduction case; 
whereas, this study indicates compelling findings for the income scenario.
Second, the recommended sample size is ten respondents per estimated parameter 
(Hair et al. 2006; Byrne 2010). Models 1-3 each have 20 estimated items which yields a 
recommended sample size of 200 subjects rather than the 181 collected; however, Field 
2009 maintains that a sample size from five to ten subjects per measured parameter is 
acceptable with appropriate model fit. The fit o f Models 1-3 meets the suggested 
requirements for good fit; therefore, sample size does not appear to be an issue for these 
models. The actual sample size for Models 4-6 appears to be adequate in that the models 
only have twelve estimated items each resulting in a recommended sample size o f 120 
participants compared to the 128 collected. Models 7-9 compare higher moral capacity 
respondents with lower ones by splitting the DIT 2 sample (i.e., 128 subjects) at the mean 
resulting in two samples o f 64 participants each. Like Models 1-3, Models 7-9 have 20 
items to be estimated yielding from the low- to the high-end 100 and 200, respectively. 
However, Hair et al. (2006) indicate that with good model fit, even sample sizes o f those 
observed in Models 7-9 may be adequate. Fit statistics seem to be adequate for Models 7- 
9.
Last, the overall fit partially supports the measurement analysis for Models 4 - 6 .
2 2 The x /df is only less than 2.00 for Model 6 (i.e., income scenario); whereas, the % /d f for
Model 4 and Model 5 are 2.50 and 3.00, respectively which exceeds the rule o f thumb
(Hair et al. 2006; Byrnes 2010). The comparative fit index (CFI) is at least .91 for each
model for which Hair et al. (2006) and Byrnes (2010) agree that acceptable levels are
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above .9. Furthermore, the RMSE is below .08 for Model 6 (i.e., income scenario), but is 
.11 and .13 for Model 4 and Model 5, respectively. Statisticians suggest that the RMSE 
should be below .08 (Hair et al. 2006; Bymes 2010). Given the moderate model lit, 
especially for Model 4 and Model 5, concerns about model fit may limit the interpretation 
of the models’ results.
Future Research
Since the widening of the tax gap continues to be a concern for governments, 
continued research in the area of tax compliance is necessary; however, because o f the 
aforementioned limitations future research should include the following. To address the 
generalization of the research findings, a national sample of taxpayers should be assessed. 
If a split sample of higher and lower postconventional reasoning is to be evaluated, a 
sample size o f at least 400 respondents should be administered. Perhaps the combination 
of taking a national sample of taxpayers and increasing the sample may resolve issues 
pertaining to inadequate model fit.
Moreover, this study’s findings related to religiousness and postconventional 
morality seem promising. Future research should examine how general deterrence theory 
factors and/or fairness phenomenon interact with the ideological constructs of 
religiousness, morality and ethicality in predicting tax evasion intentions.
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APPENDIX A




C om puter Sale Scenario  I:
The Smiths purchased a new computer system for use in their business. The old system was sold to a friend 
as a home computer for $2,300 in cash. The Smiths fully depreciated the old computer system on prior tax 
returns, and they are aware that the $2,300 represents taxable income.
Action: Since the computer was sold to a friend for cash and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) would not 
be aware o f  the sale, the Smiths did not report the $2,300 cash received from the sale on their federal 
income tax return.
Please give your beliefs concerning the Sm iths’ action described in the scenario above by filling in the 
circle corresponding to your assessment.
Just O O O O o o o Unjust
Fair O O O O o o o Unfair
Morally Right O O O O o o o N ot M orally Right
Acceptable O  
to my Family
O O O o o o Unacceptable 
to my Family
Traditionally O  
Acceptable
O O O o o o Traditionally
Unacceptable
Culturally O  
Acceptable





O O O o o o Does not Violate 
an Unwritten Contract
Violates an O  
Unwritten Promise
The action
O O O o o o Does not Violate an 
Unwritten Promise
described above is
The probability o f  
getting caught 
cheating in this
Ethical O O o o o O  O  Unethical
tax situation is
The probability that 
my friends would 
undertake the
High O o o o o O  O  Low
same action is
The probability that 
I would undertake
High O o o o o O  O  Low
the same action is High O o o o o O  O  Low
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Business M eal Scenario  2:
The Browns started a business where they frequently incur expenses for business-related meals and 
entertainment. Because o f  the nature o f  their business, the Browns routinely save all o f  their receipts for 
meals and entertainment. While preparing their tax return, the Browns find that, in addition to their 
business receipts, they have accumulated enough personal meals and entertainment receipts to falsely 
support an additional $2,300 deduction.
Action: Since falsely reporting the personal meals and entertainm ent receipts for business would probably 
not be detected by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Browns took the additional false $2,300 
deduction on their federal income tax return.
Please give your beliefs concerning the action o f  the dealer described in the scenario by filling in the circle 
corresponding to your assessment.
Just O O O o o o o Unjust
Fair O O O o o o o Unfair
Morally Right 
Right
O O O o o o o Not Morally
Acceptable to my 
Family








O O o o o o o Culturally
Unacceptable
Violates an
an Unwritten Contract 
Contract






O O o o o o o Does not Violate 
Unwritten
described above is Ethical O
Probability o f  
getting caught 
cheating in this
O o o o o o Unethical
tax situation is High
Probability that 
my friends would 
undertake the
O O o o o o o Low
same action is High
Probability that 
I would undertake
O O o o o o o Low
the same action is High O O o o o o o Low
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Thank you for participating in this survey. Your participation is vital to the success o f  this research. This 
study is concerned with how people view the social problem s and issues o f  taxation. YOUR RESPONSES 
ARE COMPLETELY ANONYMOUS.
Please provide the following information about yourself:
What is your grade point average (GPA)? __ . __
What is your undergraduate major?
O  Accounting
O  Computer Information Systems 
O  Economics 
O  Finance 
O  Management 
O  Marketing
O  Other _________________
Please respond to the following statements based on the scale below:
N ever Seldom Somewhat Always Not
Agree Rarely Agree Neutral Agree Usually Agree Applicable
Have you com pleted an ethics course?
O  Yes O  No
Have you ever filed a federal income tax return? 











I enjoy reading about my religion.
© ® ® ® © ® ©
I go to a place o f  worship because it helps me make friends.( D ® ® ® © ® © ®
It doesn’t matter what I believe so long as 1 am good.
© ® ® ® ® © @ ®
4. It is important to me to spend time in private thought and prayer.
® ® ® ® ® © ®
1 have often had a strong sense o f  G od’s presence.
® © ® ® ® ® ®
®
I pray mainly to gain relief and protection.
© © © @ © ® © ®
1 try hard to live all my life according to my religious beliefs.
© @ @ ® © ® © ®  
What religion offers me most is comfort in times o f  trouble and sorrow.
® © @ ® © ® ® ®
Prayer is for peace and happiness.
© © © ® © ® ©
Although I am religious, I don’t let it affect my daily life.
© © © ® © ® ©
®
®
I go to a place o f  worship mostly to spend time with my friends. 
® © @ ® © ® @ ®
My whole approach to life is based on my religion.
© ® ® ® ® ® © ®
Although I believe in my religion, many other things are more important in life. 
© ® @ @ ® ® © ®
APPENDIX C 
FIVE DILEMMA DIT-2 INSTRUMENT
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This portion of the survey is divided into five stories about specific social problems.
After each story, there will be a list of questions. The questions that follow each story 
represent different issues that might be raised by the problem. You will be asked to rate 
and rank the questions in terms of how important each one seems to you when making 
your decision.
Example of the task:
Imagine you are about to vote for a candidate for the Presidency of the United States. 
Before you vote, you are asked to rate the importance of five issues you could consider in 
deciding who to vote for. Rate the importance of each item (issue) by checking the 
appropriate box.
Rate the following issues in terms of importance:
Great Much Some Little None
1. Financially are you personally better o ff  now □ □ □ □ □
than you were four years ago?
2. Does one candidate have a superior moral □ □ □ □ □
character?
3. Which candidate stands the tallest? □ □ □ □ □
4. Which candidate would make the best □ □ □ □ □
world leader?
5 . Which candidate has the best ideas for our □ □ □ □ □
country’s internal problems, like crime and 
health care?
Note. Some items may seem irrelevant or do not make sense (as possibly in item #3). In 
that case, rate the item as "None". After you rate all o f the items you will be asked to 
RANK the TOP FOUR ITEMS in terms of importance. Note that it makes sense that the 
items you rate as most important should be RANKED high as well. So if you only rated 
Item 1 as having great importance, you should rank it as most important.
Consider the five issues above and rank the FOUR ISSUES that are most important:
Most important issue? 1. □ 2. □ 3. □ 4. □ 5. □
Second most important? 1. □ 2. □ 3. □ 4. □ 5. □
Third most important? 1. □ 2. □ 3. □ 4. □ 5. □
Fourth most important? 1. □ 2. □ 3. □ 4. □ 5. □
Again, remember to consider all o f the items before you rank the four most important 
items and be sure that you only rank items that you found important.
Note also that before you begin to rate and rank items you will be asked to state your 
preference for what action to take in the story.
Thank you and you may begin the questionnaire!
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Story 1 Famine
The small village in Northern India has experienced shortages of food before, but this 
year’s famine is worse than ever. Some families are even trying to feed themselves by 
making soup from tree bark. Mustaq Singh’s family is near starvation. He has heard that 
a rich man in his village has supplies o f food stored away and is hoarding food while its 
price goes higher so that he can sell the food later at a huge profit. Mustaq is desperate 
and thinks about stealing some food from the rich man’s warehouse. The smalt amount of 
food that he needs for his family probably would not even be missed.
Do you favor the action o f taking food?
□  Should take the food □  Cannot decide □  Should not take the food
Rate the following issues in terms o f importance:
Great Much Some Little None
1. Is Mustaq Singh courageous enough to risk 
getting caught for stealing?
□ □ □ □ □
2. Is it not only natural for a loving father to care 
so much for his family that he would steal?
□ □ □ □ □
3. Should not the com m unity’s laws be upheld? □ □ □ □ □
4. Does Mustaq Singh know a  good recipe for 
preparing soup from tree bark?
□ □ □ □ □
5. Does the rich man have any legal rights to store 
when other people are starving?
□ □ □ □ □
6. Is the motive o f  Mustaq Singh to steal for 
him self or to steal for his family?
□ □ □ □ □
7. What values are going to be the basis for 
social cooperation?
□ □ □ □ □
8. Is the epitome o f eating reconcilable with the 
guilt o f  stealing?
□ □ □ □ □
9. Does the rich man deserve to be robbed for 
being so greedy?
□ □ □ □ □
10. Is not private property an institution to enable 
to enable the rich to steal from the poor?
□ □ □ □ □
11. W ould stealing bring about more total good 
for everybody concerned or wouldn’t it?
□ □ □ □ □
12. Are laws getting in the way o f the most basic 
claim o f  any member o f  a society?
□ □ □ □ □
Consider the 12 issues above and rank the FOUR ISSUES that are most important:
Most important issue? 1. □ 2. □ 3. □ 4. □ 5. □ 6. □ 7. □ 8. □ 9. □ 10. □ 11. □ 12. □
Second most important? 1. □ 2. □ 3. □ 4. □ 5. □ 6. □ 7. □ 8. □ 9. □ 10. □ 11. □ 12. □
Third most important? l . D 2. □ 3. □ 4. □ 5. □ 6. □ 7. □ 8. □ 9. □ 10. □ 11. □ 12. □
Fourth most important? 1. □ 2. □ 3. □ 4. □ 5. □ 6. □ 7. □ 8. □ 9. □ 10. □ 11. □ 12. □
Story 2 Reporter
Molly Dayton has been a news reporter for the Gazette newspaper for over a decade. 
Almost by accident she learned that one of the candidates for Lieutenant Governor for her 
state, Grover Thompson, had been arrested for shop-lifting 20 years earlier. Reporter 
Dayton found out that early in his life, Candidate Thompson has undergone a confused 
period and done things he later regretted, actions which would be very out o f character
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now. His shoplifting had been a minor offense and charges had been dropped by the 
department store. Thompson has not only straightened himself out since then, but built a 
distinguished record in helping many people and in leading constructive community 
projects. Now, Reporter Dayton regards Thompson as the best candidate in the field and 
likely to go on to important leadership positions in the state. Reporter Dayton wonders 
whether or not she should write the story about Thompson’s earlier troubles because in 
the upcoming close and heated election, she fears that such a news story could wreck 
Thompson’s chance to win.
Do you favor the action of reporting the story?
□  Should report the story □  Cannot decide □  Should not report the story
Rate the following issues in terms o f importance:
1. Doesn’t the public have a right to know all the 
facts about all the candidates for office?
2. Would publishing the story help Reporter 
Dayton’s reputation for investigative reporting?
3. If  Dayton does not publish the story, w ouldn’t? 
another reporter get the story anyway and get 
the credit for investigative reporting?
4. Since voting is such a joke anyway, does it 
make any difference what reporter Dayton does?
5. Hasn’t Thompson shown in the past 20 years 
that he is a better person than his earlier days as 
a shoplifter?
6. What would best service society?
7. If  the story is true, how can it be wrong to 
report it?
8. How could reporter Dayton be so cruel and 
heartless as to report the damaging story about 
candidate Thompson?
9. Does the right o f “habeas corpus” apply in 
this case?
10. Would the election process be more fair with 
or without reporting the story?
11. Should reporter Dayton treat all candidates for 
office in the same way by reporting everything 
she learns about them good or bad?
12. Isn’t it a  reporter’s duty to report all the news 
claim o f any member o f a society? 
regardless o f  the circumstances?
Consider the 12 issues above and rank the FOUR ISSUES that are most important:
Most important issue? 1. □ 2. □ 3. □ 4. □ 5. □ 6. □ 7. □ 8. □ 9. □ 10. □ 11. □ 12. □
Second most important? 1. □ 2. □ 3. □ 4. □ 5. □ 6. □ 7. □ 8. □ 9. □ 10. □ 11. □ 12. □
Third most important? 1. □ 2. □ 3. □ 4. □ 5. □ 6. □ 7. □ 8. □ 9. □ 10. □ 11. □ 12. □
Fourth most important? 1. □ 2. □ 3. □ 4. □ 5. □ 6. □ 7. □ 8. □ 9. □ 10. □ 11. □ 12. □
G re a t M uch Some L ittle None
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
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Story 3 School Board
Mr. Grant has been elected to the School Board District 190 and was chosen to be 
chairman. The district is bitterly divided over the closing of one of the high schools. One 
of the high schools has to be closed for financial reasons, but there is no agreement over 
which school to close. During his election to the School Board, Mr. Grant had proposed a 
series o f “Open Meetings” in which members of the community could voice their 
opinions. He hoped that dialogue would make the community realize the necessity of 
closing one high school. Also, he hoped that through open discussions, the difficulty o f 
the decision would be appreciated, and that the community would ultimately support the 
school board decision. The first “Open Meeting” was a disaster. Passionate speeches 
dominated the microphones and threatened violence. The meeting barely closed without 
fist-fights. Later in the week, school board members received threatening phone calls.
Mr. Grant wonders if he ought to call off the next “Open Meeting.”
Do you favor the action of calling off the next “Open Meeting”?
□  Should call o ff the next open meeting □  Cannot decide □  Should have the next open meeting 
Rate the following issues in terms o f  importance:
1. Is Mr. Grant required by law to have “Open 
Meetings “on major school board decisions?
□ □ □ □ □
2, Would Mr. Grant be breaking his election campaign 
promises to the community by discontinuing the 
“Open Meetings”?
□ □ □ □ □
3. W ould the community be even angrier with 
Mr. Grant if  he stopped the “Open M eetings”?
□ □ □ □ □
4. W ould the change in plans prevent scientific 
assessment?
□ □ □ □ □
5. If the school board is threatened, does the chairman □  
have the legal authority to protect the Board by making 
decisions in closed meetings?
□ □ □ □
6. Would the community regard Mr. Grant as a 
coward if  he stopped the open meetings?
□ □ □ □ □
7. Does Mr. Grant have another procedure in mind for 
ensuring that divergent views are heard?
□ □ □ □ □
8. Does Mr. Grant have the authority to expel 
troublemakers from the meetings or prevent 
them from making long speeches?
□ □ □ □ □
9. Are some people deliberately undermining the 
school board process by playing some sort o f  
power game?
□ □ □ □ □
10. What effect would stopping the discussion have 
on the community’s ability to handle controversial 
issues in the future?
□ □ □ □ □
11. Is the trouble coming from only a few hotheads 
and is the community in general really 
fair-minded and democratic?
□ □ □ □ □
12. What is the likelihood that a good decision 
could be made without open discussion from 
the community?
□ □ □ □ □
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Consider the 12 issues above and rank the FOUR ISSUES that are m ost important:
Most important issue? 1. □  2. □  3. □  4. □  5. □  6. □  7. □  8. □  9. □  10. □  l l . D  12. □
Second most important? 1. □  2. □  3. □  4. □  5. □  6. □  7. □  8. □  9. □  10. □  11. □  12. □
Third most important? 1. □  2. □  3. □  4. □  5. □  6. □  7. □  8. □  9. □  10. □  11. □  12. □
Fourth most important? 1. □  2. □  3. □  4. □  5. □  6. □  7. □  8. □  9. □  10. □  11. □  12. □
Story 4 Cancer
Mrs. Bennett is 62 years old, and in the last phases of colon cancer. She is in terrible pain 
and asks the doctor to give her more pain-killer medicine. The doctor has given her the 
maximum safe dose already and is reluctant to increase the dosage because it would 
probably hasten her death. In a clear and rational mental state, Mrs. Bennett says that she 
realizes this; but she wants to end her suffering even if  it means ending her life. Should 
the doctor give her an increased dosage?
Do you favor the action of giving more medicine?
□  Should give Mrs. Bennett increased dosage □  Cannot decide □  Should not give Mrs. Bennett 
increased dosage
Rate the following issues in terms o f  importance:
Great IVIiich !Some Little Non
1. Isn’t the doctor obligated by the same laws as everyone □ □ □ □ □
else if  giving an overdose would be the same as killing
her?
2. W ouldn’t society be better o ff without so many laws □ □ □ □ □
about what doctors can and cannot do?
3. If Mrs. Bennett dies, would the doctor be legally □ □ □ □ □
responsible for malpractice?
4. Does the family o f  Mrs. Bennett agree that she should □ □ □ □ □
get more painkiller medicine?
5. Is the painkiller medicine an active heliotropic drug? □ □ □ □ □
6. Does the state have the right to force continued existence □ □ □ □ □
o f those who do not want to live?
7. Is helping end another’s life ever a responsible act o f □ □ □ □ □
cooperation?
8. Would the doctor show more sympathy for Mrs. Bennett □ □ □ □ □
by giving the medicine or not?
9. Would not the doctor feel guilty from giving Mrs. Bennett □ □ □ □ □
so much drug that she died?
10. Should only God decide when a person’s life should end? □ □ □ □ □
11. Shouldn’t society protect everyone against being killed? □ □ □ □ □
12. Where should society draw the line between protecting □ □ □ □ □
life and allowing someone to die if  the person wants to?
Consider the 12 issues above and rank the FOUR ISSUES that are most important:
Most important issue? 1. □  2. □  3. □  4. □  5. □  6. □  7. □ 8. □  9. □ 10. □ 11. □ 12. □
Second most important? 1. □  2. □  3. □  4. □  5. □  6. □  7. □ 8. □  9. □ 10. □ 11. □ 12. □
Third most important? 1. □  2. □  3. □  4. □  5. □  6. □  7. □ 8. □  9. □ 10. □ 11. □ 12. □
Fourth most important? ! . □  2. □  3. □  4. □  5. □  6. □  7. □ 8. □  9. □ 10. □ 11. □ 12. □
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Story 5 Demonstration
Political and economic instability in a South American country prompted the President of 
the United States to send troops to “police” the area. Students at many campuses in the 
U.S.A have protested that the United States is using its military might for economic 
advantage. There is widespread suspicion that big oil multinational companies are 
pressuring the President to safeguard a cheap oil supply even if it means loss o f life. 
Students at one campus took to the streets in demonstrations, tying up traffic and 
stopping regular business in town. The president o f the university demanded that the 
students stop their illegal demonstrations. Students then took over the college’s
administration building, completely paralyzing the college. Are the student’s right to
demonstrate in these ways?
Do you favor the action of demonstrating in this way?
□  Should dem onstrate  this way □  Cannot decide □  Should no t dem onstra te  this way
Rate the following issues in terms o f  importance:
Great Much Some Little Norn
1. Do the students have any right to take over □ □ □ □ □
property that does not belong to them?
2. Do the students realize that they might be □ □ □ □ □
arrested and fined, and even expelled from 
school?
3. Are the students serious about their cause or are □ □ □ □ □
they just doing it ju st for fun?
4. If the university president is soft on students □ □ □ □ □
this time, will it lead to more disorder?
5. Will the public blame all students for the □ □ □ □ □
actions o f  a few student demonstrators?
6. Are the authorities to blame by giving in to the □ □ □ □ □
greed o f  the multinational oil companies?
7. Why should a few people like Presidents and □ □ □ □ □
business leaders have more power than 
ordinary people?
8. Does this student demonstration bring about □ □ □ □ □
more or less good in the long run to all people? 
9. Can the students justify  their civil disobedience? □ □ □ □ □
10. Shouldn’t the authorities be respected by □ □ □ □ □
students?
11. Is taking over the building consistent with □ □ □ □ □
principles o f  justice?
12. Isn’t it everyone’s duty to obey the law whether □ □ □ □ □
one likes it or not?
Consider the 12 issues above and rank the FOUR ISSUES that are most important: 
Most important issue? 1. □  2. □  3. □  4. □  5. □  6. □  7. □  8. □  9. □  10. □ 11. □ 12. □
Second most important? 1. □  2. □  3. □  4. □  5. □ 6. □  7. □ 8. □  9. □  10. □ 11. □ 12. □
Third most important? 1. □  2. □  3. □  4. □  5. □ 6. □  7. □ 8. □  9. □  10. □ 11. □ 12. □
Fourth most important? 1. □  2. □  3. □  4. □  5. □ 6. □  7. □ 8. □  9. □  10. □ 11. □ 12. □
APPENDIX D 
HUMAN USE APPROVAL LETTERS
177
LOUISIA N A  T E C H
U N  I V E R S I T Y
M E M O R A N D U M
OFFICE OF UNIVERSITY RESEARCH
TO: Mr. Fred Coleman and Dr. Thomas Phillips
FROM: Barbara Talbot, University Research
SUBJECT: HUM AN USE COM M ITTEE REVIEW
DATE: June 23, 2011
In order to facilitate your project, an EXPEDITED REVIEW  has been done for your proposed study
The proposed study’s revised procedures w ere found to provide reasonable and adequate safeguards 
against possible risks involving hum an subjects. The information to be collected m ay be personal in 
nature or implication. Therefore, diligent care needs to be taken to protect the privacy o f  the participants 
and to assure that the data are kept confidential. Informed consent is a critical part o f  the research 
process The subjects m ust be inform ed that their participation is voluntary. It is important that consent 
materials be presented in a language understandable to every participant. I f  you have participants in your 
study whose first language is not English, be sure that informed consent materials are adequately 
explained or translated. Since your reviewed project appears to do no dam age to the participants, the 
Human Use Committee grants approval o f  the involvement o f  human subjects as outlined.
Projects should be renew ed annually. This approval was finalized on June 23, 2011 and this project will 
need to receive a continuation review by the IRB i f  the project, including data analysis, continues 
beyond June 23, 2012. Any discrepancies in procedure or changes that have been made including 
approved changes should be noted in the review application. Projects involving NIH funds require annual 
education training to be  documented. For more information regarding this, contact the Office o f 
University Research.
You are requested to maintain written records o f  your procedures, data collected, and subjects involved 
These records will need to be available upon request during the conduct o f  the study and retained by the 
university for three years after the conclusion o f  the study. If  changes occur in recruiting o f  subjects, 
informed consent process or in your research protocol, or i f  unanticipated problem s should arise it is the 
Researchers responsibility to notify the OITice o f  Research or IRB in w riting The project should be 
discontinued until modifications can be reviewed and approved.
If  you have any questions, please contact Dr. M ary Livingston at 257-4315.
entitled:
“G eneral D eterrence T heory and the Defining Issues T est:...”
HUC 878
A M EM BER OF I H E UNIVERSITY O r  L O U ISIA N A  SY STEM
P.O. BOX 3052 • RU STO N, LA 71 ’ 72 •  TELEPHONE (318) J57-5075 •  FAX (318) 257-5079
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L O U I S I A N A  T E C H
U N I V E R S I T Y
O F F IC E  O F  U N IV E R S IT Y  R E S E A R C H
M EM ORANDUM
TO: Mr. Fred Coleman and Dr. Thomas Phillips
FROM: Barbara Talbot, University Research
SUBJECT: HUMAN USE COM M ITTEE REVIEW
DATE: June 20, 2012
In order to facilitate your project, an EXPEDITED REV IEW  has been done for your proposed 
study entitled:
The proposed study’s revised procedures were found to provide reasonable and adequate 
safeguards against possible risks involving human subjects. The information to be collected may 
be personal in nature or implication. Therefore, diligent care needs to be taken to protect the 
privacy o f  the participants and to assure that the data are kept confidential. Informed consent is a 
critical part o f  the research process. The subjects m ust be informed that their participation is 
voluntary. It is important that consent materials be presented in a language understandable to 
every participant. If you have participants in your study whose first language is not English, be 
sure that informed consent materials are adequately explained or translated. Since your reviewed 
project appears to do no damage to the participants, the Human Use Committee grants approval 
o f  the involvement o f human subjects as outlined.
Projects should be renewed annually. This approval was finalized on June 20, 2012 and this 
project will need to receive a continuation review by the IRB i f  the project, including data 
analysis, continues beyond June 20, 2013. A ny discrepancies in procedure or changes that have 
been made including approved changes should be noted in the review application. Projects 
involving NIH funds require annual education training to be docum ented. For m ore information 
regarding this, contact the Office o f  University Research.
You are requested to maintain written records o f  your procedures, data collected, and subjects 
involved. These records will need to be available upon request during the conduct o f  the study 
and retained by the university for three years after the conclusion o f  the study. If  changes occur 
in recruiting o f  subjects, informed consent process or in your research protocol, or i f  
unanticipated problems should arise it is the Researchers responsibility to notify the Office o f  
Research or IRB in writing. The project should be discontinued until modifications can be 
reviewed and approved.
If you have any questions, please contact Dr. Mary Livingston at 257-4315.
A M E M B E R  O F T i l t  UNIVERSITY OF L O U ISIA N A  SYSTEM
“The Effects of Ideology on the Likelihood of Income Tax Compliance”
HUC 982
P.O. BOX 3092 • RUSTON, LA 71272 •  TELEPHONE (318) 257-5075 • FAX (318) 257-5079
•\.N EQUAL O PPO RTU NITY  U N IV ERSITY
